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Shiro Ishikawa
Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Science and Technology, Keio University,
3-14-1 Hiyoshi, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-8522 Japan (E-Mail: ishikawa@math.keio.ac.jp)
The philosophy of science is a discipline concerning the metaphysical aspect of science. Recently, I
proposed measurement theory, which is characterized as the metaphysical and linguistic interpretation of
quantum mechanics. I assert that this theory is one of the most fundamental languages in science, and
thus, it is located at the central position in science. This assertion will be examined throughout this
preprint, which is written as the draft of my future book (concerning the philosophy of science). Hence, I
hope to hear various opinions about this draft.
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Measurement theory is composed of two axioms as follows.
measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom 1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
And it has the following classification:
(Y)
Chap. 1
measurement theory
(scientific language)

quantum measurement 6© : Chap. 3
classical measurement

continuous
{
pure type 1© : (Chaps. 2–9)
mixed type 2© : Sec.4.4
bounded
{
pure type 3© : Chaps. 10, 11
mixed type 4© : Notes 10.4, 11.3
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For the section in which each axiom is explained, see the following table: In this preprint, we mainly
Axiom 1 Axiom 2
1©:continuous·pure Sec. 2.2 (Axiompc 1) Sec. 6.4 (Axiompmc 2)
2©:continuous·mixed Sec. 4.4 (Axiommc 1) ditto
3©:bounded·pure Sec. 10.1 (Axiommb 1) Sec. 11.3 (Axiompmb 2)
4©:bounded·mixed Sec. 10.4 (Axiompb 1) ditto
5©:trial Sec. 4.1 (Axiom(T)1) many opinions
6©:quantum Sec. 3.1 (Axiom(Q)1) (cf. [32])
devote ourselves to classical pure measurement theory ( 1© and 3©).
1 Measurement Theory born from Quantum Mechanics
Measurement theory is characterized as a language created in order to describe ordinary phenomena numer-
ically, though it is oriented in quantum mechanics. In this chapter, the outline of two axioms (i.e., Axiom 1
(in Chap. 2) and Axiom 2 (in Chap. 5) ) will be introduced.
1.1 Why do we start from quantum mechanics?
We think that readers, who read the abstract, ask the following:
(A1) Why is quantum mechanics (i.e., the physics concerning the microscopic world) applicable to the
description of ordinary phenomena (i.e., economics, psychology, electric engineering, etc. ) ? Or,
why is the quantum mechanical approach (i.e., measurement theory) indispensable? That is, why
does measurement theory — quantum mechanical language — hold? Further, is there another
approach?
Although the problem will be answered here and there in this print, our answers are not sufficient. However,
we are convinced that the readers, who read the whole of this print, agree to the following opinion:
(A2) Measurement theory — quantum mechanical approach — is most natural. And, there is no powerful
rival against measurement theory.
The worst understanding of measurement theory is to consider measurement theory as ”an ass in a lion’s
skin”. In this preprint, we consistently assert (cf. [13]) that measurement theory is more fundamental
than quantum mechanics (cf. Sec.9.3).
1.1.1 The classical mechanical world-view
Before we explain the quantum mechanical world-view (i.e., measurement theory ), in this section we
discuss the classical mechanical approach and its problems.
The law is most essential in physics, and moreover, there is no physics without the law. However, the
language should be prepared before the is declared. In this sense, physics has the following structure:
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(B) [physics] := [language] + [law]
(
=
(law)
language
)
For example, consider Newtonian mechanics If we do not know how to use the term ”causality” (i.e.,
”time”, ”space”, ”velocity”, ”acceleration” and so on), then we can not declare ”the law of Newton kinetic
equation”. That is, Newtonian mechanics has the following structure:
(C) Newtonian mechanics :=
(Newtonkinetic equation)
how to use the term ”causality”
This means that the linguistic aspect is valid without the test of the law. Consider Newton mechanics(C).
the time variable differential equation is valid independently whether the law is true or not. That is,
(D) Newton mechanics
without verification experiment−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
linguistic aspect
how to use ”causality”
[differential equation]
And, applying differential equation to lots of phenomena, you get the belief such that
differential equation is quite applicable to sciences and engineering. (In this preprint, we consider
that ”sciences = engineering”(cf. Note 1.2, Note 1.11, Sec.8.1(m)). ).
If you get this belief, it may be called the causal world-view. The general form of differential equation
is represented by the system of differential equation (which is called the state equation):
state equation :=

dω1
dt (t) = v1(ω1(t), ω2(t), . . . , ωn(t), t)
dω2
dt (t) = v2(ω1(t), ω2(t), . . . , ωn(t), t)· · · · · ·
dωn
dt (t) = vn(ω1(t), ω2(t), . . . , ωn(t), t)
(1.1)
Therefore,
(E1) the causal world-view (state equation method) is the spirit that every motion phenomena should
be represented by state equation(1.1), or the spirit to believe that, if a certain phenomenon is
represented by state equation(1.1), it has the causality (cf. Sec.6.1.2(c))
And further, the state equation method acquires the concept of ”probability”, we get
(E2) dynamical system theory(=statistics)
(Here, we consider that ”dynamical system theory = statistics”(cf. Sec.7.1). ). This is the classical
mechanical world-view method, whose starting point is Newtonian mechanics.
This classical mechanical world-view method, in which Newtonian mechanics is regarded as the starting
point, we have acquired a great success. Since there is no science without statistics( that is, differential
equation, probability ). the classical mechanical world-view (=statistics·dynamical system theory) is a
base supporting present age science
However, there are points of uncertainty in the classical mechanical method. For example, the following
problems (F1)–(F5) are considered:.
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(F1) What kind of theory is statistics? That is, is it ”mathematics”, ”mathematical method”, ”applied
mathematics”, ”world-view”, ”language” (and so on) ?
(F2) Why is the concept of ”probability” added to the state equation method? That is, why does classical
world-view have two birthplaces (i.e., Newtonian mechanics and gamble)?
(F3) The concept of ”probability” could be added to the state equation method. If it be so, some may
want to add another concept (e.g., fuzzy, chaos, etc.). Is it possible?
In other words,
(F4) Is the development (from the state equation method to statistics) inevitable?
which is outstanding point. And further, we have the following most fundamental question:
(F5) Why is mathematical theories differential equation and probability applicable to the description of
ordinary phenomena?
♠ Note 1.1 Since language has not fully been prepared yet, this question (F5) may be a vague expression.
But, there is a reason to consider that
(♯1) the useful mathematical theory that has the reason to be useful. That is, the powerful mechanical world
view is hidden behind a useful mathematical theory.
Because mathematic itself is independent of world. Thus, world-description method is indispensable. For
example,
mathematics world-description method
differential geometry the theory of relativity
differential equation Newton mechanics, electromagnetism
Hilbert space quantum mechanics
Problem (F5) is equivalent to the following:
(♯2) Behind hat kind of world-description is probability theory? hidden
1.1.2 Start from quantum mechanics and not Newtonian mechanics
When we start from Newtonian mechanics, we have nuisances such as (F1)–(F5): Thus, we start from
quantum mechanics. That is,
(G) measurement theory is a scientific language modeled on quantum mechanics.
Now, let us explain it.
As mentioned later (in Chap. 3), quantummechanics, which was discovered by Heisenberg, Schro¨dinger,
Born in 1925–1927, is physics for the microscopic world. quantum mechanics is composed of two laws
(i.e., ”Born’s probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics” and ”quantum kinetic equation (due to
Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger)” ). That is,
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(H) quantum mechanics
(physics)
:= measurement
(Born’s probabilistic interpretation)
+ causality
( quantum kinetic equation)
As the linguistic turn of quantum mechanics, we get measurement theory — quantum mechanical
world-view(G) — as follows:
(I) quantum mechanics
(physics)
verbalizing−−−−−−−−−→
linguistic turn
measurement theory
(scientific language)
Quantum mechanics is physics for microscopic phenomena. However, its linguistic turn (=measurement
theory) has a power to describe phenomena in our usual world.
Measurement theory is quite simple language, which has two key-words (i.e., ”measurement” and
”causality”).
(J) (J1) measurement ( use its items; observer, measuring object, state, observable (≈measuring
instrument), measured value , probability ) following Axiom 1(Sec. 2.2)
(J2) causality ( use the words: semi-ordered tree, causal operator ) following Axiom 2(Sec.
6.4)
Writing diagrammatically,
(K) measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom 1]
measurement (J1) +
[Axiom 2]
causality (J2)
where scientific language must be distinguished A from B ordinary language and mathematics (=math-
ematical language).
Here, the quantum mechanical world-view method (=measurement theory) clarifies classical mechanical
problems (F1)–(F5) in what follows( (F
′
1)–(F
′
5)):
(F′1) measurement theoryis a world-description language (i.e., scientific language )
(F′2) The source of measurement theory is quantum mechanics.
(F′3) If some try to add a basic concept to measurement theory, they must start to add the basic concept
to quantum mechanics. Therefore, we can assure that the trial is impossible.
(F′4) As mentioned in Fig. 8.2 in Chap. 8, we assert:
the development from the causal world-view(E1) to classical mechanical world-view(E2) is not
inevitable
Also, we can do well without ”gamble”.
The reason that the problems (F1)–(F4) are solved is due to the fact that quantum mechanics itself
possesses the concept ”probability”.
If it be so, there may be a reason to choose measurement theory — quantum mechanical world-view
method —, however, it is a matter of course that
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(L1) in every theory, the most important thing is to determine the starting point.
Thus, an immediate conclusion. should be avoided. However, from the above (F′1)–(F
′
4) we assert that
(L2) statistics·dynamical system theory (classical mechanical world-view) is the abbreviation of measure-
ment theory (quantum mechanical world-view method)
And thus, The question (♯2) in (F5)(=Note 1.1) — Why are the mathematical theories (i.e., differential
equation and probability theory) are useful? — is answered as follows
(F′5) measurement theory is hidden behind these mathematical theories
♠ Note 1.2 In this print, we assert that
measurement theory= the language of engineering (or, sciences)
That is, (L2) — statistics·dynamical system theory is immature, and measurement theory is mature — says
that
measurement theory makes engineering (or, sciences) mature
(Note 1.12).
1.1.3 Why does measurement theory hold?
If we believe in the argument mentioned in the previous section (i.e., the quantum mechanical world-
view(K) is superior to classical mechanical world-view(E2) ), increasingly we want to answer (A1) :
(A1) Why is quantum mechanics (i.e., the physics concerning the microscopic world) applicable to the
description of ordinary phenomena (i.e., economics, psychology, electric engineering, etc. ) ? Or,
why is the quantum mechanical approach (i.e., measurement theory) indispensable? That is, why
does measurement theory — quantum mechanical language — hold? Further, is there another
approach?
Of course, we do not have the absolute answer. Thus we want to add the following discussion: For
example, consider
the statement such as ”even monkeys fall from trees”
This is the famous proverb in Japan. This is the same as the proverb ”Even Homer sometimes nods” or ”A
good swimmer is not safe against drowning”. The statement ”Even monkeys fall from trees”, which must
have described the actual phenomenon, is isolated from reality. And the statement becomes the proverb
”Even monkeys fall from trees”. Writing diagrammatically,
the spirit:”world is before language”
Even monkeys fall from trees
( Wording describing the actual phenomenon )
−−−−−−−−−→
proverbalizing
the spirit:”language is before world”
Even monkeys fall from trees
( Wording separated from reality )
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As in the above, ”proverbalizing” means that the order of the ”world” and ”language” is reversed. That
is, the proverb ”Even monkeys fall from trees ” can be applicable to different world (which is not related
to ”monkey” nor ”tree”). This is
(M1) Wonder of man’s linguistic competence
This cannot but accept as a fact.
Thus, measurement theory is characterize as the linguistic turn. That is, rewriting (I):
(M2)
(=(I))
(the terms in (J) connect reality )
quantum mechanics(H)
(physics)
proverbalizing−−−−−−−−−−−→
the linguistic turn
(the terms in (J) have no reality)
measurement theory(K)
(scientific language)
Quantum mechanics is physics for microscopic world, however, its linguistic turn (i.e., measurement theory)
can describe ordinary world.
1.1.4 Two world-description method — realistic vs. linguistic
It is a matter of course that
(M3) The essence of the proverb is not “experimental verification” but “usability”
And further,
(N) measurement theory is based on the spirit of ”language is before world”
♠ Note 1.3 metaphysics is an academic discipline concerning the propositions in which empirical validation
is impossible. Lord Kelvin(1824–1907) said that
Mathematics is the only good metaphysics.
This is very persuasive saying. However, Our purpose is
(♯) to establish metaphysics(called measurement theory) as a discipline which forms the base
of science
If it be so, the world-description is classified as follows.
(O) world-description

1©realistic method(In the beginning was the ”world”)
physical phenomena are directly described in mathematics.
physics is created by this method.
The law is main
”world is before language”.
2©linguistic method(In the beginning was the ”word”)
Phenomena are described in a scientific language.
Variuos sciences are created by this method
The scientific law and the scientific laguage are main
As a scientific language, measurent thorey is adoptted
”language is before world”.
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The linguistic method is, for the first time, established my measurement theory, and thus it is a new
world-description method. Thus, for completeness, we add the following two notes.
♠ Note 1.4 For example, assume that you want to understand some economical phenomenon P . For this,
consider the following four methods (a)–(d):
(a) you exactly measure the economical phenomenon P , and represent it mathematically. Then, you can
create a certain economical theory Ta.
(b) First we decide use the mathematical theory (differential equation, probability theory). you exactly
measure the economical phenomenon P , and represent it by the above mathematics. Then, you can
create a certain economical theory Tb.
(c) First we decide use statistics (=dynamical system theory). you exactly measure the economical language
before world P , and represent it by the above mathematics. Then, you can create a certain economical
theory Tc.
(d) First we decide use measurement theory. you exactly measure the economical phenomenon P , and
describe it by measurement theory. Then, you can create a certain economical theory Td. This is the
linguistic method.
Note that the economical phenomenon P is common. Thus, if each (a)–(d) is the fully considered theory, we
can expect that Ta = Tb = Tc = Td.
(e) if Ta = Tb = Tc = Td, then we can consider that it is created by (d).
However, the theory of relativity can not be understood in measurement theory i.e., in the linguistic method).
Also, as seen in Chap. 9, it is interesting to see that T ′c 6= T ′d in equilibrium statistical statistics. In this case,
we assert that T ′d should be adopted.
♠ Note 1.5 If some may regard ”realistic method vs. linguistic method” (the world-description classification
(O)) as ”materialism vs. idealism” in philosophy, they never accept ”linguistic method”. However, we think
that ”linguistic method” is acceptable for everyone. As mentioned in Chap. 8, we think that
(♯) ”idealism = linguistic method”
In this sense, the idealism can not be understood without measurement theory.
1.2 Monism and dualism
1.2.1 Monism[=”matter”] and dualism[=”mind and matter”]
In the previous section, we discuss the world-description classification (O). In this section, we introduce
anther world-description classification, i,e., monism and dualism. In monism, we consider that ”world” =
”matter”, and in dualism, ”world” = ”I(=mind)”+”matter”. That is, That is,
(P1) world-description

monism=[ ”matter”])
dualism=[”I(=mind)”+”matter”])
Newtonian mechanics and the theory of relativity, which are formulated in monism, acquire a great
success.
If we are concerned with the troublesome thing such as ”I(=mind)”, objectivity is spoiled, and thus,
we are without science. However, quantum mechanics, which are formulated in dualism, acquires a great
success.
Therefore, the dualism in this not is the dualism inspired from quantum mechanics.
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♠ Note 1.6 The world-description mentioned in this print is always quantitative. And thus, mathematics is
always fundamental and essential in our world-description. However, it should be noted that
(♯) mathematics itself is independent of world. That is, mathematics exists without world.
That is, mathematics is the origin learning (before science, that is, before the world-description classifications
(O) and (P1)).
Considering (O) and (P1), we get the following classification:
(P2) world-description

1© realistic method
{
monism · · · classical mechanics,...
dualism· · · quantum mechanics
2© linguistic method
{
monism· · · (cf. Sec.1.2.2)
dualism· · · (measurement theory, Sec.1.2.3)
1.2.2 Linguistic world-description in monism(state equation method)
The realistic world-description in monism is well known as physics (i.e., Newtonian mechanics, etc.). Thus,
in this section, we devote ourselves to the linguistic world-description in monism. Although this may not
be authorized yet, there may be a reason to consider that it is the same as the state equation method,
which is characterized as the linguistic turn of Newtonian mechanics (see the (D)). The essence of the state
equation method is only ”causality”. Thus, the state equation method without causality is quite simple.
That is,
The key-words are as follows:
(Q) object(=matter) and state(=property)
And thus, the statements (in linguistic world-description method) are as follows:
Linguistic world-description method in monism
An object has a state ω
This can be easily understood in the following simple examples:
(R1) The temperature of water in this cup is 5
◦C
⇒ [The object (i.e., the water in this cup )] has a state such as [5 ◦C]
(R2) John has 500 dollars in his purchase
⇒ [The object (i.e., John’s purchase)] has a state such as [500 dollars]
(R3) This flower is red
⇒ [The object (i.e., this flower)] has a state such as [red]
(R4) The water in this cup is cold
⇒ [The object (i.e., the water in this cup )] has a state such as [cold]
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Here, (R1) and (R2) are important. That is, (R3) and (R4) are regarded as the preparation of Sec. 1.2.3
(The linguistic world-description in dualism).
There is a possibility that a state is ω. or ω′,... Put Ω = {ω, ω′, ....}, which is a state space. For
example,
(R′1) In the case of (R1), we see that the state space Ω = {ω | ω ◦C is the temperature of water } = [0, 100].
(R′2) In the (R2), we consider the possibility such that 1 cent, 2 cents, .... Therefore, The state space Ω
= {0, 1, 2, . . .}
♠ Note 1.7 Most scientists may not be familiar with the following questions:,
(♯) ”realistic method” or ”linguistic method”? ”monism” or dualism”?
As mentioned in (F1), the reason is due to the fact that these questions have been been kept ambiguous in
statistics (=dynamical system theory). That is, as mentioned in (L2), statistics (=dynamical system theory)
does not have a power to clarify the questions (♯). Therefore, the argument in this section is not authorized,
and thus it should be regarded as the preparation for the following (Sec.1.2.3) (Linguistic method in dualism).
1.2.3 Linguistic world-description method in dualism(= the Copenhagen interpretation of
measurement theory)
Quantum mechanics is dualistic physics (i.e., dualistic and realistic world-description), and, measurement
theory is the linguistic turn ( verbalizing, proverbalizing) of quantum mechanics. And therefore, measure-
ment theory is dualistic and linguistic world-description. The monastic and linguistic world-description
mentioned in the previous section is too simple, but the dualism and linguistic world-description (i.e.,
measurement theory) is rather troublesome.
As mentioned in (K) and (J1), measurement theory has the following structure:
(K) measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom 1]
measurement (J1) +
[Axiom 2]
causality (J2)
in which we see two key-words (i.e., ”measurement” and ”causality”. Thus, even if we omit ”causality”,
we have ”measurement” which is composed of the following terms:
(J1) measurement ( the items: observer, measuring object, state, observable (≈measuring
instrument), measured value , probability ).
Thus, compared with monism, dualism has many key-words.
The concept of ”measurement” can be, for the first time, understood in dualism. Let us explain it.
The image of ”measurement” is as shown in Fig. 1.1.
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•
observer
(I(=mind))
system
(matter)
✛
✲
[observable]
[measured value]
a©interfere
b©perceive a reaction
[state]
Figure 1.1: The image of “measurement(= a©+ b©)” in dualism
In the above,
(S1) a©: it suffices to understand that ”interfere” is, for example, ”apply light”.
b©: perceive the reaction.
That is, ”measurement” is characterized as the interaction between ”observer” and ”measuring object”.
However,
(S2) In measurement theory, ”interaction” must not be emphasized.
Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, it might better to omit the interaction ” a© and b©” in Fig. 1.1.
Before we mention several rules [(U1)–(U7)] (which is called ”the Copenhagen interpretation”), we
must say so called ”the Copenhagen interpretation” in that follows.
(T) The Copenhagen interpretation is one of the earliest and most commonly taught interpretations of
quantum mechanics. The essential concepts of the Copenhagen interpretation were devised by Niels
Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and others. And finally it was accomplished by von Neumann [32](1932).
This Copenhagen interpretation in (T) is within physics. On the other, our ”Copenhagen interpretation
[(U1)–(U7)]” is not physics. Thus the two are completely different. In this sense, there may be an
opinion that ”the Copenhagen interpretation”, Hence in this book it should have been called ”the linguistic
interpretation” or ”the linguistic Copenhagen interpretation”.
The Copenhagen inteppretation
(U1) Consider the dualism composed of “observer” and “system( =measuring object)”. And therefore,
“observer” and “system” must be absolutely separated. ((this section, Sec.5.3.2). If it says for a
metaphor, we say ”Audience should not be up to the stage”
(U2) Of course, ”matter(=measuring object)” has the space-time. On the other hand, the observer does
not have the space-time. Thus, the question: “When and where is a measured value obtained?” is
out of measurement theory, Thus, there is no tense in measurement theory. This implies that there
is no tense in science. (Sec. 2.3.3, Sec.6.4.2).
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(U3)
(=(S2))
In measurement theory, ”interaction” must not be emphasized(this section, Sec.3.4).
(U4) Only one measurement is permitted(Sec.2.5). Thus, the state after measurement is meaningless.
(U5) There is no probability without measurement(Sec.2.2, Note 4.7).
(U6) observable is before state, Or, observable is superior to state(Sec.2.6.2).
(U7) State never moves(Sec.6.4.1)
and so on. Also, see Sec.3.3.1(e), Sec. 6.4.3(f3).
Now we can state the Prototype of Axiom 1(measurement) as follows (for the precise version, see
Axiompc 1(page 23))”.
Axiom 1(measurement) Prototype
When an observer takes a measurement of an observable O (or, by a measuring
instrumentO ) for a measuring object with a state ω, the probability that a measured
value x is obtained is given by P .
Here, measurement theory assert that
Describe every phenomenon modeled on Axiom 1 under the direction of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion [(U1)–(U7)]
♠ Note 1.8 Summing up (M2), we see
(M2)
(the terms (J) have reality)
quantum mechanics(H):physics
(the Copenhagen interpretation)
proverbalizing−−−−−−−−−→
linguistic turn
(the terms (J) have no reality)
measurement theory(K):language
( the Copenhagen interpretation )
Therefore,
(♯) the Copenhagen interpretation[(U1)–(U7)] is common in both quantum mechanics(H) and measurement
theory(K).
For example, the following is one of the simplest dualistic statements.
(V) When an observer measures by the exact ruler (i.e., measuring instrument ) for the pencil (i.e.,
measuring object ) with the state ( the length 15.3 cm ), the probability that measured value
[15.3 cm] is obtained is 1.
Here, the region in which there is a possibility that a state ω [resp. a measured value x] exists is called
a state space [resp. measured value space], and denoted by Ω [resp. X ].
In the above (V), we may consider that Ω = [5, 30]. Also, if the rule’s length is 25cm, we may put
X = [0, 25].
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The following example is typical:
Example 1.1 [The water is cold or hot?] Let testees drink water with various temperature ω ◦C
(0 ≦ ω ≦ 100). And you ask them “cold” or “hot” alternatively. Gather the data, ( for example, gc(ω)
persons say “cold”, gh(ω) persons say “hot”) and normalize them, that is, get the polygonal lines such
that
fc(ω) =
gc(ω)
the numbers of testees
fh(ω) =
gh(ω)
the numbers of testees
And
fc(ω) =

1 (0 ≦ ω ≦ 10)
70−ω
60 (10 ≦ ω ≦ 70)
0 (70 ≦ ω ≦ 100)
, fh(ω) = 1− fc(ω)
1
fc fh
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Figure 1.2: Cold or hot?
Therefore, for example,
(W1) You choose one person from the testees, and you ask him/her “cold” or “hot” alternatively. Then
the probability that he/she says
[
”cold”
”hot”
]
is given by
[
fc(55) = 0.25
fh(55) = 0.75
]
This is described in terms of Axiom 1 in what follows.
Define the state space Ω such that Ω = interval [0, 100](⊂ R) and measured value space X = {c, h}.
Here, consider the ”[C-H]-thermometer” such that
(W2) for water with ω
◦C, [C-H]-thermometer presents
[
c
h
]
with probability
[
fc(ω)
fh(ω)
]
. This [C-H]-
thermometer is denoted by O = (fc, fh)
Note that this [C-H]-thermometer can be easily realized by ”random number generator”.
Here, we have the following identification:
(W3) (W1) ⇐⇒ (W2)
Therefore, the statement (W1) in ordinary language can be represented in terms of measurement theory
as follows.
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(W4) When an observer takes a measurement by [[C-H]-instrument]
measuring instrumentO=(fc,fh)
for [water]
(System (measuring object))
with [55 ◦C]
(state(= ω ∈ Ω) )
, the probability that measured value
[
c
h
]
is obtained is given by
[
fc(55) = 0.25
fh(55) = 0.75
]
In the above, note that,
(Wa5) The terms in (J1) are used
(Wb5) It is due to the Copenhagen interpretation [(U1)–(U7)]. (although ((U2), (U6), (U7) are not used,
these will be used in the relation with Axiom 2(Chap. 6).
This example will be again discussed in the following chapter(Example 2.7).
♠ Note 1.9 It may be understandable to consider ”observable” =”the partition of word”. For example, Fig. 1.2
says that
(
fc, fh
)
is the partition between ”cold” and ”hot”. Also, ”measuring instrument” is the instrument
that choose a word among words. In this sense, we consider that ”observable”= ”measurement instrument”.
Also, John Locke’s famous sayings “primary quality (e.g., length, weight, etc.)” and “secondary quality (e.g.,
sweet, dark, cold, etc.)” urge us to associate the following correspondence:
state↔primary quality, observable↔ second quality
These words form the basis of dualism.
1.2.4 Monism vs. dualism
The readers may understand that dualistic world-description is rather troublesome. Here, recall Examples
((R3) and (R4)). That is,
(R3) This flower is red
⇒ [The object (i.e., this flower)] has a state such as [red]
(R4) The water in this cup is cold
⇒ [The object (i.e., the water in this cup )] has a state such as [cold]
The readers may feel that these (R3) and (R4) are unnatural. Form the dualistic point of view, ”red” and
”cold” should be regarded as ”measured vales” and not ”states”. This is a reason that, in science (i,e.,
the monastic world-description), we may say ”This water is 55”, On the other hand, in science, we seldom
say ”This water is hot”. The statement ”this water is hot” is not represented in the monism but in the
dualism. as seen in (W4) of Example 1.1). That is, dualistic method has a power to clarify the difference
between ”state(= the original property of measuring object)” and ”measured value”.
Compared with monism, the dualistic view has a possibility to extend the range of description.
1 MEASUREMENT THEORY BORN FROM QUANTUM MECHANICS 15
Thus, we push on to scientific dualism. In spite that we do not consider ”the mind cannot be solved by the
principle of a substance”, we believe that dualism (with a great power of expression) should be adopted.
♠ Note 1.10 Readers may want to know the conclusion of ”monism vs. dualism”. In physics, this is discussed
in Einstein–Bohr debate is characterized as ”monism[4]vs.dualism[1]” in physics. This is still unsolved. We
think that
(♯1) In the linguistic method, dualism is superior to monism. That is because the monism is not mature in
the linguistic method (Note 1.7).
Also, we think that statistics =dynamical system theory) is should be regarded as the abbreviation of
measurement theory (cf. Chap.4). Summing up the above arguments, we have the following:
Table 1.1: realistic and linguistic world-description methods  monism·dualism
monism dualism
realistic world-description method
(realistic world-view)
Newtonian mechanics
( electromagnetism ,· · · )
quantum mechanics
linguistic world-description method
(linguistic world-view)
state equation method
(Note 1.7)
measurement theory
Therefore, measurement theory has two kinds of ”absurdness.” That is,
(♯2) the absurdness of measurement theory

idealism · · ·linguistic world-view
dualism · · ·the Copenhagen interpretation
♠ Note 1.11 Readers may want to ask:
What is science (other than physics) ?
The answer will be presented in Sec.8.1(m). For the time being, think
various sciences (other than physics )=engineering
We add some remark in what follows. For example, consider the question:
a heart transplant operation is medical or engineering?
A heart transplant operation is, of course, most advanced science and technology. However, it is still unripe
if we regard a heart transplant operation as engineering. That is because we can not yet create the robot
who has the technology of a heart transplant. Such a robot will be realized in the development. The heart
transplant operation is still considered to be infancy as one field of engineering.
1.3 Ordinary language— lawless area —
It is sure that
Ordinary language is human beings’ greatest invention.
But, ordinary language is elusive ambiguous and very strange monster languages to take in, and it cannot
be said that the framework is clear Thus, let us explain the relation among ordinary language, scientific
language and mathematical language.
For example, clearly mathematics is included in the ordinary language statements (R1), (R2) and (W1).
The word Greek ”logos” has a meaning of both ”logic” and ”language.” Thus, considering that ”math-
ematics + ordinary language” ⊂ wide ordinary language”, we may assert that ”wide ordinary language”,
is the Origin language before world-description(Chap. 1(O)).
If it be so, we may see:
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(X1) the relation between widely ordinary language andworld-description method:
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic method
(Newtonian mechanics,etc.)
2©linguistic method
(measurement theory)
And thus, we think:
(X2) every science holds as a premise of widely ordinary language 0©.
But, it is a matter of course that ordinary language is not created for science, and the framework of
widely ordinary language is not clear. Even if there exists the rule of ordinary language, it is too complicate
to write it. Thus, ordinary language is so-called ”lawless area” or ”disorderly language”.
Although there may be many opinions, it is sure that the following is one of them:
(X3) ” 0© widely ordinary language” includes the statement (R1), (R2), (W1) in Example 1.1 and further,
arithmetical word problems ( (Example 7.6) or (Chap.11 (A2)) and so on), statistics (=dynamical
system theory)
That is, there is a reason to consider that these somehow sink into ordinary language.
But, measurement theory is composed of two rules (Axioms 1 and 2). And thus, it has the clear
framework. Therefore, as the statement (W1) in Example 1.1 in ordinary language was written by the
measurement theoretical (W4),
(X4) As much as possible, we start from ” 2© measurement theory” and not ” 0© widely ordinary language”.
And
(X5) to establish metaphysics(called measurement theory) as a discipline which forms the base of science,
or as a basic language by which sciences are described. Or equivalently,
measurement theory is the special language by which sciences are described. And
reversely, sciences hold by the measurement theoretical description.
This is our purpose of this print.
♠ Note 1.12 The readers may ask:
Why do we need to assert the (X5)?
This answer was already presented in Note 1.11. That is,
measurement theory is the language for engineering (or, sciences), or in other words, for quantification,
mechanization, and automation.
There may be several opinion for the following disciplines:
Computational psychology, mathematical economics, financial engineering, cognitive science, manage-
ment engineering, a medical engineering, educational technology, ergonomics, etc.
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However, in order to regard these as sciences, there is no method besides describing these in terms of
measurement theory. Also, some may ask:
(A1) Why does measurement theory hold? Is there another scientific language?
However, we have no answer to this question. Let us add ”two purposes” to (X1) in what follows.
(X1)
(Chap.1)
0© widely ordinary language
(world-description(=before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

(clarify God’s principle)
1©realistic method
(Newtonian mechanics,etc.)
(create robots like human being)
2©linguistic method
(measurement theory)
Lastly, we add the classification of measurement theory (as mentioned in the guide of this print).
(Y) measurement theory
(scientific language)

quantum measurement : Chap. 3
classical measurement

continuous
{
pure type : (Chaps. 2–9)
mixed type : Sec.4.4
bounded
{
pure type : Chaps. 10, 11
mixed type : Note 11.3
2 Axiomp
c
1 — measurement
In Part II, we study ”classical (continuous pure type) measurement thory” in the whole picture (Y) of
measurement theory mentioned in Section1.3. This is characterized as follows:
measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
c 1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
p
c 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
measurement theory proclaims that
(♯) After the example of the sentences of Axiompc 1 and Axiom
p
c 2, every phenomenon should be described.
Or, making a model of the sentences of Axioms 1 and 2, describe every phenomenon.
In this chapter, we are devote ourselves to the mathematical formulation of Axiompc 1 (measurement). Axiom
p
c
2 (causality) will be discussed in Chapter 6 later.
2.1 Classical (continuous pure type) measurement theory
2.1.1 State and Observable — the first quality and the secondary quality
If we expect that many scientists are interested in the philosophy of science (i.e., the studies about the
metaphysical aspects of science), we can not do it without mathematics. Therefore, in this section 2.1.1,
we prepare some elementary mathematical results.
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Throughout this print, put N = {1, 2, 3, . . .} (i.e., the set of all natural numbers), N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}
(i.e., the set of all non-negative integers), Z = {0,±1,±2, . . .} (i.e., the set of all integers), R (i.e., the set
of all real numbers). Let X be a set. And let P(X) or 2X be a set of all subsets of X . That is,
P(X) = 2X = {Ξ | Ξ ⊆ X}
Let Ω be a locally compact space, for example, Ω = N( or, the set of all natural numbers), the real
line R, the interval in R, the plane (=2-dimensional space) R2 and so on. It is usually assumed that a
finite set Ω has the discrete metricdD, where
dD(ω, ω
′) =
{
1 (ω 6= ω′)
0 (ω = ω′) (2.1)
This (Ω, dD) is called a discrete metric space.
Let C(Ω) be the set of all complex valued bounded continuous function f : Ω→ C, that is,
C(Ω) = {f | f is a complex valued continuous function on Ω such that‖f‖C(Ω) <∞}
where the norm ‖f‖C(Ω) is defined by
‖f‖C(Ω) = sup
ω∈Ω
|f(ω)| (2.2)
It is elementary that the vector space C(Ω) is a Banach space.
Our present purpose is to read several examples in Section 2.3. Thus, we have to add some mathematical
preparations.
Definition 2.1 [Observable, state space, state, measured value, measured value space] A triplet
O=(X,F , F ) is called an observable (or, measuring instrument) in C(Ω) if it satisfies that
(i) [Measurable space]. X is a set (called a “measured value set”, “sample space”, or “label set” ), and
F ( ⊆ P(X) ( ≡ {Ξ : Ξ ⊆ X}) ) is the field. That is,
(a) : ∅(= empty set) ∈ F , X ∈ F , (b) : Ξi ∈ F (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) =⇒
n⋃
i=1
Ξi ∈ F
(c) : Ξ ∈ F =⇒ X \ Ξ ∈ F
where X \ Ξ(= {x | x ∈ X, x /∈ Ξ}), i.e., the compliment of Ξ. Also, the pair (X,F) is called a
(finitely) measurable space.
(ii) [Positivity]. for every Ξ ∈ F , F (Ξ) is an element in C(Ω) such that 0 ≤ F (Ξ)] ≤ 1 (that is,
0 ≤ [F (Ξ)](ω) ≤ 1 (∀ω ∈ Ω) , F (∅) = 0 and F (X) = 1 (where 0 is the 0-element in C(Ω)),
(iii) [Complete additivity]. for any countable decomposition {Ξ1,Ξ2, ...,Ξn, ...} of Ξ,
(
i.e., Ξ, Ξn ∈ F ,
∪∞n=1Ξn = Ξ, Ξn ∩ Ξm = ∅(if n 6= m)
)
, it holds that
[F (Ξ)](ω) = lim
N→∞
N∑
n=1
[F (Ξn)](ω) (∀ω ∈ Ω). (2.3)
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The C(Ω) is called a basic algebra. Also, the Ω and its element ω(∈ Ω) is respectively called a state
space (or, spectrum) and a state. And, the X and its element x(∈ X) is respectively called a measured
value space and a measured value. Let ω ∈ Ω. The triplet (X,F , [F (·)](ω)) is called a sample probability
space.
♠ Note 2.1 Some may think that the function space C(Ω) is too simple. However, the C(Ω) or, the L∞(Ω, ν)
(Chap. 10,11 ) is an inevitable conclusion from dynamics ( cf. [11, 29] ). It is prohibited to consider the
other function spaces. If some intend to improve and extend measurement theory, they must start from
the improvement of quantum mechanics. In this sense, the improvement of measurement theory may be
impossible ((F′3) in Chap. 1).
2.1.2 Examples of Observables
In what follows, we shall mention several examples of observables.
Example 2.2 [Existence observable ]
Let O ≡ (X,F , F ) be any observable in a C(Ω). Define the observable O(exi) ≡ (X, {∅, X}, F (exi)) in a
basic algebra C(Ω) such that:
F (exi)(∅) ≡ 0, F (exi)(X) ≡ IC(Ω),
which may be called the existence observable (or, null observable). Consider any observable O = (X,F , F )
in C(Ω). Note that {∅, X} ⊆ F . And we see that
[F (∅)](ω) = 0, [F (X)](ω) = 1 (∀ω ∈ Ω)
Thus, we see that (X, {∅, X}, F (exi)) = (X, {∅, X}, F ), and therefore, we say that any observable O =
(X,F , F ) includes the existence observable O(exi).
Example 2.3 [The resolution of the identity I ] Also, we may find the similarity between an
observable O and the resolution of the identity I in what follows. Consider an observable O ≡ (X,F , F )
in C(Ω) such that X is a countable set (i.e., X ≡ {x1, x2, ...}) and F = P(X). Then, it is clear that
(i) F ({xk}) ≥ 0 for all k = 1, 2, ...
(ii)
∑∞
k=1 F ({xk}) = IC(Ω) in the sense of weak topology of C(Ω),
which imply that the [F ({xk}) : k = 1, 2, ..., n] can be regarded as the resolution of the identity element
IC(Ω). Thus we say that
An observable O
( ≡ (X,F , F ) ) in C(Ω) can be regarded as
“ the resolution of the identity IC(Ω)
i.e., [F ({xk}) : k = 1, 2, ..., n].
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0
1
[F ({x1})](ω)
[F ({x2})](ω)
[F ({x3})](ω)
Ω
Figure 2.1: O ≡ ({x1, x2, x3}, 2{x1,x2,x3}, F ) in C(Ω)
In Fig. 2.1, assume that Ω = [0, 100] is the axis of temperatures ( ◦C), and put X = {C(=”cold”), L
(=”lukewarm” = ”not hot enough”), H(=”hot”) }. And further, put fx1 = fC, fx2 = fL, fx3 = fH. Then,
the resolution {fx1, fx2 , fx3} can be regarded as the word’s partition C(=”cold”), L(=”lukewarm”=”not hot
enough”), H(=”hot”) .
Also, putting
F(= 2X) = {∅, {x1}, {x2}, {x3}, {x1, x2}, {x2, x3}, {x1, x3}, X}
and
[F (∅)](ω) = 0, [F (X)](ω) = fx1(ω) + fx2(ω) + fx3(ω) = 1
[F ({x1})](ω) = fx1(ω), [F ({x2})](ω) = fx2(ω), [F ({x3})](ω) = fx3(ω)
[F ({x1, x2})](ω) = fx1(ω) + fx2(ω), [F ({x2, x3})](ω) = fx2(ω) + fx3(ω)
[F ({x1, x3})](ω) = fx1(ω) + fx3(ω)
then, we have the observable (X,F(= 2X), F ) in C([0, 100]).
Example 2.4 [Triangle observable ] Let testees drink water with various temperature ω(0 ≦ ω ≦ 100).
And you ask them ”How many degrees( ◦C) is roughly this water? Gather the data, ( for example, hn(ω)
persons say n (n = 0, 10, 20, . . . , 90, 100). and normalize them, that is, get the polygonal lines. For example,
define the state space Ω by the closed interval [0, 100] (⊆ R). For each n ∈ N10010 = {0, 10, 20, . . . , 100},
define the (triangle) continuous function gn : Ω→ [0, 1] by
gn(ω) =

0 (0 ≦ ω ≦ n− 10)
ω − n− 10
10
(n− 10 ≦ ω ≦ n)
−ω − n+ 10
10
(n ≦ ω ≦ n+ 10)
0 (n+ 10 ≦ ω ≦ 100)
(2.4)
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1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
g0 g10 g20 g30 g40 g50 g60 g70 g80 g90 g100
Figure 2.2: Triangle observable
Putting Y = N10010 and define the triangle observable O
△ = (Y, 2Y , F△) such that
[F△(∅)](ω) = 0, [F△(Y )](ω) = 1
[F△(Γ)](ω) =
∑
n∈Γ
gn(ω) (∀Γ ∈ 2N10010 )
Then, we have the triangle observable O△ = (Y (= N10010 ), 2
Y , F△) in C([0, 100]).
Example 2.5 [Exact observable ] Consider a commutative basic algebra C(Ω). Let BΩ be the Borel
field, i.e., the smallest σ-field that contains all open sets. For each Ξ ∈ BΩ, define the characteristic
function χ
Ξ
: Ω→ R such that
χ
Ξ
(ω) =

1 ω ∈ Ξ
0 ω /∈ Ξ
Put [F (exa)(Ξ)](ω) = χΞ(ω) (Ξ ∈ BΩ, ω ∈ Ω). The triplet O(exa) = (Ω,BΩ, F (exa)) may be called an exact
observable, if χ
Ξ
: Ω → R is continuous for all Ξ(∈ BΩ). For example, when Ω = N,Z, the O(exa) is an
observable. However, when when Ω = R, it is not so. Of course, we want to consider the O(exa) is an
observable. However, it is not always true, since the exact observable O(exa) does not always exist (i.e.,
generally, χΞ /∈ C(Ω) ) in the basic algebraic formulation. This is a weak point of the basic algebraic
formulation. For this, we must prepare the bounded type formulation as mentioned in Chap. 10 and 11.
However, it is convenient to consider the exact observable O(exa). Thus,
(G3) in spite of the wrong usage, we sometimes use (G1) or (G2).
Of course, when Ω is finite, or Ω = N, any function f : Ω → R is continuous, and therefore, we see that
O(exa) is an observable in C(Ω).
♠ Note 2.2 In usual case such as Ω = R, the O(exa) can not regarded as the existence observable in C(R).
This fact is a weak point in measurement theory(continuous type). This will be improved in measurement
theory(bounded type; Chap. 10,11 ). However, in spite of the weak point, measurement theory(continuous
type) is, of course, fundamental.
Example 2.6 [Round observable is not observable] Define the state space Ω by Ω = [0, 100]. For
each n ∈ N10010 ={0, 10, 20, . . . , 100}, define the discontinuous function gn : Ω→ [0, 1] such that
gn(ω) =

0 (0 ≦ ω ≦ n− 5)
1 (n− 5 < ω ≦ n+ 5)
0 (n+ 5 < ω ≦ 100)
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g0 g10 g20 g50 g80 g90 g100
Figure 2.3: Round observable
Define ORND = (Y (=N10010 ), 2
Y , GRND) such that
[GRND(∅)](ω) = 0, [GRND(Y )](ω) = 1
[GRND(Γ)](ω) =
∑
n∈Γ
gn(ω) (∀Γ ∈ 2Y = 2N10010 )
Recall that gn is not continuous. Therefore, the triplet ORND = (Y, 2
Y , GRND) is not an observable in
C([0, 100]). Of course, we want to regard it as an observable. For this, we must prepare ”bounded type
measurement theory” (cf. Chaps. 10,11).
2.2 Axiompc 1 — There is no science without measurement
As mentioned in Chap. 1, measurement theory is formulated as follows:. That is,
measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
c 1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
p
c 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
In what follows, we shall explain Axiompc 1. ( For Axiom
p
c 2(causality ), see Chap. 6).
With any classical system S, a basic algebra C(Ω) can be associated in which measurement theory of
that system can be formulated. A state of the system S is represented by a state ω(∈ Ω, i.e., a state space
). Also, an observable is represented by O ≡ (X,F , F ) in the C(Ω).
(a1) An observer takes a measurement
[
of observable [O]
by measuring instrument[O]
]
for a measuring object
with a state.
and thus, in short, we write:
(a2) An observer take a measurement MC(Ω)
(
O, S[ω]
) (
or, MC(Ω)
(
O, S[δω]
) )
.
where δω is a point measure at ω. Thus, the value [F (Ξ)](ω) is also written by M(Ω)
〈
δω, F (Ξ)
〉
C(Ω)
.
And further, by measurement MC(Ω)
(
O, S[ω]
)
, measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained.
Axiompc 1 is the linguistic turn of Born’s quantum measurement as follows (cf. Sec.3.2 ).
Born’s quantum measurement
(physical law)
proverbalizing−−−−−−−−−→
linguistic turn
measurement theory(Axiompc 1)
(linguistic rule)
Since Axiompc 1 below is similar to [Axiom 1 Prototype] (12 page), all readers can easily understand it.
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Axiompc 1 (measurement: continuous pure type)
Consider a measurement MC(Ω)
(
O := (X,F , F ), S[ω]
)
formulated in a basic algebra C(Ω).
Assume that the measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)
(
O, S[ω]
)
.
Then, the probability that the x ( ∈ X) belongs to a set Ξ ( ∈ F) is given by [F (Ξ)](ω) ( ≡
M(Ω)
〈
δω, F (Ξ)
〉
C(Ω)
)
.
If it writes without carrying out simple, we see:
(b) When an observer takes a measurement of an observable O=(X,F , F ) (or, by a measuring
instrumentO ) for a measuring object with a state ω, the probability that a measured value
belongs to Ξ(∈ F) is given by [F (Ξ)](ω).
Measurement theory says that Describe every phenomenon modeled on Axiompc 1. That is, the
key-words in Axiompc 1 is as follows.
(c) measurement, observer, system(measuring object), state, observable , measured value , probability
and
Use these key-words modeled on Axiompc 1.
The meanings of key-words in (c) are not explained. Therefore, the experimental verification is mean-
ingless. That is,
(d) Axiompc 1(measurement) is a metaphysical statement, in the sense that it can not be verified by
experiment. This is the remarkable feature of linguistic method.
This should be compared to physics (i.e., realistic method). Many readers may no be familiar to linguistic
method. However, several examinations in the following section will promote reader’s understanding.
♠ Note 2.3 If metaphysics has history of failure, this is due to the serious trial to answer the following problem
(♯) What is the meaning of the key-words in (c)?
Although this (♯) may be attractive, however, it is not productive. What is important is to know how to use
the key-words in (c). Of course, this answer is mentioned in Axiompc 1.
The following example (under Axiompc 1 ) is the same as Example 1.1.
Example 2.7 [Continued from Example 1.1)] [The measurement of ”cold or hot” for water in a cup]
In Example 1.1, we consider this [C-H]-thermometer O = (fc, fh), where the state space Ω = [0, 100], the
measured value space X = {c,h}. That is,
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fc(ω) =

1 (0 ≦ ω ≦ 10)
70−ω
60 (10 ≦ ω ≦ 70)
0 (70 ≦ ω ≦ 100)
, fh(ω) = 1− fc(ω)
Then, we have the (temperature) observable Och = (X, 2
X , Fch) in C(Ω) such that
[Fch(∅)](ω) = 0, [Fch(X)](ω) = 1
[Fch({c})](ω) = fc(ω), [Fch({h})](ω) = fh(ω)
Thus, we get a measurement MC(Ω)(Och, S[δω]) ( = MC(Ω)(Och, S[δω]). Therefore, for example, putting
ω = 55 ◦C, we can, by Axiompc 1(page 23), represent the statement (W1) in Example 1.1 as follows.
(e) the probability that a measured valuex(∈ X={c, h}) obtained by measurement
MC(Ω)(Och, S[ω(=55)]) belongs to set

∅
{c}
{h}
{c, h}
 is given by

[Fch(∅)](55) = 0
[Fch({c})](55) = 0.25
[Fch({h})](55) = 0.75
[Fch({c, h})](55) = 1

If it writes without omitting, we see:
(f) When an observer takes a measurement by [[C-H]-instrument]
measuring instrumentOch=(X,2X ,Fch)
for [water in cup]
(system(measuring object))
with [55 ◦C]
(state(= ω ∈ Ω) )
, the probability that measured value
[
c
h
]
is obtained is given by
[
fc(55) = 0.25
fh(55) = 0.75
]
Here, note that the key-words in (c) — observer, state, system (=measuring object), observable (=mea-
suring instrument), measurement, measured value , probability — are contained in the above (f).
2.3 Simple examples of measurements
2.3.1 linguistic world-view — Wonder of man’s linguistic competence
The applied scope of physics physics (realistic world-description method) is rather clear. But the applied
scope of measurement theory (as well as the proverb ”Even monkeys fall from trees” ) is ambiguous.
As mentioned in Note 2.3, what we can do in measurement theory is
(a)

(a1): Use the language defined by Axiom
p
c 1
(a2): Trust in man’s linguistic competence (Chap. 1(M1))
Thus, some readers may doubt that
(b) Is it science?
However, the spirit of measurement theory is different from that of physics.
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2.3.2 Elementary examples — urn problem, etc.
Since measurement theory is a language, we can not master it without examinations. Thus, we present
simple examples in what follows.
Example 2.8 [The number of balls in urn] In a certain urn U , some balls are contained.
(a) Counting the number of the balls contains n balls, we get ”n”.
Now we shall represent the obvious statement (a) in terms of measurement theory.
Define the state ωn of the urn U such that
ωn · · · n balls are contained in the urn U . (n = 0, 1, 2, . . .)
Therefore, the state space Ω is defined by
Ω={ω0, ω1, ω2, . . .}
with the discrete metric.
state ω0 state ω1 state ω2
· · · · · ·
Figure 2.4: The number of balls in the urn
Define the measured value space by N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. And define observable O = (N0, 2N0 , F ) in C(Ω)
such that
[F (Ξ)](ωn) =
{
1 (n ∈ Ξ)
0 (n /∈ Ξ) (∀n ∈ N0, ∀Ξ ⊆ N0)
This observable O = (N0, 2N0 , F ) is called a counting observable. Therefore, the above statement (a)in
ordinary language can be translated to the following (b) in terms of Axiompc 1,
(b) The probability the a measured value obtained by measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[ωn]) belong to Ξ(⊆ N0)
is given by
[F (Ξ)](ωn) =
[
1 (n ∈ Ξ)
0 (n /∈ Ξ)
]
That is,
(c) a measured value obtained by measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[ωn]) is surely n
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Example 2.9 [Continued from Example 2.4 (triangle observable )] Let testees drink water with
various temperature ω ◦C (0 ≦ ω ≦ 100). And you ask them ”How many degrees( ◦C) is roughly this
water? Gather the data, ( for example, hn(ω) persons say n
◦C (n = 0, 10, 20, . . . , 90, 100). and normalize
them, that is, get the polygonal lines. For example, define the state space Ω by the closed interval [0, 100]
(⊆ R). For each n ∈ N10010 = {0, 10, 20, . . . , 100}, define the (triangle) continuous function gn : Ω → [0, 1]
by
gn(ω) =

0 (0 ≦ ω ≦ n− 10)
ω − n− 10
10
(n− 10 ≦ ω ≦ n)
−ω − n+ 10
10
(n ≦ ω ≦ n+ 10)
0 (n+ 10 ≦ ω ≦ 100)
(a) You choose one person from the testees, and you ask him/her ”How many degrees( ◦C) is roughly this
water?”. Then the probability that he/she says
[
”about 40 ◦C”
”about 50 ◦C”
]
is given by
[
g40(47) = 0.25
f50(47) = 0.75
]
This is described in terms of Axiompc 1 in what follows.
Putting Y = N10010 and define the triangle observable O
△ = (Y, 2Y , F△) such that
[F△(∅)](ω) = 0, [F△(Y )](ω) = 1
[F△(Γ)](ω) =
∑
n∈Γ
gn(ω) (∀Γ ∈ 2N10010 )
Then, we have the triangle observable O△ = (Y (= N10010 ), 2Y , F△) in C([0, 100]). And we get a measure-
ment MC(Ω)(O
△, S[δω]). For example, putting ω=47
◦C, we see, by Axiompc 1(page 23), that
(b) the probability that a measured value obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O
△, S[ω(=47)])
is
[
about 40 ◦C
about 50 ◦C
]
is given by
[
[F△({40})](47) = 0.3
[F△({50})](47) = 0.7
]
///
Example 2.10 [The urn problem]. There are two urns U1 and U2. The urn U1 [resp. U2] contains 8 white
and 2 black balls [resp. 4 white and 6 black balls] (cf. Fig. 2.5).
Table 2.1: urn problem
Urn w·b white ball black ball
Urn U1 8 2
Urn U2 4 6
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ω1 ω2
Figure 2.5: Urn problem
Here, consider the following “statement (a)”:
(a) When one ball is picked up from the urn U2, the probability that the ball is white is 0.4.
In measurement theory, the “measurement (a)” is formulated as follows: Assuming
U1 · · · “the urn with the state ω1”
U2 · · · “the urn with the state ω2”
define the state space Ω by Ω = {ω1, ω2}. That is, we assume the identification;
U1 ≈ ω1, U2 ≈ ω2,
Put “w” = “white”, “b” = “black” , and put X = {w, b}. And define the observable O( ≡ (X ≡
{w, b}, 2{w,b}, F )) in C(Ω) by
[F ({w})](ω1) = 0.8, [F ({b})](ω1) = 0.2,
[F ({w})](ω2) = 0.4, [F ({b})](ω2) = 0.6.
Thus, we get the measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[δω1 ]). Here, Axiom
p
c 1(page 23) says that
(b) the probability that a measured value b is obtained by MC(Ω)(O, S[δω1 ]) is given by
F ({b})(ω1) = 0.8
♠ Note 2.4 Readers may fell that Example 2.7–Example 2.10 are too easy. However, note that
(♯) Since how to write in addition to this was not learned, it wrote like this reluctantly.
As mentioned in (a) of Sec.2.3.1, what we can do is
to be faithful to Axiompc , and to trust in Man’s linguistic competence
If some find the other writing, it will be praised as the greatest discovery on history of science. That is
because it means the discovery beyond quantum mechanics.
♠ Note 2.5 The statement (a) in Example 2.10 is not necessarily guaranteed:
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When one ball is picked up from the urn U2, the probability that the ball is white is 0.4.
What we say is that
the statement (a) in ordinary language should be written by the measurement theoretical statement
(b)
It is a matter of course that ”probability” can not be derived from mathematics itself. For example, the
following (♯1) and (♯2) are not be guaranteed.
(♯1) From the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, choose one number. Then, the probability that the number is even is given
by 2/5
(♯2) From the closed interval [0, 1], choose one number x. Then, the probability that x ∈ [a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] is
given by |b − a|
The common sense — ”probability” can not be derived from mathematics, which is independent of our world
— is well known as Bertrand’s paradox (cf. [11]). Thus, It is usual to add the term ”at random” to the
above (♯1) and (♯2). In this print, this term ”at random” is frequently omitted.
2.3.3 About the space in our world — Leibniz’s relationalism
Example 2.11 [Approximate measurement of the position of a particle] Let Ω be an interval of
the one dimensional space R. Consider a particle P with the position ω0(∈ Ω = R). Consider the situation
described in Fig. 2.6.
Consider the following measurement (a):
(a) measure a particle’s position roughly.
This (a) will be characterized as follows. Let σ be a fixed positive real. Define the normal observable (or
Gaussian observable) OGσ ≡ (R,BR, Gσ) in C(Ω) (where Omega = R) such that:
[Gσ(Ξ)](ω) =
1√
2πσ2
∫
Ξ
e−
(x−ω)2
2σ2 dx (∀Ξ ∈ BR, ∀ω ∈ Ω ≡ [a, b]),
which will be often used in this book. See Fig. 2.6.
✲
x
y
✻
y = 1√
2πσ2
e−
x2
2σ2
σ−σ 2σ−2σ
68.3%
95.4%
Figure 2.6: Error function
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Here, note that 1√
2πσ2
∫∞
−∞ e
− x2
2σ2 dx = 1 and
1√
2πσ2
∫ σ
−σ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx = 0.683...,
1√
2πσ2
∫ 2σ
−2σ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx = 0.954...
1√
2πσ2
∫ 1.96σ
−1.96σ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx ≈ 0.95, 1√
2πσ2
∫ 1.65σ
−∞
e−
x2
2σ2 dx ≈ 0.95 (2.5)
Thus, the (a) is characterized as follows.
(b) the probability that a measured value obtained by the measurement MC(R)(OGσ , S[δω0 ]) belongs to
Ξ (∈ B
R
) is given by [Gσ(Ξ)](ω0).
///
Leibniz’ opinion (metaphysical space-time)
The problem ”What is space-time?” is fundamental in any world-description method. For this problem,
measurement theory answers as follows (for time, see Sec.6.4.2):
(a) The position of a matter is represented by a state (that is, a state space mathbbR3). Therefore, the
position(Example 2.11), the temperature (Example 2.7, Example 2.9), the number of balls (Example
2.8) and so on are all kinds of states. That is,
This world where we live is regarded as a kind of state space, and thus, it is
represented by R3.
(For the general cases (including quantum thheory), see [14, 16]) As mentioned above, space-time is not
regarded as something special in measurement theory. This idea is considerably different from common
sense (i.e., the common sense of the theory of relativity).
The above argument urges us to recall Leibniz-Clarke correspondence as follows.
[Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]: Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (1715–1716) is important to know
both Leibniz’s and Clarke’s (=Newton’s) ideas concerning space and time.
(b) Newton’s absolutism says that the space-time should be regarded as a receptacle of a ”thing.” There-
fore, even if ”thing” does not exits, the space-time exists. On the other hand, Leibniz’s relationalism
says that
(b1) Space is a kind of state of ”thing”.
(b2) Time is an order of occurring in succession which changes one after another.
♠ Note 2.6 Many scientists may think that
Newton’s assertion is understandable, in fact, his idea was inherited by Einstein. On the other, Leibniz’s
assertion is incomprehensible and literary. Thus, his idea is not related to science.
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However, recall the classification of the world-description:
world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1© : realistic method (i.e., world is before language)
2© : linguistic method (i.e., language is before world)
in which Newton and Leibniz respectively devotes himself to 1© and 2©. Although Leibniz’s assertion is not
clear, we believe that
Leibniz found the importance of ”linguistic space and time” in science,
though he did not propose his language.
As mentioned in (a), measurement theory adopts Leibniz’s relationalism. For time, see Sec.6.4.
♠ Note 2.7 Although ”What is space and time?” is long time unsolved problem, Newton’s and Leibniz’s ideas
are characterized in the following classification of the world-description:
(O)
(Chap.1)

1© : Newotn, Clarke
(realistic world view)
· · ·
(space-time in physics)
realistic space-time
“What is space-time?”
(successors: Einstein, etc.)
2© : Leibniz
(linguistic world view)
· · ·
(space-time in measurement theory)
linguistic space-time
“How should space-time be represented?”
(i.e., spectrum, tree)
Measurement theory is in Leibniz’s side. Thus, we consider that
(♯2) Space should be described as a kind of spectrum (=state space in classical situation)
That is, we think that the Leibniz-Clarke debates should be essentially regarded as ”linguistic world view
2©” v.s. ”realistic world view 1©”.
Recall the proverb ”Even monkeys fall from trees” in Sec.1.1 such that
(♯1)
physical [space-time-probability]
quantum mechanics
(realistic method)
linguistic turn−−−−−−−−−−−→
proverbalizing
linguistic [space-time-probability]
measurement theory
(linguistic method)
Although quantum mechanics will be explained in Chap. 3, we can now conclude that
(♯2) It suffices to use the terms (space, time, probability) in measurement theory by an analogy of quantum
mechanics. Moreover, the usage is possible even if we do not quantum mechanics. That is because
these terms may be used according to our common sense.
In linguistic method, the question ”What is space (time, probability)?” is not important (Note 2.3). What
is important is
(♯3) How should the term space (time, probability) be used ?
This is respectively answered in (a) in this section, Sec. 6.4.2, Axiompc 1.
♠ Note 2.8 The space-time in measuring object is well discussed in the above. However, we have to say
something about ”observer’s time”. We conclude that observer’s time is meaningless in measurement theory
as mentioned the Copenhagen interpretation(U2) in Chap. 1. That is, the following question is nonsense in
measurement theory:
(♯1) When and where does an observer take a measurement
(♯2) Therefore, the is no tense (present, past, future) in sciences.
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2.4 The age of engineering and various sciences
2.4.1 MeasurementTheory — help the weak
Measurement Theory sided with the ”Leibniz’s relation theory” which may be called ”endangered species”
for the foregoing paragraph, and again with the John Locke’s ”the primary quality and the second quality”
in Note 1.9. If it has a worldly way of speaking, measurement theory will be an ally of weak things - what
cannot have confidence, a thing currently considered to be suspicious, a thing which is not trusted, a thing
like endangered species, a thing which is not respected, a cheap thing -. The concrete image is summarized
as notes.
♠ Note 2.9 We consider that
The strong vs. The weak
1©Newton’s space-time Leibniz’s space-time
2© materialism idealism
3©physical science metaphysics
4©monism dualism
5©physics engineering(=various science) (cf. Sec. 8.1(m))
6©Einstein Fisher(or, von Neumann)
7©theory of relativity quantum mechanics
8©realistic world-view linguistic world-view
Supposing it decides ”by majority”, please understand the standard which classifies ”a strong thing” and ”a
weak thing” to such an extent that it says that it will become like this. Since it does not have the science
view whose another side settled while one side has a ”realistic science view”, both are divided. Namely,
”The strong side” has a common language called physics. However, ”the weak side” does not have a
common language.
In this book,I claim that
a sight in which ”the weak side” depends on the authority (mathematics, physics, application, culture)
of the other place, and makes a living is caught from another’s eyes, it is not a suitable good thing
, and needs to establish independent authority - linguistic science view - . Namely,
(♯1) If ”the weak side” is bundled considering Measurement Theory as a common language,
it can rank the strong side.
Although it is the same,
(♯2) If the engineering theory - Measurement Theory - which bundles a weak side is made, it
can rank the strong side.
This is an opinion of this book. (Chap. 12). See Note 9.7 about upper 6© , and see Note 9.3 about 7©.
Moreover, 8© is a conclusion of this book.
In Chapter 9, equilibrium statistical mechanics is taken from the territory of physics, and it is regarded
as one field of engineering and various sciences. If it goes by this flow ,
(c) Measurement theory is a good fellow who helps ”a weak thing”.
However, we should say that this view is superficial. In fact, the position of ”a strong side” and ”a weak
side”” is substantially reversed bordering on the second half of the 20th century (as a symbolic incident,
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Apollo’s landing on the moon (1969) occurs. ). It is what is called ”the end of a big tale”, and it is as
follows, if the ”ultimate purpose” is made to contrast and it writes.
The understanding of God’s rule
(The age of physics)
−−−−−−−−→
Apollo (1969)
The manufacture of a robot like man
(The age of engineering)
Now, physics is a storyteller of ”the myth of space creation.” Although it may turn out that there is an
irresistible charm in a myth lover and there may also be an opinion that it becomes a serious problem 1000
years after, I think that the meaning of ”the seriousness of 1000-years-after” becomes delicate by lower (e).
All the things that are actually in personal appearance and are moving the world now are the products
of engineering - engineering works · construction, a car, an airplane, electrical machinery and apparatus,
petroleum products, a computer, etc. - , and engineering is also bearing human beings’ fate (or influences
the fate of one country). If this is taken into consideration ,
(d) By obtaining a formal language called Measurement theory, engineering and science make the scaffold
steadfast, and sees adolescence - fast progressive era -.
This is the greatest message of this book. (as mentioned in (I) of Chap. 13). If it thinks simply that what
is necessary is just to leave science to a robot after that if ”about the same robot as a scientist” is made,
the meaning of what ”man contributes to development of engineering and science” will become doubtful.
It follows,
(e) The time of engineering — the best-before date of Measurement theory (up to the day when ”the
time when a robot does science, and the time when a robot makes a robot” come) — will be at most
four hundreds of years from now on.
♠ Note 2.10 About a scientific language, when a conclusion is written previously, it is as follows. (Chap. 12).
(♯1)

0© : language in mathematics · · · set theory
1© : language in physics · · · the theory of relativity, ......
(the realistic world-view:Clarify God’s rule)
2© : language in engineering · · · measurement theory
(linguistic world-view:create a robot like a man)
0©and 1© will be common sense. About 2©, it will argue about this book whole volume. Although Gauss
(1777 – 1855) did not know set theory, the mathematical achievements were great, and although neither watt
(1736 – 1819) nor Edison (1847 - 1931) knew modern control theory, they did large invention. Moreover,
there are various ways to make ”about the same robot as a scientist.” It is an extreme talk,:
(♯2) ”Man” was made, when neglecting water, air, and a gravel without doing anything for about 4 billion
years.
Therefore, large invention may be possible if there is even time (even if there is no control theory(⊂Measurement
theory; Chapter 7 )). However, in order ”to hurry”, control theory is indispensable and this thought is
spontaneous generation, but I think that it was popularized by Norbert Wiener’s (1894 year–1964 year)
”cybernetics.” The reason which we must hurry - the reason the easy thing of ”if there is even time” is not
said. - is written in the following paragraph.
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2.4.2 Measurement Theory - For the further development of engineering and various science
-
The reason into which engineering must be developed immediately is explained below. Dr. Hawking (1942
–), a British theoretical physicist, is warning as follows on the website ”Big Think.” :
(a) The resources of the earth are limited while population increases geometrically. Furthermore, by
the time progress of technology changed global environment also often and bad, it resulted. We
accomplished the development which should attract attention over the past 100 years. But, it is
not a thing which one chance merely remains behind on the earth in order to overcome 100 years of
future, but is spread in the universe.
Even if Dr. Hawking does not say, everyone surely feel that ”a big misfortune” will surely happen before
long if lives on this narrow earth. If Dr. Hawking’s warning (a) is said at a word,
(b) [ Human beings’ continuation] ⇐⇒ [The construction of Space Colony]
The story of this book is developed by believing this.
♠ Note 2.11 As mentioned above, I would like to consider
(♯) earth escape (construction and settlement of a space colony) hundreds of years after
as the present target of the human beings, us. There may be some readers puzzled to the ”space colony.”
However, this is a device for fixing the purpose of ”realization of a space colony” and keeping an argument
from being spread. For achievement of this (♯), since human beings have to mobilize fully all the results
(intellectual product) of the engineering and various science accumulated in the past, I think that it is
perfect as a target. Moreover, if human beings reside permanently in the universe in 10,000 years, and if
they look back upon history then, I will think that ”the beginning of agriculture” and ”earth escape” are
commented as two major events of a history of man. If that is right, we may call that the challenge(♯) is
”the greatest battle of human beings.”
In this book, a ”space colony” is often used as a metaphor. This is because I think as follows.
(c) Since this book is writing of engineering, I should declare the clear purpose.
It is because ”the standard of importance” will become diffuse and it will deviate from the meaning of (c)
in the argument which is not shown the concrete target.
(d) In order to secure the firm foothold of engineering and to promote development of engineering further,
Measurement theory was made as ”a language of engineering.”
The author’s ”spirit” is as follows.
(e) Measurement theory was made in order to defeat the greatest battle of human beings - Construction
and settlement of the space colony of hundreds of years of after -.
♠ Note 2.12 If you are a reader of a theoretical lover, you may ask as follows.
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(♯) Although measurement theory includes quantum mechanics(Chap. 1(Y)), why don’t you propose the
”measurement theory” include the theory of relativity?
However, this book is ”writing of engineering” as mentioned above. Although I think that ”refraining from
doing too much” is an engineering sense, there is no mind which, of course, stops that the reader of a
theoretical lover challenges the above-mentioned (♯).
2.5 The Copenhagen interpretation — Only one measurement is permitted
In this section, we examine the Copenhagen interpretation(Chap. 1(U4)), i.e., ”Only one measurement is
permitted”. ”Only one measurement” implies that ”only one observable” and ”only one state”. That is,
we see:
[only one measurement] =⇒

only one observable (=measuring instrument)
only one state
(2.6)
♠ Note 2.13 Although there may be several opinions, the author believes that the standard Copenhagen
interpretation says that only one measurement is permitted. This spirit is inherited to measurement theory.
2.5.1 ”Observable is only one” and simultaneous measurement
For example, consider the following situation:
(a) There is a cup in which water is filled. Assume that the temperature is ω ◦C (0 ≦ ω ≦ 100). Consider
two questions ”Is this water cold or hot?” and ”How many degrees( ◦C) is roughly the water?”. This
implies that we take two measurements such that
(♯1): MC(Ω)(Och=({c, h}, 2{c,h}, Fch), S[ω]) in Example 2.7
(♯2) : MC(Ω) (OAB =(N
100
10 , 2
N
100
10 , GAB), S[ω]) in Example 2.9
However, as mentioned in the above, ”only one observable” must be demanded. Thus, we have the following
problem.
Problem 2.12 Represent two measurementsMC(Ω)(Och=({c, h}, 2{c,h}, Fch), S[ω]) andMC(Ω)(OAB=(N10010 ,
2N
100
10 , GAB), S[ω]) by only one measurement.
This will be answered in what follows.
Definition 2.13 [Product measurable space] For each k = 1, 2, . . . , n, consider a measurable (Xk,
Fk). The product space×nk=1Xk of Xk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) is defined by
n×
k=1
Xk = {(x1, x2, . . . , xn) | xk ∈ Xk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n)}
Similarly, define the product×nk=1 Ξk of Ξk(∈ Fk) (k = 1, 2, . . . , n) by
n×
k=1
Ξk = {(x1, x2, . . . , xn) | xk ∈ Ξk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n)}
Further, the σ-field ⊠ nk=1Fk on the product space×nk=1Xk by
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⊠
n
k=1Fk is the smallest field including {×nk=1 Ξk | Ξk ∈ Fk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n)}
(×nk=1Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk) is called the {product measurable space. Also, in the case that (X,F) = (Xk,Fk)
(k = 1, 2, . . . , n), the product space ×nk=1Xk is denoted by Xn, and the product measurable space
(×nk=1Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk) is denoted by (Xn,Fn).
Definition 2.14 [simultaneous observable , simultaneous measurement] For k = 1, 2, . . . , n
consider observable Ok = (Xk, Fk, Fk) in C(Ω). Let (×nk=1Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk) be the product measurable
space. An observable Ô = (×k∈K Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk, F̂ ) in C(Ω) is called the simultaneous observable of
{Ok : k = 1, 2, ..., n}, if it satisfies the following condition:
[F̂ (Ξ1 × Ξ2 × · · · × Ξn)](ω) = [F1(Ξ1)](ω) · [F2(Ξ2)](ω) · · · [Fn(Ξn)](ω)
(∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀Ξk ∈ Fk (k = 1, 2, . . . , n)) (2.7)
Ô is also denoted by×nk=1 Ok, F̂ =×nk=1 Fk. Also, the measurement MC(Ω)(×nk=1 Ok, S[ω]) is called the
simultaneous measurement.
In what follows, let us explain the simultaneous measurement. We want to take two measurements
MC(Ω)(O1, S[ω]) and measurement MC(Ω)(O2, S[ω]). That is, it suffices to image the following:
(b) state
ω(∈Ω)
−−−−−−−→
−→ observable
O1=(X1,F1,F1)
−−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω)(O1,S[ω])
measured value
x1(∈X1)
−→ observable
O2=(X2,F2,F2)
−−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω)(O2,S[ω])
measured value
x2(∈X2)
However, the Copenhagen interpretation(Chap. 1(U4)) says that two measurements can not be taken,
Therefore, combining two observables O1 and O2, we construct the simultaneous observable O1 ×O2, and
take the simultaneous measurement MC(Ω)(O1 × O2, S[ω]) in what follows.
(c) state
ω(∈Ω)
−−−−−−−→ simultaneous observable
O1×O2
−−−−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω)(O1×O2,S[ω])
measured value
(x1,x2)(∈X1×X2)
Example 2.15 [The answer to Problem ] Consider the state space Ω such that Ω = [0, 100], the closed
interval. And consider two observables, that is, ch-observable Och = (X={c, h}, 2X, Fch) (in Example
2.7) and about-observable OAB = (Y (=N10010 ), 2
Y , GAB) (in Example 2.9). Thus, we get the simultane-
ous observable Och × OAB = ({c, h} × N10010 , 2{c,h}×N
100
10 , Fch ×GAB), take the simultaneous measurement
MC(Ω)(Och × OAB, S[ω]). For example, putting ω = 55, we see
(d) when the simultaneous measurement MC(Ω)(Och × OAB, S[55]) is taken, the probability
that the measured value

(c, about 50 ◦C)
(c, about 60 ◦C)
(h, about 50 ◦C)
(h, about 60 ◦C)
 is obtained is given by

0.125
0.125
0.375
0.375
 (2.8)
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That is because
[(Fch ×GAB)({(c, about 50 ◦C)})](55)
=[Fch({c})](55) · [GAB({about 50 ◦C})](55) = 0.25 · 0.5 = 0.125
and similarly,
[(Fch ×GAB)({(c, about 60 ◦C)})](55) = 0.25 · 0.5 = 0.125
[(Fch ×GAB)({(h, about 50 ◦C)})](55) = 0.75 · 0.5 = 0.375
[(Fch ×GAB)({(h, about 60 ◦C)})](55) = 0.75 · 0.5 = 0.375
♠ Note 2.14 The above argument does not have generality. In quantum mechanics, a simultaneous observable
O1 × O2 does not always exist (Note 3.3 and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in Sec.3.4).
2.5.2 ”State is only one” and parallel measurement
For example, consider the following situation:
(a) There are two cups A1 and A2 in which water is filled. Assume that the temperature of the water in
the cup Ak (k = 1, 2) is ωk
◦C (0 ≦ ωk ≦ 100). Consider two questions ”Is the water in the cup A1
cold or hot?” and ”How many degrees( ◦C) is roughly the water in the cup A2?”. This implies that
we take two measurements such that
(♯1): MC(Ω)(Och=({c, h}, 2{c,h}, Fch), S[ω1]) in Example 2.7
(♯2) : MC(Ω) (OAB =(N
100
10 , 2
N
100
10 , GAB), S[ω2]) in Example 2.9
However, as mentioned in the above, ”only one state” must be demanded. Thus, we have the following
problem.
Problem 2.16 Represent two measurementsMC(Ω)(Och=({c, h}, 2{c,h}, Fch), S[ω1]) and MC(Ω)(OAB
=(N10010 , 2
N
100
10 , GAB), S[ω2]) by only one measurement.
This will be answered in what follows.
Definition 2.17 [Parallel observable , parallel measurement] [Parallel observable, parallel measure-
ment]. For each k = 1, 2, ..., n, consider a measurement MC(Ω)k
(
Ok ≡ (X,F , Fk), S[ρp
k
]
)
in a C∗-algebra
C(Ω)k. Put Ĉ(Ω) =
⊗n
k=1 C(Ω)k, i.e., the tensor product C
∗-algebra of {C(Ω)k : k = 1, 2, ..., n}.
Here, consider the tensor product C∗-observable
⊗n
k=1 Ok ≡ (Xn, ⊠ nk=1F , F̂ ≡
⊗n
k=1 Fk ) in Ĉ(Ω) (≡⊗n
k=1 C(Ω)k ) such that:
F̂ (Ξ1 × Ξ2 × · · · × Ξn) = F1(Ξ1)⊗ F2(Ξ2)⊗ · · · ⊗ Fn(Ξn) (∀Ξk ∈ F , k = 1, 2, ..., n). (2.9)
Therefore, we get the measurement M⊗C(Ω)k(
⊗n
k=1Ok, S[
⊗
n
k=1 ρ
p
k
]) in
⊗n
k=1 C(Ω)k, which is also denoted
by
⊗n
k=1MC(Ω)k(Ok, S[ρ
p
k
]) and called the parallel measurement of {MC(Ω)k(Ok, S[ρpk])}nk=1.
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In what follows, let us explain the parallel measurement. We want to take two measurementsMC(Ω)(O1,
S[ω1]) and measurement MC(Ω)(O2, S[ω2]). That is, it suffices to image the following:
(b)

state
ω1(∈Ω1)
−−−−−−−→ observable
O1
−−−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω1)
(O1,S[ω1])
measured value
x1(∈X1)
state
ω2(∈Ω2)
−−−−−−−→ observable
O2
−−−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω2)
(O2,S[ω2])
measured value
x2(∈X2)
However, the Copenhagen interpretation(Chap. 1(U4)) says that two measurements can not be taken, Let
us regard two states ω1 and ω2 as one state (ω1, ω2) (∈ Ω1×Ω2). And further, combining two observables
O1 and O2, we construct the simultaneous observable O1 × O2, and take the simultaneous measurement
MC(Ω1×Ω2)(O1 ⊗ O2, S[(ω1,ω2)]) in what follows.
(c) state
(ω1,ω2)(∈Ω1×Ω2)
−→ parallel observable
O1⊗O2
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω1×Ω2)
(O1⊗O2,S[(ω1,ω2)])
measured value
(x1,x2)(∈X1×X2)
Example 2.18 [Answer to Problem 2.16] Put Ω1 = Ω2 = [0, 100], and define the state space Ω1×Ω2.
And consider two observables, that is, ch-observable Och = (X={c, h}, 2X, Fch) in C(Ω1) (in Example 2.7)
and about-observable OAB = (Y (=N10010 ), 2
Y , GAB) in C(Ω2) (in Example 2.9). Thus, we get the parallel
observable Och×OAB = ({c, h}×N10010 , 2{c,h}×N
100
10 , Fch⊗GAB) in C(Ω1×Ω2), take the parallel measurement
MC(Ω1×Ω2)(Och ⊗ OAB, S[(ω1,ω2)]). For example, putting (ω1, ω2) = (25, 55), we see the following.
(d) When the parallel measurement MC(Ω1×Ω2)(Och ⊗ OAB, S[(25,55)]) is taken, the probability
that the measured value

(c, about 50 ◦C)
(c, about 60 ◦C)
(h, about 50 ◦C)
(h, about 60 ◦C)
 is obtained is given by

0.375
0.375
0.125
0.125

That is because
[(Fch ⊗GAB)({(c, about 50 ◦C)})](25, 55)
=[Fch({c})](25) · [GAB({about 50 ◦C})](55) = 0.75 · 0.5 = 0.375
Thus, similarly,
[(Fch ⊗GAB)({(c, about 60 ◦C)})](25, 55) = 0.75 · 0.5 = 0.375
[(Fch ⊗GAB)({(h, about 50 ◦C)})](25, 55) = 0.25 · 0.5 = 0.125
[(Fch ⊗GAB)({(h, about 60 ◦C)})](25, 55) = 0.25 · 0.5 = 0.125
Remark 2.19 Also, for example, putting (ω1, ω2) = (55, 55), we see: ;
(e) parallel measurement MC(Ω1×Ω2)(Och ⊗ OAB, S[(55,55)]), Therefore,
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The probability that a measured value

(c, about 50 ◦C)
(c, about 60 ◦C)
(h, about 50 ◦C)
(h, about 60 ◦C)
 is obtained is given by

0.125
0.125
0.375
0.375
 (2.10)
That is because, we similarly, see
[Fch({c})](55) · [GAB({about 50 ◦C})](55) = 0.25 · 0.5 = 0.125
[Fch({c})](55) · [GAB({about 60 ◦C})](55) = 0.25 · 0.5 = 0.125
[Fch({h})](55) · [GAB({about 50 ◦C})](55) = 0.75 · 0.5 = 0.375
[Fch({c})](55) · [GAB({about 60 ◦C})](55) = 0.75 · 0.5 = 0.375
This is the same as Example 2.15 (cf. Note 2.15 later).
The follow is obvious, it is deep.
Theorem 2.20 The sample probability space of a simultaneous measurement MC(Ω)(×nk=1 Ok, S[ω]) is
the same as that of a parallel measurement MC(Ωn) (
⊗n
k=1 Ok, S[⊗nk=1ω]).
Proof.
(2.7) = ”(2.9) in the case that ωk = ω (∀k = 1, 2, . . . , n)”.
Thus, the proof is immediately follows.
♠ Note 2.15 Theorem 2.20 is rather deep in the following sense. For example, ”To toss a coin 10 times”
is a simultaneous measurement. On the other hand, ”To toss 10 coins once” is characterized as a parallel
measurement. The two have the same sample space. This means that the two are not distinguished by the
sample space and not the measurements (i.e., a simultaneous measurement and a parallel measurement).
However, this is peculiar to classical pure measurements. It does not hold in classical mixed measurements
and quantum measurement.
2.5.3 The law of Large Numbers — How to find out the sample space
Let O = (X,F , F ) be an observable in C(Ω). Consider its n-dimensional parallel observable O˜(=⊗n
k=1 O) = (X
n,Fn, F˜ (=⊗nk=1 F )) in C(Ωn). That is,
[F˜ (Ξ1 × Ξ2 × · · · × Ξn)](ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn) = [F (Ξ1)](ω1)[F (Ξ1)](ω2) · · · [F (Ξn)](ωn)
(∀(ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn) ∈ Ωn, ∀Ξk ∈ F (k = 1, 2, . . . , n))
Further, put M+1(X) = {ν : ν is a probability measure on X }. Define the map w : Xn →M+1(X)
such that,
[w(x1, x2, . . . , xn)](Ξ) =
♯[{k : xk ∈ Ξ}]
n
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
χ
Ξ
(πk(x˜)) =
1
n
n∑
k=1
χ
Ξ
(xk)
∀Ξ ∈ F , ∀x˜ = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn
where ♯[A] = “the number of the elements of a set A”, χ is a characteristic function such that χ
Ξ
(x) =
1 (x ∈ Ξ), = 0 (x /∈ Ξ), πk : Xn → X is defined by πk(x˜) =πk(x1, x2, . . . , xk, . . . , xn) = xk
Before we present Theorem 2.21( the weal law of large numbers in measurement theory), we add the
following note.
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♠ Note 2.16 The weak law of large numbers in probability theory is as follows.
(♯) Let (X,F , P ) be a probability space. Consider its n-dimensional product probability space (Xn,Fn, Pn).
Let f : X → R be a measurable function such that ∫
X
f(x)P (dx) = µ and
∫
X
|f(x) − µ|2P (dx) = σ2.
Then it holds that
Pn({(x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ Xn | |
∑n
k=1 f(xk)
n
− µ| > ε}) ≦ σ
2
ε2n
(∀ε > 0, ∀n = 1, 2, ...)
This theorem, discovered by Jacob Bernoulli (1654-1705) and was announced in 1713 (after his death), is
the most fundamental assertion in science. Recall that mathematics is independent of our world. Thus some
may ask that
Why is a mathematical theorem (♯) useful?
This is due to the fact that the mathematical theorem (♯) sinks into the widely ordinary language 0© in the
following diagram:
(X1)
(Chap.1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic scientific language
(Newtonian mechanics, etc.)
2©linguistic scientific language
(measurement theory, etc.)
However, the following theorem 2.21 ( the weak law of large numbers in measurement theory ) is not in
0© but 2©.
Theorem 2.21 [The weak law of large numbers in measurement theory(cf. [10, 11, 13])] Suppose
the above parallel measurement MC(Ωn)(
⊗n
k=1 O, S[(ω,...,ω)]) in C(Ω
n). For any ǫ > 0 and any Ξ ( ∈ F),
define D̂Ξ,ǫ ( ∈ ⊠ nk=1F ) by
D̂Ξ,ǫ =
{
x˜ = (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ Xn :
∣∣∣[w(x˜)](Ξ) − [F (Ξ)](ω)∣∣∣< ǫ}.
Then we see that
1− 1
4ǫ2n
≤ [F̂ (D̂Ξ,ǫ)](ω, ..., ω) ≤ 1, (∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀Ξ ∈ F , ∀ǫ > 0, ∀n). (2.11)
Proof. ω ∈ Ω, Ξ ∈ F . Define µ and σ such that
µ =
∫
X
χΞ(x)[F (dx)](ω) = [F (Ξ)](ω)
σ2 =
∫
X
|χ
Ξ
(x) − µ|2[F (dx)](ω) = [F (Ξ)](ω)(1 − [F (Ξ)](ω))
Then, the law of large numbers (Note 2.16) says that
[F̂ (Xn \ D˜Ξ,ε)](ω, ω, . . . , ω) ≦ σ
2
ε2n
=
1
ε2n
[F (Ξ)](ω)(1 − [F (Ξ)](ω))
=
1
ε2n
(1
4
− ([F (Ξ)](ω) − 1
2
)2
)
≦
1
4ε2n
Thus, we get (2.11)
♠ Note 2.17 As mentioned in Note 1.1, we believe that:
(♯1) Behind a useful mathematical theory, the powerful world view is always hidden
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Because mathematic itself is independent of our world. In fact,
(♯2) In the proof of Theorem 2.21(The law of large numbers in measurement theory), we can find the law
of large numbers in probability theory ((♯)) in Note 2.16).
Therefore, for example,
mathematics world-description method
differential geometry the theory of relativity
differential equation Newton mechanics, electromagnetism
Hilbert space quantum mechanics
probability theory
(Hilbert space)
measurement theory
♠ Note 2.18 Now we can expect readers to believe in our assertion that
(♯1) There is the metaphysics (called measurement theory) in the center of sciences.
♠ Note 2.19 As mentioned in Chap. 8, measurement theory is deeply related to traditional philosophies. For
example, we see:
linguistic method(language is before world) · · · Saussure(Sec.8.1)
state and observable · · ·Locke’s primary quantity and secondary quantity
only one measurement · · · only one state, no movement (Parmenides )
observer’s time(Note 2.8) · · ·Augustine’s time, McTaggart’s paradox([27, 14])
(the interpretation made dwarfish in Note 6.6)
primary substance · secondary substance · · ·The problem of universals([12])
observable is before state · · ·Recognition constitutes the world
(Kant Copernican turn cf. Sec.8.1)
3 From Quantum Mechanics to Measurement Theory
As mention in Chap. 1, we assert that
(♯) quantum mechanics
(physics)
proverbalizing−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(linguistic turn)
measurement theory
(scientific language)
Therefore, first we shall review the elementary step of quantum mechanics. And further, we derive Axiompc
1 in Sec.2.2 from Born’s quantum measurement theory. Discussing EPR-paradox, Schro¨dinger’s cat, Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle we study the spirit of quantum mechanics. However, our assertion (i.e., the
linguistic world-view) is the reverse arrow of the (♯), that is, ”from measurement theory to quantum mechan-
ics”. This will be discussed in Sec. 9.3.
3.1 The quick review on quantum mechanics
quantum mechanics is composed of two axioms (i.e., ”Born’s quantum measurement theory” and ”quantum
kinetic equation”). That is,
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quantum mechanics
(physics)
:=
[quantum measurement]
measurement
[Born’s probabilistic interpretation]
+
[kinetic equation]
causality
[quantum kinetic equation ]
In Sec.3.2, we derive classical measurement theory(Axiompc 1) from quantum mechanics(Born’s quan-
tum measurement theory). This is rather concrete. For the abstract argument, see [8, 11].
3.1.1 Born’s quantum measurement theory
Let C be the complex field (i.e., the set of all complex numbers). Let Cn be the n-dimensional complex
space. That is,
Cn =
{
α =

α1
α2
...
αn
 ∣∣∣ α1, α2, . . . , αnis complex number}
The inner product 〈·, ·〉 and the norm || · || is respectively defined by
〈α, β〉 =
n∑
k=1
αk · βk, ||α|| = |〈α, α〉|1/2 (∀α, ∀β ∈ Cn)
(where αk is the conjugate complex number of αk). H = Cn is called the n-dimensional Hilbert space.
Also, an infinite dimensional Hilbert space C∞ is defined by H = {α ∈ C∞ | ||α|| = (
∞∑
k=1
αk ·αk)1/2 <∞}.
Define the state space Ω̂ such that Ω̂(⊂ Cn). That is,
Ω̂ =
{
α ∈ Cn | ||α|| = 1}
where α and β are identified if α = eθ
√−1β (fore some θ ∈ R). The ω(∈ Ω̂) is called the state.
Let B(Cn) be the set of all n× n-complex matrices. That is,
B(Cn) =
{
A =
a11 · · · a1n... ... ...
an1 · · · ann
 ∣∣∣ aij is complex numbers}
which is called the basic algebra. The matrix A(∈ B(Cn)) is said to be non-negative Hermitian matrix if
it satisfies the following conditions (i) and (ii):
(i) A is Hermitian, that is, A = A∗, (where A∗ is the conjugate transposed matrix)
(ii) A ≧ 0, That is, 〈α,Aα〉 ≧ 0 (∀α ∈ Cn)
For simplicity, assume that the measured value space X is finite set. The triplet O = (X, 2X , F ) is
called an observable in the basic algebraB(Cn), if it satisfies the following (cf. [3]):
(i) The map F : 2X → B(Cn) satisfies that (a): F (∅) = 0(= 0−matrix), F (X) = I(= unit matrix) (b):
for each Ξ ∈ 2X , F (Ξ) is a non-negative Hermite matrix.
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(ii) for each Ξ ∈ 2X , it holds that F (Ξ) = ∑
x∈Ξ
F ({x})
Also, the observable O = (X, 2X , F ) is said to be a projective observable, if it satisfies that F (Ξ) = (F (Ξ))2
(∀Ξ ∈ 2X).
Here, we have the quantum measurement MB(Cn)(O = (X, 2
X , F ), S[ω]) (where ω ∈ Ω̂ ). That is,
quantum measurement MB(Cn)(O, S[ω])
= the quantum measurement of the observable O for the measuring object S with a quantum
state ω(∈ Ω̂)
Under the above preparation, we can introduce ”Born’s quantum measurement theory” as follows.
Axiom(Q) 1 [Born’s quantum measurement theory]
Consider a measurement MB(Cn)(O := (X, 2
X , F ), S[ω]) formulated in a basic algebra B(C
n).
Assume that the measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained by the measurement MB(Cn)(O, S[ω]).
Then, the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained is given by 〈ω, F ({x})ω〉.
Also, the parallel quantum measurement
⊗N
k=1MB(Cn)(O, S[ω]) is possible, and thus, we can get the
sample probability space (X,F , 〈ω, F (·)ω〉).
♠ Note 3.1 Since quantum mechanics is physics, the following terms have reality:
(♯) measurement, observer, measuring object, state, observable (≈measuring instrument), measured value
, probability
Now, we shall show that an Hermitian matrix A(∈ B(Cn)) can be regarded as a projective observable.
For simplicity, this is shown in the case that n = 3. We see (for simplicity, assume that xj 6= xk(if j 6= k) )
A = U∗
x1 0 00 x2 0
0 0 x3
U (3.1)
where U (∈ B(C3)) is the unitary matrix, xk ∈ R). Putting X = {x1, x2, x3},
FA({x1}) = U∗
1 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
U, FA({x2}) = U∗
0 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
U,
FA({x3}) = U∗
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 1
U
the, we get the projective observable OA = (X, 2
X , FA) in B(C3). Thus, we have the following identifica-
tion:
A
(Hermitian matrix)
←→ OA = (X, 2X , FA)
(projective observable )
(3.2)
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Let A(∈ B(Cn)) be an Hermitian matrix. Under the identification (3.2), we have the quantum mea-
surement MB(Cn)(OA, S[ω]). Born’s quantum measurement theory say that
The probability that a measured value x(∈ X) is obtained by the quantummeasurementMB(Cn)(OA, S[ω])
is given by 〈ω, FA({x})ω〉.
Therefore, the expectation of a measured value is given by∫
X
x〈ω, FA(dx)ω〉 =
∑
xi∈X
xi〈ω, FA({xi})ω〉 = 〈ω,Aω〉
Also, its variance (δωA)
2 is given by
(δωA)
2 =
∑
xi∈X
(xi − 〈ω,Aω〉)2〈ω, FA({xi})ω〉 = 〈Aω,Aω〉 − |〈ω,Aω〉|2 (3.3)
Quantum measurement theory( Stern–Gerlach experiment Schtern–Gerlach experiment (1922))
Assume that we examine the beam (of silver particles) after passing through the magnetic field. Then,
as seen in the following figure, we see that all particles are deflected either equally upwards or equally
downwards in a 50:50 ratio. See Fig. 3.1.
S
N
electron e
state ω =
[
α1
α2
]
[↑]
U©
[↓] D©
Screen
Figure 3.1: Stern–Gerlach experiment (1922)
Consider the two dimensional Hilbert space V = C2, And therefore, we get the non-commutative basic
algebra C(Ω) = B(V )(= Bc(V )), that is, the algebra composed of all 2 × 2 matrices. Note that C(Ω) =
B(V ) = Bc(V ) since the dimension of V is finite.
The spin state of an electron e is represented by ω ∈Ω̂(⊂ C2). Put ω =
[
α1
α2
]
( where, ||ω||2 =
|α1|2 + |α2|2 = 1 ).
Define Oz ≡ (Z, 2Z , Fz), the spin observable concerning the z-axis, such that, Z = {↑, ↓} and
Fz({↑}) =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, Fz({↓}) =
[
0 0
0 1
]
,
Fz(∅) =
[
0 0
0 0
]
, Fz({↑, ↓}) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
.
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Here, Born’s quantum measurement theory (the probabilistic interpretation of quantum mechanics)
says that
When a quantum measurementMB(C2)(O, S[ω]) is taken, the probability that
a measured value
[ ↑
↓
]
is obtained is given by
 〈ω, F z({↑})ω〉 = |α1|2
〈ω, F z({↓})ω〉 = |α2|2

That is, putting ω (=
[
α1
α2
]
∈ Ω̂), we says that
When the electron with a spin state state ω progresses in a magnetic field,
the probability that the Geiger counter
[
U©
D©
]
sounds
is give by

[
α1 α2
] [1 0
0 0
] [
α1
α2
]
= |α1|2
[
α1 α2
] [0 0
0 1
] [
α1
α2
]
= |α2|2

EPR-paradox
Next, let us explain EPR-paradox (Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen) [4, 30]). Consider Two electrons P1 and
P2 and their spins. The tensor Hilbert space H = C2 ⊗ C2 is defined in what follows. That is,
e1 =
[
1
0
]
, e2 =
[
0
1
]
(i.e., the complete orthonormal system {e1, e2} in the C2),
C2 ⊗ C2 = {
∑
i,j=1,2
αijei ⊗ ej | αij ∈ C, i, j = 1, 2}
Put u =
∑
i,j=1,2
αijei ⊗ ej and v =
∑
i,j=1,2
βijei ⊗ ej. And the inner product 〈u, v〉
C2⊗C2
is defined by
〈u, v〉
C2⊗C2
=
∑
i,j=1,2
αi,j · βi,j
Therefore, we have the tensor Hilbert space H = C2 ⊗ C2 with the complete orthonormal system
{e1 ⊗ e1, e1 ⊗ e2, e2 ⊗ e1, e2 ⊗ e2}.
For each F ∈ B(C2) and G ∈ B(C2), define the F ⊗ G ∈ B(C2 ⊗ C2) (i.e., linear operator F ⊗ G :
C2 ⊗ C2 → C2 ⊗ C2 ) such that
(F ⊗G)(u ⊗ v) = Fu⊗Gv
Let us define the singlet state s(∈ C2 ⊗ C2) of two particles P1 and P2 by
s =
1√
2
(e1 ⊗ e2 − e2 ⊗ e1)
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Here, we see that 〈s, s〉
C2⊗C2
= 12 〈e1 ⊗ e2 − e2 ⊗ e1, e1 ⊗ e2 − e2 ⊗ e1〉C2⊗C2 = 12 (1 + 1) = 1, and thus, s
is a state. Also, assume that
two particles P1 and P2 are far.
Let O = (X, 2X , F z) in B(C2) (where X = {↑, ↓} ) be the spin observable concerning the z-axis such
that
F z({↑}) =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, F z({↓}) =
[
0 0
0 1
]
The parallel observable O⊗ O = (X2, 2X × 2X , F z ⊗ F z) in B(C2 ⊗ C2) is defined by
(F z ⊗ F z)({(↑, ↑)}) = F z({↑})⊗ F z({↑}),
(F z ⊗ F z)({(↓, ↑)}) = F z({↓})⊗ F z({↑})
(F z ⊗ F z)({(↑, ↓)}) = F z({↑})⊗ F z({↓}),
(F z ⊗ F z)({(↓, ↓)}) = F z({↓})⊗ F z({↓})
Thus, we get the measurementMB(C2⊗C2)(O⊗O, S[s]) The, Born’s quantum measurement theory says that
When the parallel measurementmeasurement MB(C2⊗C2)(O⊗ O, S[s]) is taken,
the probability that the measured value

(↑, ↑)
(↓, ↑)
(↑, ↓)
(↓, ↓)
 is obtained
is given by

〈s, (F z ⊗ F z)({(↑, ↑)})s〉
C2⊗C2
= 0
〈s, (F z ⊗ F z)({(↓, ↑)})s〉
C2⊗C2
= 0.5
〈s, (F z ⊗ F z)({(↑, ↓)})s〉
C2⊗C2
= 0.5
〈s, (F z ⊗ F z)({(↓, ↓)})s〉
C2⊗C2
= 0
 (3.4)
That is because, F z({↑})e1 = e1, F z({↓})e2 = e2, F z({↑})e2 = F z({↓})e1 = 0 For example,
〈s, (F z ⊗ F z)({(↑, ↓)})s〉
C2⊗C2
=
1
2
〈(e1 ⊗ e2 − e2 ⊗ e1), (F z({↑})⊗ F z({↓})(e1 ⊗ e2 − e2 ⊗ e1)〉
C2⊗C2
=
1
2
〈(e1 ⊗ e2 − e2 ⊗ e1), e1 ⊗ e2〉
C2⊗C2
=
1
2
Here, it should be noted that we can assume that the x1 and the x2 (in (x1, x2) ∈ { (↑z, ↑z), (↑z, ↓z),
(↓z, ↑z), (↓z, ↓z)}) are respectively obtained in Tokyo and in New York (or, in the earth and in the polar
star).
(b)
(probability 1
2
)
↑z
Tokyo
↓z
New York
or
(c)
(probability 1
2
)
↓z
Tokyo
↑z
New York
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This fact is, figuratively speaking, explained as follows:
• Immediately after the particle in Tokyo is measured and the measured value ↑z [resp. ↓z] is observed,
the particle in Tokyo informs the particle in New York “Your measured value has to be ↓z [resp.
↑z]”.
Therefore, the above fact implies that quantum mechanics says that there is something faster than light.
This is essentially the same as the de Broglie paradox (cf. [30]. Also see §9.3.3). That is,
• if we admit quantum mechanics, we must also admit the fact that there is
something faster than light (i.e., so called ”non-locality”). (3.5)
♠ Note 3.2 As shown and emphasized in [16], quantum syllogism does not generally hold. We believe that this
fact was, for the first time, discovered in EPR-paradox [4]. The reason that we think so is as follows. Consider
the two-particles system composed of particles P1 and P2, which is formulated in a Hilbert space L
2(R2). Let
ρs(∈ Sp(Bc(L2(R2))) be the EPR-state in EPR-paradox (or, the singlet state in Bohm’s situation). Here,
consider as follows:
(Z1) Assume that (x1, p2) and p
′
2 are obtained by the simultaneous measurement of [ the position of P1, the
momentum of P2] and [the momentum of P2]. Since it is clear that p2 = p
′
2, thus, we see that
(x1, p2)
[the position of P1, the momentum of P2] )
=⇒ p2
[the momentum of P2]
Here, for the definition of “=⇒”, see ref. [8].
(Z2) Assume that p1 and p2 are obtained by the simultaneous measurement of [the momentum of P1] and
[the momentum of P2]. Since the state ρs(∈ Sp(Bc(L2(R2))) is the EPR-state, we see that p1 = −p2,
that is, we see that
p2
[ the momentum of P2 ]
=⇒ −p2
[the momentum of P1]
(Z3) Therefore, if quantum syllogism holds, (Z1) and (Z2) imply that
−p2
[the momentum of P1]
that is, the momentum of P1 is equal to −p2.
Since the above (Z1)- (Z3) is not the approximately simultaneous measurement (cf. the definition (N)), it
is not related to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Theorem 3.2 later). Thus, the conclusion (Z3) is not
contradictory to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. However, now we can say that the conclusion (Z3) is not
true. That is because the interpretation (H2) (i.e., only one measurement is permitted) says, as seen in [13],
that quantum syllogism does not hold by the non-commutativity of the above three observables, i.e.,
[the position of P1, the momentum of P2]
[the momentum of P2]
[the momentum of P1]
Thus we see that EPR-paradox is closely related to the fact that quantum syllogism does not hold in general.
3.1.2 Supplement — Bell’s inequality
Let us have the argument in the previous section develop.
Put a = (a1, a2) ∈ R2, |a| =
√|a1|2 + |a2|2 = 1. Define the observable Oa = (X={1,−1}, 2X , Fa) in
B(C2) such that
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Fa({1}) = 1
2
[
1 a1 − a2
√−1
a1 + a2
√−1 1
]
,
Fa({−1}) = 1
2
[
1 −a1 + a2
√−1
−a1 − a2
√−1 1
]
.
Further, put b = (b1, b2) ∈ R2, |b| =
√|b1|2 + |b2|2 = 1, and, by the same way, define the observable Ob =(
X={1,−1}, 2X, Fb
)
in B(C2).
♠ Note 3.3 For example, assume that a = (1, 0), b = (1/√2, 1/√2). Then, the simultaneous observable Oa×Ob
in B(C2) does not exist. The proof is easy, thus, it is omitted.
Of course, we have the parallel observable O˜ab (=Oa ⊗ Ob) = (X2, 2X2 , Fa ⊗ Fb) in B(C2 ⊗ C2).
And further, we have themeasurement MB(C2⊗C2)(O˜ab, S[s]), where s is a singlet state. Born’s quantum
measurement theory says that
The probability that a measured value x˜ ( = (x1, x2)) ∈ X2 (={1,−1}2) is obtained by the measure-
ment MB(C2⊗C2)(O˜ab, S[s]) is given by νab({(x1, x2)}), where
νab({(x1, x2)}) = 〈s,
(
(Fa ⊗ Fb)({(x1, x2)})
)
s〉
C2⊗C2
(3.6)
Now, define the correlation function Cab by
Cab =
∫
X2
x1 · x2 νab(dx1dx2) =
∫
X2
x1 · x2 〈s,
(
(Fa ⊗ Fb)(dx1dx2)
)
s〉
C2⊗C2
=
∑
(x1,x2)∈X2
x1 · x2〈s,
(
(Fa ⊗ Fb)({(x1, x2)})
)
s〉
C2⊗C2
A simple calculation shows( cf. [30]),
= a1b1 + a2b2
Here, put a1(= (a11, a
1
2)), a
2(= (a21, a
2
2)), b
1(= (b11, b
1
2)), b
2(= (b21, b
2
2)). And we have the following four
measurements:
MB(C2⊗C2)(O˜a1b1 , S[s]), MB(C2⊗C2)(O˜a1b2 , S[s]),
MB(C2⊗C2)(O˜a2b1 , S[s]), MB(C2⊗C2)(O˜a2b2 , S[s])
Therefore, we have the parallel measurement
⊗
i,j=1,2MB(C2⊗C2)(O˜aibj , S[s]). We easily see that, for each
x ∈ {−1, 1},
νa1b1({x} ×X) = νa1b2({x} ×X), νa1b1(X × {x}) = νa2b1(X × {x})
νa2b1({x} ×X) = νa2b2({x} ×X), νa1b2(X × {x}) = νa2b2(X × {x})
Here, put
a1 = (0, 1), b1 =
( 1√
2
,
1√
2
)
, a2 = (1, 0), b2 =
( 1√
2
,− 1√
2
)
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then, we see
|Ca1b1 − Ca1b2 | + |Ca2b1 + Ca2b2 | = 2
√
2 (3.7)
♠ Note 3.4 The theoretical conclusion (3.7) is completely verified by experiment (cf. [30]). Also, the inequality
such as
(♯) ”formula like the left-hand side of (3.7)” ≦ 2
is called ”Bell’s inequality”. For example, in mathematics, Bell’s inequality is as follows. Let (Y,G, µ) be
a probability space. Consider each measurable functionfk : Y → {−1, 1}, (k = 1, 2, 3, 4). And put C13 =∫
Y
f1(y) · f3(y)µ(dy), C14 =
∫
Y
f1(y) · f4(y)µ(dy), C23 =
∫
Y
f2(y) · f3(y)µ(dy), C24 =
∫
Y
f2(y) · f4(y)µ(dy).
Then, adding the proof, we can mention Bell’s inequality as follows.
|C13 − C14|+ |C23 + C24|
=|
∫
Y
f1(y) · f3(y)− f1(y) · f4(y)µ(dy)|+ |
∫
Y
f2(y) · f3(y)− f2(y) · f4(y)µ(dy)| ≦ 2
3.2 The derivation of Axiompc 1 from Born’s quantum measurement
Let us derive Axiompc 1 from Born’s quantum measurement. That is,
Born’s quantum measurement
(quantum mechanics)
−−−−−−−−→
Derivation
Axiompc 1
(measurement theory)
Let H be a Hilbert space such that H = Cn. In this case, we restrict the state space Ω˜(⊂ Ω̂ ⊂ Cn)
such that
Ω˜ = {e1, e2, . . . , en} =


1
0
...
0
 ,

0
1
...
0
 , . . . ,

0
0
...
1


Thus, e(∈ Ω˜) is called a state.
Further, define BD(Cn) by all n× n-diagonal matrices, which is called a basic structure.
(a) The above argument is not physical but mathematics. we do not mind it since our interest is the
linguistic aspect of quantum mechanics.
Assume that a measured value space X is finite. The triple O˜ = (X, 2X , F˜ ) is called an observable in
BD(Cn), if it satisfies the following (i) and (ii):
(i) O˜ = (X, 2X , F˜ ) is an observable in B(Cn).
(ii) For each Ξ ∈ 2X , F˜ (Ξ) is a diagonal .
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Now we have the (diagonal matrices type) quantum measurement MBD(Cn)(O˜, S[e]) (where e ∈ Ω˜ ). That
is,
MBD(Cn)(O˜, S[e])
= The measurement of the observable O˜ in BD(Cn) for the system with the statee(∈ Ω˜)
And we have the (diagonal matrices type) quantum measurement theory as follows.
Axiom(D) 1 quantum measurement diagonal matrix type
Consider a measurement MBD(Cn)(O˜= (X, 2
X , F˜ ), S[e]) formulated in a basic algebra BD(C
n).
Assume that the measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained by the measurement MBD(Cn)(O˜, S[e]).
Then, the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained is given by 〈e, F˜ ({x})e〉.
Now, let O˜ = (X, 2X , F˜ ) be an observable in BD(Cn). Thus, for each x(∈ X), we see that
F˜ ({x}) =

f11({x}) 0 · · · 0
0 f22({x}) · · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · fnn({x})
 ∈ BD(Cn)
Here, a discrete metric space Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn} is regarded as a space. For each x ∈ X , define
fx : Ω→ R such that
fx(ωk) = fkk({x})
(
= 〈ek, F˜ ({x})ek〉
)
(∀k = 1, 2, . . . , n)
Then, we can regard {fx}x∈X as the resolution of the unity on Ω. Thus, putiing
[F (Ξ)](ω) =
∑
x∈Ξ
fx(ω) (∀ω ∈ Ω) (3.8)
we get the observable O = (X, 2X , F ) in C(Ω). Therefore, under the following identification:
 observable O˜ = (X, 2X , F˜ ) in BD(Cn)
Ω˜ = {e1, e2, ..., en} ∋ ek

 ←→
identification

 observable O = (X, 2X , F ) in C(Ω)
ωk ∈ {ω1, ω2, ..., ωn} = Ω


we see
(diagonal matrix type) quantum measurement MBD(Cn)(O˜, S[ek ])
= classical measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[ωk])
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Axiompc 1 (measurement: finite Ω)
Consider a measurement MC(Ω)(O= (X, 2
X , F ), S[ω]) formulated in a basic algebra C(Ω). Then,
the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O=
(X, 2X , F ), S[ω]) is given by [F ({x})](ω).
If it writes without carrying out simple, we see:
(b) When an observer takes a measurement of an observable O=(X, 2X , F ) (or, by a measuring
instrumentO ) for a measuring object with a state ω, the probability that a measured value
belongs to Ξ(∈ 2X) is given by [F (Ξ)](ω).
♠ Note 3.5 Note that A measurement MB(Cn)(O := (X, 2X , F ), S[ω]) in Axiompc 1 (The probabilistic in-
terpretation of quantum mechnaics) is physics, but a measurement MC(Ω)(O= (X, 2
X , F ), S[ω]) in Axiom
p
c
1(Measurement; finite Ω) is language.
This is the mechanism of the derivation such that
(c) Born’s quantum measurement
(quantum mechanics)
−−−−−−−−→
Derivation
Axiompc 1
(measurement theory)
However, the above is merely the starting point. Our purpose is to asser as follows.
(d) What is important is to show the power of classical measurement theory, and to decalre that it is a
scientific language. That is, we have to show that Axiompc 1 is the most powerful proverb in sceince.
3.3 Schro¨dinger’s cat
In what follows, we expain our opinion about the Copenhagen interpretation.
3.3.1 The Copenhagen interpretation — measured value is perceived by the brain —
Schro¨dinger’s cat is the most famous paradox in quantum science.
[Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox]. Note that Schro¨dinger’s cat does not appear in the world of measurement
theory. Let us explain it as follows: In 1935 (cf. [?]) Schro¨dinger published an essay describing the
conceptual problems in quantum mechanics. A brief paragraph in this essay described the cat paradox.
(a) Suppose we put a cat in a cage with a radioactive atom, a Geiger counter, and a poison gas bottle;
further suppose that the atom in the cage has a half-life of one hour, a fifty-fifty chance of decaying
within the hour. If the atom decays, the Geiger counter will tick; the triggering of the counter will
get the lid off the poison gas bottle, which will kill the cat. If the atom does not decay, none of the
above things happen, and the cat will be alive. Now the question:
(b) We then ask: What is the state of the cat after one hour?
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The answer according to quantum mechanics is that
(c) the cat is in a state which can be thought of as half-alive and half-dead, that is, the state such as
“Fig.3.2(♯1)” +“Fig.3.2(♯2))”
2 (or more theoretocally,
|“Fig.3.2(♯1)” 〉+|“Fig.3.2(♯2))” 〉√
2
).
Fig.3.2(♯1)
· · ·
✻
tick !
Fig.3.2(♯1)
cat cat
poison gas
Figure 3.2: Schro¨dinger’s cat
Of course, this answer (A) is curious. This is the so-called Schro¨dinger’s cat paradox. This paradox is
due to the fact that micro mechanics and macro mechanics are mixed in the above situation. On the
other hand, as seen in (2.38), micro mechanics (= quantum measurement theory) and macro mechanics (=
classical measurement theory) are always separated in measurement theory. Therefore, Schro¨dinger’s cat
does not appear in the world of measurement theory, though this may be a surface solution of Schro¨dinger’s
cat paradox.
(d) At the moment of the measurement (i.e., at the moment of having opened the window of the box
and seeing inside), ”alive” or ”dead” is determined. That is,
half-alive and half-dead
At the moment of having opened the window of the box−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
and seeing inside
{
alive
dead
This is famous Schro¨dinger cat paradox. For author’s opinion, see Note 3.6. Here, note that
(e1) ”At the moment of the measurement” means that ”At the moment that the signal reach observer’s
brain”
The readers may doubt it. However, the dualism is to partition ”brain” and ”matter”.
Thus, the dualism says that
(e2) There is no measurement without our brain.
Some may think, from the point of the realistic view, that the (e2) is absurd. However, out proposal is
linguistic. We think that this (e2) is also one of the (linguistic) Copenhagen interpretation.
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♠ Note 3.6 The cause of ”confusion” is because it is caught by realism. According to the linguistic world-view
(i.e., ””The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” due to Wittgenstein, Chap. 8 (m)),
(♯) Schro¨dinger’s cat is out of the description of measurement theory, and thus, Schro¨dinger’s cat does not
exist (cf .[14, 16]).
3.4 Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
3.4.1 The thought experiment by γ-rays microscope
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle[5] is the following Proposition 3.1 [(i) and (ii)]. This is usually said to
be the greatest scientific result in the 20-th century. However, as mentioned is the following section, it is
doubtful.
Proposition 3.1 [Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation] (cf. [5]).
(i) The particle position q and momentum p can be measured “simultaneously”, if the “errors” ∆(q)
and ∆(p) in determining the particle position and momentum are permitted to be non-zero.
(ii) Moreover, for any ǫ > 0 , we can take the above “approximate simultaneous” measurement of the
position q and momentum p such that ∆(q) < ǫ (or ∆(p) < ǫ ). However, the following Heisenberg’s
uncertainty relation holds:
∆(q) ·∆(p) ≥ ~
2
, (3.9)
for all “approximate simultaneous” measurements of the particle position and momentum.
✲
✻
z
x
2ε
electron e ✛
~ν
an object lens
Figure 3.3: The thought experiment by γ-rays microscope
Heisenberg’s argument ( the thought experiment by γ-rays ) is formed by the following two approximate
equalities (3.10) and (3.11):
∆x =
λ
sin ε
( the optical resolution (concerning x-axixs), λ: wavelength) (3.10)
Also, as seen in Fig. 3.3, the error of the momentum px (x-axis direction) is, by Compton recoil, estimeted
as
∆px =
~ν
c
sin ε (c: light speed, thus, c = λ · ν )) (3.11)
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Thus, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (3.9) is obtained by
∆x ·∆px = (3.10)× (3.11) ≈ ~
For precise argument, see [32], in which my favorite explanation is written.
However, it should be noted that the above is not argument in the framework of quantum mechanics.
♠ Note 3.7 We think that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle(Proposition 3.1) is meaningless. That is because
For example,
(♯) The approximate measurement and ”error” in Proposition 3.1 are not defined.
This will be improved in Theorem 3.4 in the framwork of quantum mechanics. That is, Heisenber’s thought
experiment is an execellent idea before the discovery of quantum mechanics. Some may ask that
If it be so, why is Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Proposition 3.1) famous?
The author thinks that
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (Proposition 3.1) was used as the slogan for advertisement of quantum
mechanics in order to emphasize the difference between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics.
3.4.2 The quantam mechanical formulation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle
We think that the standard Copenhagen interpretation says that
A measurement is not related to an interaction
Therefore, we do not trust Heisenberg’s thought experiment by γ-rays, which clearly is related to a thing
like an interaction.
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is often misunderstood as Robertson’s uncertainty reltion as follows.
Theorem 3.2 [Robertson’s uncertainty principle ] For simplicity, Put H = Cn. Let A, B (∈ B(Cn))
be Hermitian, thereffore, by (3.2), its observable representation is OA, OB respectively. Here, con-
sider the measurement MB(Cn)(OA, S[ω]) and MB(Cn)(OB , S[ω]). That is, consider a parallel measurement
MB(Cn)⊗B(Cn)(OA ⊗ OB, S[ω⊗ω]). Then, it holds that:
δωA · δωB ≧
1
2
|〈ω, (AB −BA)ω〉| (∀ω ∈ Ω̂(⊂ Cn))
where, δωA and δ
ω
B is defined by (3.3). That is,{
δωA =
[〈Aω,Aω〉 − |〈ω,Aω〉|2]1/2
δωB =
[〈Bω,Bω〉 − |〈ω,Bω〉|2]1/2
Of course, the above holds in the case of infinite dimensional Hilbert space. For example, when Q and P
is respectively the position observable and the momentum observable (i.e., when QP − PQ = ~√−1 ), it
holds that δωQ · δωP ≧ 12~
As pointed out in ”mathematical foundatins of quantum mechanics(1932);[32]”, Robertoson’s uncer-
tainty principle is not the mathematical representation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
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Let us begin with ”approximately simultaneous observable”.
Definition 3.3 [Approximately simultaneous observable, error] For simplicity, put H = Cn.
And let A, B (∈ B(Cn)) be Ermite. Let X and Y (⊂ R) be finite sets. The observable OAB = (X ×
Y, 2X×Y , FAB) in B(Cn) is called the approximately simultaneous observable of A and B, if it satisfies
that 
〈ω,Aω〉 =
∑
x∈X
x〈ω, FAB({x} × Y )ω〉
〈ω,Bω〉 =
∑
y∈Y
y〈ω, FAB(X × {y})ω〉
(∀ω ∈ Ω̂(⊂ Cn))
Further, the errors ∆ωA and ∆
ω
B of the simultaneous measurementMB(Cn)(OAB , S[ω]) is respectively defined
by 
∆ωA =
[∑
x∈X
x2〈ω, FAB({x} × Y )ω〉 − 〈Aω,Aω〉
]1/2
∆ωB =
[∑
y∈Y
y2〈ω, FAB(X × {y})ω〉 − 〈Bω,Bω〉
]1/2 (∀ω ∈ Ω̂(⊂ Cn))
Now, we can present the mathematical representation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle as follows.
Theorem 3.4 [Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (cf. [7, 11]) ] Put H = Cn. Let A, B (∈ B(Cn))
be Hermitian. Then it holds that
(i) A simultaneous measurement MB(Cn)(OAB , S[ω]) of A and B exists.
(ii) Further, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle holds as follows.
∆ωA ·∆ωB ≧
1
2
|〈ω, (AB −BA)ω〉| (∀ω ∈ Ω̂(⊂ Cn))
(ii)′ Of course, the above holds in the case of infinite dimensional Hilbert space. For example, when Q and
P is respectively the position observable and the momentum observable (i.e., when QP−PQ = ~√−1
), it holds that
∆ωQ ·∆ωP ≧
1
2
~ (∀ω ∈ Ω̂(⊂ H)) (3.12)
♠ Note 3.8 As mentioned in Note 3.2, quantum syllogism does not hold. However, it should be noted that
Heisenberg’ uncertainty principle and the result concerning syllogism(♯1)–(♯3) in (Theorem 3.1) do not
conradict. That is because Heisenberg’ uncertainty principle is related to an approximate measurement.
What we did in this section is
The theory that is not described by quantum mechanics quantum mechanics ( i,e., Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle(Proposition 3.1) ) is described in quantum mechanics such as Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle(Theorem 3.4).
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Replacing ”quantum mechanics” to ”measurement theory”, we have the spirit such that
Our standing-point 3.5 [=Chap. 1(X4)] Thus, outstanding point is as follows.
(♯1) The theory described in ordinary language should be described in measurement theory.
IN the following chapters, the readers wii find that
(♯2) Many ambiguous theories can be automatically sloved if they are descibed in measurement theory.
♠ Note 3.9 The author proceeded
from quantum mechanics (cf. [7] ) to classical measurement theory ([8, 9])
Thus, I was convinced at the time of the beginning as follows.
(♯) Unless we know quantum mechanics, we can not understand classical measurement theory.
However, it is not true. This fact was taught by the students of my seminar. That is because without
the knowledge of quantum mechanics, we can understand und well use measurement theory. In fact, the
undergraduate students in my seminar can understand measuremenmt theory without the knowledge of
quantum mechanics. Thus, the author studied, from my students the following fact (= the main thema of
this print= linguistic world view):
(♯2) Even if we do not know ”monkey” and ”tree”, we can use the proverb ”Even monkeys fall from trees”.
(Continued to Sec. 8.1.2)
4 Fisher statistics I
Measurement theory (continuous pure type) is formulated as follows.
measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
c 1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
p
c 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
In Chap. 2, we explained Axiompc 1. In this chaper, Fisher statistics is described in terms of Axiom
p
c 1. The
term ”Fisher statistics” is used in order to distiguish Baysian statistics, which will be introduced as mixed
measurement theory in Sec.4.4.
4.1 Why is statistics useful in science?
4.1.1 Is the foundations of statistics firm?
Statistics is quite important decipline. Statistics is indispesable for life insurance, DNA identification of a
trial. the determination of the economic policy of a country., etc. Therefore, statistics has to be regarded
as ”the disipline with absolute authority”. However, from the view-pint of world-description, statistics is
not firm. That is because the following question is not yet answered:
What kind of world-view is statistics due?
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That is, Our standing-point 3.5(=Chap. 1(X4)) says that
Every engineering (or, science) should be described by measurement theory (i.e., Axiompc 1 and 2).
If it be so, what we have to do is
Statistical methods — Fisher maximim likelihood method, confidence interval, statistical hypothesis
testing, Bayes’ metod, etc. — are descibed in terms of measurement theory
This will be done in this chapter. Also, this means to answer the problem:
Why is statistics useful in science?
4.1.2 Trial and measurement
The tem ”trial” is studied in mathematics of the high school. However, the following question is not easy.
Is the term ”trial” a mathematical term?
Although it is not easy, in what follows we say something.
Let (X,F , P ) be a probability space. Here, X is called a sample space, and its element is said to be a
sample. Following common sense, we define the ”trial” as follows.
the ”trial” is an experiment repeatable repeatedly such as ”coin-tossing”, ”throwing dice” , etc.
By the trial, a sample x(∈ X) is obtained. When a sample belongs to Ξ(∈ F), an event Ξ(∈ F) is said to
happen.
Now, we think that the following three sentences (A1)–(A3) asr same:
(A1) The probanility that an event Ξ(∈ F) happens is given by P (Ξ).
(A2) When a trial is taken, the probability that a sample belongs to an event Ξ(∈ F) is given by P (Ξ).
(A3) When a trial (X,F , P ) is taken, the probability that a sample belongs to an event Ξ(∈ F) is given
by P (Ξ).
Since a trial is repeatable, we can get a sample data, and thus, a sample probability space (X,F , P ).
In the statement (A3), a trial (X,F , P ) and a sample probability space (X,F , P ) overlap. Thus, the
is not usual, but we adopt often the (A3) in this print.
♠ Note 4.1 (A1) may be mathematical, on the other hand, (A3) may be linguistic. However, these can not be
clarified without the measurement theoretcal view-ponit.
Let Ω be a set, which is called a parameter space. and , and . For each parameter ω(∈ Ω), define a
trial (X,F , Pω) and consider a family of trials {(X,F , Pω)}ω∈Ω. The, we think that the following three
statements (B1)–(B3) are the same:.
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(B1) Let ω0 ∈ Ω. A trial (X,F , Pω0) is taken, the probability that a sample belongs to an event Ξ(∈ F)
is given by Pω0(Ξ).
(B2) Let ω0 ∈ Ω. When, for a population S[ω0], a trial (X,F , Pω0) is taken, the probability that a sample
belongs to an event Ξ(∈ F) is given by Pω0(Ξ).
(B3) When a trial T({(X,F , Pω)}ω∈Ω, S[ω0]) is taken, the probability that a sample belongs to an event
Ξ(∈ F) is given by Pω0(Ξ).
Similarly,, a sample probability space (X,F , Pω0) is obtained.
In the above (B1)–(B3), the term ”trial” is used in confusion, however, we expect readers to read these
such as
(B1)=(B2)=(B3)
Although the statement (B3) may be familiar, we adopt the (B3). And we present Axiom
p
c 1( trial
type) as follows.
Axiom(T) 1 (trial version)
When a trial T({(X,F , Pω)}ω∈Ω, S[ω0]) is taken, the probability that a sample belongs to an
event Ξ(∈ F) is given by Pω0(Ξ).
This as well as Axiompc 1(23 page) is linguistic. Since we prepare (A1)–(B3), readers are expected to
understand it as ”linguistic” than ”mathematical”.
The following example make readers understand the delicate diffrence between ”measurement” and
”trial”.
Example 4.1 [Example 2.10(urn problem):measurement and trial] Again consider Example
2.10(urn problem). There are two urns U1 and U2. The urn U1 [resp. U2] contains 8 white and 2 black
balls [resp. 4 white and 6 black balls] (Fig. 4.1).
U1≈ω1 U2≈ω2
Figure 4.1: Urn problem(=Fig. 2.5)
Like Example 2.10, consider the following “statement (a)”:
(a) When one ball is picked up from the urn U2, the probability that the ball is white is 0.4.
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Now, let us describe the (a) interms of ”measurement” and ”trial”.
[I: Description by measurement]
This was already mentined in Example 2.10(urn problem).
[II: Description by trial]
Let Ω = {ω1, ω2} be a parameter space. Consider the following identufication:
Urn U1≈ parameter ω1, Urn U2≈ parameter ω2
Define a trial {({w, b}, 2{w,b}, Pω)}ω∈Ω by
Pω1({w}) = 0.8, Pω1({b}) = 0.2
Pω2({w}) = 0.4, Pω2({b}) = 0.6 (4.1)
Therefore, the statement (a) is, by Axiompc 1(trial), described as follows.
(b) When a trial T( {({w, b}, 2{w,b}, Pω)}ω∈Ω, S[ω2]) is taken, the probability that a sample
[
w
b
]
is
obtained is given by
[
Pω2({w}) = 0.4
Pω2({b}) = 0.6
]
The smilarity between [I: Description by measurement] and [II: Description by trial] is due to the
followin theorem (Theorem 4.2).
Theorem 4.2 A trial and a classical measurement are mathematically equavalent.
Proof. Consider a trial T({(X,F , Pω)}ω∈Ω, S[ω0]) and a measurement MC(Ω)(O=(X,F , F ), S[ω0]) such
that
Pω(Ξ) = [F (Ξ)](ω) (∀Ξ ∈ F , ω ∈ Ω)
This completes the proof.
♠ Note 4.2 Theorem 4.2 says that ”trial= classical measurement” as a mathematical structure. For example,
(♯) A trial is repeatabe, but only one measurement is permitted.
Still, the (♯) is not problem if we introduce a parallel measurement(Sec. 2.5.2). Further, the spirit of
Kolmogorov extension theorem — regarding many trials as one trial — is caused by the Copenhagen inter-
pretation ( only one measurement is permitted. ) (cf [13, 16]). However, the spirit of measurement theory (
linguistic world-view [Chap. 1(I)] and the Copenhagen interpretation[(U1)–(U7) ) is omitted in a trial. Thus
we consider that ”trial” is within ordinary language. Again consider the (X1) (in (Chap. 1 and Note 2.4 ):
(X1)
(Chap.1)
(ordinary language)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1 (O))


1©realistic method
2©linguistic method
where the trial is located in 0©. Also, the following is important:
(♯) state and observable are indespensable in measurement theory, and thus, it is connected to quantum mechanics.
Since the trial is not connected to quantum mechanics, the problem ”monism or dualism?” is neglected in the
trial.
Therefore, the overestimation of Theorem 4.2 (mathematical equivalence) must be avoided.
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4.2 Fisher consider Born’s reverse
As shown in Theorem 4.2meastement and statistics(trial) are similar. Therefore, we can expect that
statistical methods can be described in terms of measurement theory. In what follows, this will be done.
4.2.1 Inference problem
Problem 4.3 [The urn problem by Fisher’s maximum likelihood method]. There are two urns U1 and U2.
The urn U1 [resp. U2] contains 8 white and 2 black balls [resp. 4 white and 6 black balls].
Here consider the following procedures (i) and (2).
(i) One of the two (i.e., U1 or U2) is chosen and is settled behind a curtain. Note, for completeness, that
you do not know whether it is U1 or U2.
(ii) Pick up a ball out of the urn chosen by the procedure (A1). And you find that the ball is white.
Here, we have the following problem:
(iii) Infer the probability that the ball obtained in the above (A3) is white ( or, black) ?
✲ ✛[∗]
You do not know which the urn behind the curtain is, U1 or U2.
Assume that you pick up a white ball from the urn.
The urn is U1 or U2? Which do you think?
U1 U2
Figure 4.2: Which is the hidden urn, U1 or U2?
The answer is easy, that is, thr urn behind the curtain is U1. That is because the urn U1 has more
white balls than U2. It is too easy, but it includes the essence of Fisher maximim likelihood method.
4.2.2 Fisher maximim likelihood method in measurement theory
We begin with the following definition.
Notation 4.4 [MA(O, S[∗])]. Consider a measurement MA(O ≡ (X,F , F ), S[ρp]) formulated in a C∗-
algebra A. In most measurements, it is usual to think that the state ρp (∈ Sp(A∗)) is unknown. That is
because the measurement MA(O, S[ρp]) may be taken in order to know the state ρp. Thus, when we want
to stress that we do not know the state ρp, the measurement MA(O, S[ρp]) is often denoted by MA(O, S[∗]).
///
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Using this notation, we characterize our problem (i.e., inference) as follows.
(a) Assume that a measured value obtained by a measurement MC(Ω)(O=(X,F , F ), S[∗]) belongs to
Ξ(∈ F). Then, infer the unknown state[∗] (∈ Ω)
Therefore, the measurement is ”the view from the front”, that is,
(b) (observable[O], state[ω(∈ Ω)]) measurement−−−−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω)(O,S[ω])
measured value[x(∈ X)]
On the other hand, the inference is ”the view from the back”, that is,
(c) (observable[O],measured value[x ∈ Ξ(∈ F)]) inference−−−−−−−−−→
MC(Ω)(O,S[∗])
state[ω(∈ Ω)]
In this sence, the inference problem is the reverse problem of measurement. Therefore, it suffices to image
Fig. 4.3.
(measuring object)
unknown state −−−−−−−→ observable
(measuring instrument)
−−−−−−−−−−→
probabilistic
measured value
(output)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(observer)
✻
inference
Figure 4.3: The image of inference
In order to answer the above problem (a), we shall describe Fisher maximim likelihood method in terms
of measurement theory.
Theorem 4.5 [Fisher maximim likelihood method(measurement theoretical representation) (
cf. [10, 20])] Consider a measurement MC(Ω)(O =(X,F , F ), S[∗]).
Assume that we know that a measured value obtained by a measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[∗]) belongs to
Ξ (∈ F). Then, there is a reason to infer that the unknown state state [∗] is ω0 (∈ Ω) such that
[F (Ξ)](ω0) = max
ω∈Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)
0
1
Ω
ω0
[F (Ξ)](ω)
Figure 4.4: Fisher maximim likelihood method
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Proof. Let ω1 and ω2 be elements in Ω such that [F (Ξ)](ω1) < [F (Ξ)](ω2). Thus, by Axiom
p
c
1(measurement),
(i) the probability that a measured value obtained by a measurementMC(Ω)(O, S[ω1]) belongs to Ξ is
equal to [F (Ξ)](ω1)
(ii) the probability that a measured value obtained by a measurementMC(Ω)(O, S[ω2]) belongs to Ξ is
equal to [F (Ξ)](ω2)
Since we assume that [F (Ξ)](ω1) < [F (Ξ)](ω2), we can conclude that ”(i) is more rare than (ii)”. Thus,
there is a reason to infer that [∗] = ω2.
♠ Note 4.3 Fisher maximim likelihood method in statistics is easily obtained if a measurement MC(Ω)(O=
(X,F , F ), S[ω0]) is replaced by a trial T({(X,F , Pω)}ω∈Ω, S[ω0]) in Theorem 4.5.
Answer 4.6 [The measurement theoretical answer to Problem 4.3] Consider a measurement
MC(Ω)(O=({w, b}, 2{w,b}, F ), S[∗]) in Example 2.10. The formula (2.5)says that
max{[F ({w})](ω1), [F ({w})](ω2)} = max{0.8, 0.4} = 0.8 = F ({w})](ω1)
Therefore, Theorem 4.5 says that the urn behind the curtain is U1.
♠ Note 4.4 As seen in Fig. 4.3, inference (Fisher maximim likelihood method) is the reverse of measurement.
Here note that
Born’s discovery ”the probabilitstic interpretation of quantum mechanics” (42 page) : [2] (1926)
Fisher’s great book ”Statistical Methods for Research Workers” (1925)
Thus, it is surprising that Fisher and Born considered the same thing in the different fields in the same age.
4.3 Statistical methods in measurement theory
4.3.1 Examples of Fisher maximim likelihood method
Example 4.7 [Urn problem] Each urn U1, U2, U3 contains white balls and black ball such as:
Table 4.1: urn problem
w·b Urn Urn U1 Urn U2 Urn U3
white ball 80% 40% 10%
black ball 20% 60% 90%
Here,
(i) one of three urns is chosen, but you do not knot it. Pich up one ball from the unknown urn. And
you find that its ball is white. Then, How do you infer the unknow urm, i.e., U1, U2 or U3?
Further,
(ii) And further, you pich up another ball from the unknown urn. And you find that its ball is black.
That i, after all, you have one white ball and one one black ball. Then, How do you infer the unknow
urm, i.e., U1, U2 or U3?
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In what follows, we shall answer the above problems (i) and (ii) in terms of measurement theory. Put
ωj ←→ [the state such that urn Uj is chosen] (j = 1, 2, 3)
Thus, we have the state space Ω ( ={ω1, ω2, ω3} ) Further, define the observable O = ({w, b}, 2{w,b}, F ) in
C(Ω) such that
F ({w})(ω1) = 0.8, F ({w})(ω2) = 0.4, F ({w})(ω3) = 0.1
F ({b})(ω1) = 0.2, F ({b})(ω2) = 0.6, F ({b})(ω3) = 0.9
Answer to (i): Consider the measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[∗]), by which a measured value “w” is obtained.
Therefore, we see
[F ({w})](ω1) = 0.8 = max
ω∈Ω
[F ({w})](ω) = max{0.8, 0.4, 0.1}
Thus, by Fisher maximim likelihood method(Theorem 4.5), we see that
[∗] = ω1
Thus, we can infer that the unknown urn is U1.
Answer to (ii): Next, consider the simultaneous measurementMC(Ω)(×2k=1 O= (X2, 2X2 , F̂=×2k=1 F ),
S[∗]), by which a measured value (w, b) is obtained. Here, we see
[F̂ ({(w, b)})](ω) = [F ({w})](ω) · [F ({b})](ω)
thus,
[F̂ ({(w, b)})](ω1) = 0.16, [F̂ ({(w, b)})](ω2) = 0.24, [F̂ ({(w, b)})](ω3) = 0.09
Thus, by Fisher maximim likelihood method(Theorem 4.5), we see that
[∗] = ω2
Thus, we can infer that the unknown urn is U2.
Example 4.8 [Normal observable(i)] As mentioned in Example 2.11, consider the normal observable
OGσ = (R,BR, Gσ) in C(R) (where Ω = R) such that
[Gσ(Ξ)](µ) =
1√
2πσ
∫
Ξ
exp[− 1
2σ2
(x− µ)2]dx
(∀Ξ ∈ BR, ∀µ ∈ Ω = R)
Thus, the simultaneous observable×3k=1 OGσ (in short, O3Gσ ) = (R3,BR3 , G3σ) in C(R) is defined by
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[G3σ(Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξ3)](µ) = [Gσ(Ξ1)](µ) · [Gσ(Ξ2)](µ) · [Gσ(Ξ3)](µ)
=
1
(
√
2πσ)3
∫∫∫
Ξ1×Ξ2×Ξ3
exp[− (x1 − µ)
2 + (x2 − µ)2 + (x3 − µ)2
2σ2
]
× dx1dx2dx3
(∀Ξk ∈ BR, k = 1, 2, 3, ∀µ ∈ Ω = R)
Thus, we get the measurement MC(R)(O
3
Gσ
, S[∗])
Now we consider the following problem:
(a) By the measurement MC(R)(O
3
Gσ
, S[∗]) assume that a measured value (x01, x
0
2, x
0
3) (∈ R3) is obtained.
Then, infer the unknown state [∗](∈ R).
Answer(a) Put
Ξi = [x
0
i −
1
N
, x0i +
1
N
] (i = 1, 2, 3)
Assume that N is sufficiently large. Fisher maximim likelihood method(Theorem 4.5) says that the un-
known state[ ∗ ] = µ0 is found in what follows.
[G3σ(Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξ3)](µ0) = max
µ∈R
[G3σ(Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξ3)](µ)
Since N is sufficiently large, we see
1
(
√
2πσ)3
exp[− (x
0
1 − µ0)2 + (x02 − µ0)2 + (x03 − µ0)2
2σ2
]
=max
µ∈R
[ 1
(
√
2πσ)3
exp[− (x
0
1 − µ)2 + (x02 − µ)2 + (x03 − µ)2
2σ2
]
]
That is,
(x01 − µ0)2 + (x02 − µ0)2 + (x03 − µ0)2 = min
µ∈R
{
(x01 − µ)2 + (x02 − µ)2 + (x03 − µ)2
}
Therefore, solving ddµ{· · · } = 0, we conclude that
µ0 =
x01 + x
0
2 + x
0
3
3
[Normal observable(ii)] Next, consider the case:
we know that the length of the pencil µ is satisfied that 10cm µ L cm ≤30.
And we assume that
(♯) the length of the pencil µ and the roughness σ of the ruler are unknown.
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That is, assume that the state space Ω = [10, 30]× R+
(
={µ ∈ R | 10 ≦ µ ≦ 30} × {σ ∈ R | σ > 0})
Define the observable O = (R,B
R
, G) in C([10, 30]× R+) such that
[G(Ξ)](µ, σ) = [Gσ(Ξ)](µ) (∀Ξ ∈ BR, ∀(µ, σ) ∈ Ω = [10, 30]× R+)
Therefore, the simultaneous observable O3 = (R3,B
R3
, G3) in C([10, 30]× R+) is defined by
[G3(Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξ3)](µ, σ) = [G(Ξ1)](µ, σ) · [G(Ξ2)](µ, σ) · [G(Ξ3)](µ, σ)
=
1
(
√
2πσ)3
∫
Ξ1×Ξ2×Ξ3
exp[− (x1 − µ)
2 + (x2 − µ)2 + (x3 − µ)2
2σ2
]dx1dx2dx3
(∀Ξk ∈ BR, k = 1, 2, 3, ∀(µ, σ) ∈ Ω = [10, 30]× R+)
Thus, we get the simultaneous measurementMC([10,30]×R+)(O
3, S[∗]). Here, we have the following problem:
(b) When a measured value (x01, x
0
2, x
0
3) ( ∈ R3) is obtained by the measurement MC([10,30]×R+)(O3, S[∗]),
infer the unknown state [∗](= (µ0, σ0) ∈ [10, 30] × R+), i.e., the lenght µ0 of the pencile and the
roughness σ0 of the ruler.
Answer (b) By the same way of (a), Fisher maximim likelihood method(Theorem 4.5) says that the
unknownstate [ ∗ ] = (µ0, σ0) such that
1
(
√
2πσ0)3
exp[− (x
0
1 − µ0)2 + (x02 − µ0)2 + (x03 − µ0)2
2σ20
]
= max
(µ,σ)∈[10,30]×R+
{ 1
(
√
2πσ)3
exp[− (x
0
1 − µ)2 + (x02 − µ)2 + (x03 − µ)2
2σ2
]
}
Thus, solving ∂∂µ{· · · } = 0, ∂∂σ{· · · } = 0 we see
µ0 =

10 (when (x01 + x
0
2 + x
0
3)/3 < 10 )
(x01 + x
0
2 + x
0
3)/3 (when 10 ≦ (x
0
1 + x
0
2 + x
0
3)/3 ≦ 30 )
30 (when 30 < (x01 + x
0
2 + x
0
3)/3 )
σ0 =
√
{(x01 − µ˜)2 + (x02 − µ˜)2 + (x03 − µ˜)2}/3
where
µ˜ = (x01 + x
0
2 + x
0
3)/3
4.3.2 Monty Hall problem — High school students’ puzzle
The Monty Hall problem is well-known and elementary . Also it is famous as the problem in which even
great mathematician P. Erdo¨s made a mistake (cf. [6]). The Monty Hall problem is as follows:
Problem 4.9 [Monty Hall problem (cf. [11, 19])] You are on a game show and you are given the
choice of three doors. Behind one door is a car, and behind the other two are goats. You choose, say, door
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1, and the host, who knows where the car is, opens another door, behind which is a goat. For example,
the host says that
(♭) the door 3 has a goat.
And further, He now gives you the choice of sticking with door 1 or switching to door 2? What should
you do?
❄ ❄ ❄
door door door
No. 1 No. 2 No. 3
Figure 4.5: Monty Hall problem
Answer: Put Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3} with the discrete topology. Assume that each state δωm(∈ Sp(C(Ω)∗))
means
δωm ⇔ the state that the car is behind the door 1 (m = 1, 2, 3)
Define the observable O1 ≡ ({1, 2, 3}, 2{1,2,3}, F1) in C(Ω) such that
[F1({1})](ω1) = 0.0, [F1({2})](ω1) = 0.5, [F1({3})](ω1) = 0.5,
[F1({1})](ω2) = 0.0, [F1({2})](ω2) = 0.0, [F1({3})](ω2) = 1.0,
[F1({1})](ω3) = 0.0, [F1({2})](ω3) = 1.0, [F1({3})](ω3) = 0.0, (4.2)
where it is also possible to assume that F1({2})(ω1) = α, F1({3})(ω1) = 1− α (0 < α < 1). The fact that
yuo say ”the door 1” means that we have a measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]). Here, we assume that
a) “a measured value 1 is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗])”
⇔ The host says “Door 1 has a goat”
b) “measured value 2 is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]) ”
⇔ The host says “Door 2 has a goat”
c) “measured value 3 is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]) ”
⇔ The host says “Door 3 has a goat”
Recall that, in Problem 1, the host said “Door 3 has a goat”. This implies that you get the measured value
“3” by the measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]). Therefore, Theorem 1 (Fisher’s maximum likelihood method)
says that you should pick door number 2. That is because we see that
[F1({3})](ω2) = 1.0 = max{0.5, 1.0, 0.0} = max{[F1({3})](ω1), [F1({3})](ω2), [F1({3})](ω3)},
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and thus, there is a reason to infer that [∗] = δω2 . Thus, you should switch to door 2. This is the first
answer to Problem 1 (Monty-Hall problem).
♠ Note 4.5 The above answer is one of Answers of Monty Hall problem. Of course, the answer based on Bayes’
theorem — Problem 4.16 — is usual. However, it is temporary. Our final answer is presented in Problem
6.20 [Monty Hall problem] in Sec. 6.4.5.
4.3.3 Confidence interval
Let O( ≡ (X,F , F )) be an observable formulated in a basic algebra C(Ω). Assume that X has a metric
dX . And assume that the state space Ω. has the metric dΩ. Let E : X → Ω be a continuous map, which is
called “ estimator”. Let γ be a real number such that 0≪ γ < 1, for example, γ = 0.95. For any ω( ∈ Ω),
define the positive number ηγω ( > 0) such that:
ηγω = inf{η > 0 : [F (E−1(B(ω; η))](ω) ≥ γ}
where B(ω; η) = {ω1( ∈ Ω) : dΩ(ω1, ω) ≤ η}. For any x ( ∈ X), put
Dγx = {ω(∈ Ω) : dΩ(E(x), ω) ≤ ηγω}. (4.3)
x0
E(x0)
ω0 Dγx0
ΩX
Figure 4.6: Inference interval Dγx0
The Dγx is called the (γ)-inference interval of the measured value x.
The following is clear:
for any ω0( ∈ Ω), the probability, that the measured value x obtained by the measurementMC(Ω)
(
O :=
(X,F , F ), S[ω0]
)
satisfies the following condition (♭), is larger than γ (e.g., γ = 0.95).
(a) E(x) ∈ B(ω0; ηγω0) or equivalently, d(E(x), ω0) ≤ ηγω0 .
Assume that we get a measured value x0 by the measurement MC(Ω)
(
O := (X,F , F ), S[ω0]
)
. Then, we see
the following equivalences:
(b) (a) ⇐⇒ dΩ(E(x0), ω0) ≤ ηγω0 ⇐⇒ Dγx0 ∋ ω0.
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Summing the above argument, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10 [Inference interval ( cf. [15, 20] )] Let O := (X,F , F ) be an observable in C(Ω). Let
ω0 be any fixed state, i.e., ω0 ∈ Ω, Consider a measurement MC(Ω)
(
O := (X,F , F ), S[ω0]
)
. Let E : X → Ω
be an estimator. Let γ be such as 0≪ γ < 1 (e.g., γ = 0.95). For any x( ∈ X), define Dγx as in (8). Then,
we see,
(c) the probability that the measured value x0( ∈ X) obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)
(
O := (X,F , F ),
S[ω0]
)
satisfies the condition that
Dγx0 ∋ ω0 ,
is larger than γ.
Example 4.11 [Urn problem] Put Ω = [0, 1], i.e., the closed interval in R. We assume that each ω
( ∈ Ω ≡ [0, 1]) represents an urn that contains a lot of black balls and white balls such that:
the number of white balls in the urn ω
the total number of balls in the urn ω
≈ ω (∀ω ∈ [0, 1] ≡ Ω).
Define the observable O = (X ≡ {b, w},P({b, w}), F ) in C(Ω) such that
F (∅)(ω) = 0, F ({b})(ω) = ω, F ({w})(ω) = 1− ω, F ({b, w})(ω) = 1
(∀ω ∈ [0, 1] ≡ Ω).
Here, consider the following measurement Mω:
Mω := “ Pick out one ball from the urn ω, and recognize the color of the ball”
That is, we consider
Mω = MC(Ω)(O, S[δω ]).
Moreover we define the product observable ON ≡ (XN ,P(XN), FN ), such that:
[FN (Ξ1×Ξ2× · · ·×ΞN−1×ΞN )](ω) = [F (Ξ1)](ω) · [F (Ξ2)](ω) · · · [F (ΞN )](ω)
(∀ω ∈ Ω ≡ [0, 1], ∀Ξ1,Ξ2, · · · ,ΞN ⊆ X ≡ {b, w}).
Note that
“ take a measurement Mω N times”⇔ “ take a measurement MC(Ω)(ON , S[δω])”
Define the estimator E : XN( ≡ {b, w}N)→ Ω( ≡ [0, 1])
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E(x1, x2, · · · , xN−1, xN ) = ♯[{n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} | xn = b}]
N
(∀x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN−1, xN ) ∈ XN ≡ {b, w}N).
For each ω( ∈ [0, 1] ≡ Ω), define the positive number ηγω such that:
ηγω = inf
{
η > 0
∣∣∣ [FN ({(x1, x2, · · · , xN ) | ω − η ≤ E(x1, x2, · · · , xN ) ≤ ω + η})](ω) > 0.95}
= inf
[FN ({(x1,x2,··· ,xN ):|E(x1,x2,··· ,xN )−ω|≤η})](ω)>0.95
η.
Put
Dγx = {ω( ∈ Ω) : |E(x) − ω| ≤ ηγω}.
For example, assume that N is sufficiently large and γ = 0.95. Then we see, from the property of binomial
distribution, that
η0.95ω ≈ 1.96
√
ω(1− ω)
N
and
D0.95x = [E(x) − η−, E(x) + η+]
where
η− = η0.95E(x)−η− , η+ = η
0.95
E(x)+η+
.
Under the assumption that N is sufficiently large, we can consider that
η− ≈ η+ ≈ η0.95E(x) ≈ 1.96
√
E(x)(1 − E(x))
N
.
Then we can conclude that
(d) for any urn ω( ∈ Ω ≡ [0, 1])), the probability, that the measured value x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) obtained
by the measurement MC(Ω)
(
ON , S[δω]
)
satisfies the following condition (♯), is larger than γ (e.g.,
γ = 0.95).
(♯) |ω − E(x)| ≤ 1.96
√
E(x)(1−E(x))
N ≤ 0.98√N .
4.3.4 statistical hypothesis testing — St. Valentine’s Day chocolate
In what follows, we shall describe ”statistical hypothesis testing” in terms of measurement theory.
St Valentine’s Day chocolate
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You (male) would like to verify the truth of the following hypothesis.
(a′) Hypothesis: [Caroline is fond of you]
Here, you wan to judge this hypothesis (a′). by the result whether Caroline gives tomorrow’s St
Valentine’s Day chocolate.
(b′) How do we consider the two cases;{
Case A©: Caroline presents you a chocolate
Case B©: Caroline presents you a chocolate
Eveyone guess as follows.
(c′)

Case A©: there is a great possibility that Caroline is not fond of you.
Thus, the hypothesis (a′) is should be rejected
Case B©: This may be an obligatory-gift chocolate,
Thus, the hypothesis (a′) is can not be rejected
In what follows we shall study “statistical hypothesis testing”. Consider a measurement MC(Ω)(O ≡
(X,F , F ), S[∗]) formulated in C(Ω).
Here, we assume that (X, τX) is a topological space, where τX is the set of all open sets. And assume
that F = BX ; the Borel field, i,e., the smallest σ-field that contains all open sets in X . Note that we can
assume, without loss of generality, that F (Ξ) 6= 0 for any open set Ξ(∈ τX) such that Ξ 6= ∅. That is
because, if F (Ξ) = 0, it suffices to redefine X by X \ Ξ.
Problem 4.12 [Statistical hypothesis testing ( cf. [15, 20] ) ] Assume the following hypothesis
called “null hypothesis”:
(a) the unknown state [∗] belongs to a set NH ( ⊆ Ω).
Then, our problem is as follows.
(b) Define a proper [D](∈ F) such that
if a measured valued obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O ≡ (X,F , F ), S[∗]) belongs to [D],
then we can deny the null hypothesis (a), that is, [F ([D])](ω) is sufficiently small for any ω ∈ NH .
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0
1
Ω
α
NH
[F ([D])](ω)
Figure 4.7: Null Hypothesis NH
Answer: Define a function such that ΛNH : X → [0, 1]
ΛNH (x) = lim
Ξ→{x}
sup
ω∈NH
[F (Ξ)](ω)
sup
ω∈Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)
(∀x ∈ X)
Also, for any ε (0 < ε ≦ 1), define the [D]εNH ( ∈ F) such that
[D]εNH = {x ∈ X | ΛNH (x) < ε}
0
ε
1
X
[D]εNH
ΛNH (x)
Figure 4.8: ΛNH (x)C[D]εNH
And define ε0.05max (∈ [0, 1]) (i.e., significant level=0.05) such that
ε0.05max = sup{ε | sup
ω0∈NH
[F ([D]εNH )](ω0) ≦ 0.05}
Thus, we can get the rejection region [D]
ε0.05max
NH ( depending on NH , O, ε(= 0.05) ). The following is obvious:
if [∗] ∈ NH , then the probability that a measured value obtained by the measurement MC(Ω)(O
=(X,F , F ), S[∗]) belongs to [D]ε
0.05
max
NH (∈ F) is less than 0.05.
Since it is quite rare that ”[measured value] ∈ [D]ε0.05maxNH ”, we can deny the hypothesis (a).
Therefore, we can conclude that
(c)

if [measured value] ∈ [D]ε0.05maxNH , then we can deny the hypothesis (a).
if [measured value] /∈ [D]ε0.05maxNH , then we can not deny the hypothesis (a).
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Typical Examples in Classical Measurements
Our argument in the previous section may be too abstract and general. However, it is surely usual. In
this section, this will be shown as easy examples in classical measurements.
Put Ω = R, C(Ω) = C(Ω). Fix σ > 0. And consider the normal observable Oσ ≡ (R,BR, Fσ) in C(Ω)
such that:
[Fσ(Ξ)](ω) =
1√
2πσ
∫
Ξ
exp[− (x− ω)
2
2σ2
]dx (∀Ξ ∈ BR, ∀ω ∈ Ω = R).
And further, consider the product observable O2σ ≡ (R2,BR2 , F 2σ ) in C(Ω). That is,
[F 2σ (Ξ1×Ξ2)](ω) = [Fσ(Ξ1)](ω) · [Fσ(Ξ2)](ω) = 1
(
√
2πσ)2
∫∫
Ξ1×Ξ2
exp[−
∑2
k=1(xk − ω)2
2σ2
]dx1dx2
(∀Ξk ∈ BR(k = 1, 2), ∀ω ∈ Ω = R).
In what follows, we consider the measurement MC(Ω)(O
2
σ = (R
2,B
R2
, F 2σ ), S[∗])).
[Case(I); Two sided test, i.e., NH = {ω0}]. Assume that NH = {ω0}, ω0 ∈ Ω = R. Note the identification
(1), i.e., δω0 ≈ ω0. Then, we see that, for any (x1, x2) ∈ R2,
ΛNH (x1, x2) = sup
ω∈{ω0}
L((x1.x2), δω) = lim
Ξ1×Ξ2→(x1,x2)
[F 2σ (Ξ1×Ξ2)](ω0)
supω∈Ω[F 2σ (Ξ1×Ξ2)](ω)
=
exp[− (x1−ω0)2+(x2−ω0)22σ2 ]
exp[− (x1−(x1+x2)/2)2+(x2−(x1+x2)/2)22σ2 ]
= exp[− [(x1 + x2)− 2ω0]
2
4σ2
].
Also, for any ǫ( > 0), define Dǫ{ω0} ( ∈ BR2) such that:
Dǫ{ω0} = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 | Λ{ω0}(x1, x2) ≤ ǫ}.
Thus we can define ǫ(α) such that:
ǫ(α) = sup{ǫ | sup
ω∈{ω0}
[F 2σ (D
ǫ
{ω0})](ω) ≤ α}.
Thus, putting α = 0.05, we see that
R̂0.05{ω0} = D
ǫ(0.05)
{ω0}
={(x1, x2) ∈ R2 | (x1 + x2)/2 ≤ ω0 − 1.96σ√
2
}
⋃
{(x1, x2) ∈ R2 | (x1 + x2)/2 ≥ ω0 + 1.96σ√
2
}
=“Slash part in Fig. 4.9”
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x1
x2
✲
✻
2ω0
2ω0
a
b
a
b
a = 2(ω0 − 1.96σ/
√
2)
b = 2(ω0 + 1.96σ/
√
2)
Figure 4.9: Rejection region R̂0.05{ω0}
[Case(II); One sided test, i.e., NH = [ω0,∞)]. Assume that NH = [ω0,∞), ω0 ∈ Ω = R. Then,
Λ[ω0,∞)(x1, x2) = sup
ω∈[ω0,∞)
L((x1.x2), δω) = sup
ω∈[ω0,∞)
lim
Ξ1×Ξ2→(x1,x2)
[F 2σ (Ξ1×Ξ2)](ω)
sup
ω∈Ω
[F 2σ (Ξ1×Ξ2)](ω)
= sup
ω∈[ω0,∞)
exp[− [(x1 + x2)− 2ω]
2
4σ2
] =
{
exp[− [(x1+x2)−2ω0]24σ2 ] (x1+x22 < ω0)
1 ( otherwise )
Also, for any ǫ( > 0), define Dǫ[ω0,∞) ( ∈ BR2) such that:
Dǫ[ω0,∞) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 | Λ[ω0,∞)(x1, x2) ≤ ǫ} = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 |
x1 + x2
2
− ω0 <
√
4σ2 log ǫ}.
Thus we can define ǫ(α) such that:
ǫ(α) = sup{ǫ | sup
ω∈[ω0,∞)
[F 2σ (D
ǫ
[ω0,∞))](ω) ≤ α}.
Therefore, putting α = 0.05, we see that
R̂0.05[ω0,∞) = D
ǫ(0.05)
[ω0,∞) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 |
(x1 + x2)
2
≤ ω0 − 1.65σ√
2
} = “Slash part in Fig. 4.10”
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x1
x2
✲
✻
2ω0
2ω0
c
c
c = 2(ω0 − 1.65σ/
√
2)
Figure 4.10: Rejection region R̂0.05[ω0,∞)
♠ Note 4.6 Although several statistical methods are described in terms of measurements in this section.
However, it should be that there are some gap between the statistical description and the measurement
theoretical description. Recall that measurement theory says that
(♯1) the state after a measurement is meaningless
Therefore, Theorem 4.5 [Fisher maximum likelihood method(measurement theoretical representation) ] should
be formally written as follows
(♯2) Theorem 4.5
′ [Fisher maximum likelihood method(measurement theoretical representation) ( cf.[11,
20] ) ] Let O×O1 =(X×Y,F×G, F×G) be a simultaneous observable in C(Ω). Consider a simultaneous
measurement MC(Ω)(O× O1, S[∗]). Assume that ameasured value (x, y) belongs to Ξ× Y (∈ F ⊠ G).
Then, there is a reason to infer that
the probability that y ∈ Γ is given by [G(Γ)](ω0) (∀γ ∈ G)
where [F (Ξ)](ω0) = maxω∈Ω[F (Ξ)](ω).
Theorem 4.5 is the abbreviation Theorem 4.5′ Note that (♯2) is applicable to quantum mechanics (under the
existence of a simultaneous observable O× O1 ).
4.4 Bayesian statistics
4.4.1 What is mixed measurement?
Recall the classification ofmeasurement theory(Chap. 1(Y)), that is,
(a) measurement theory
(scientific language)

quantum measurement 6© : Chap. 3
classical measurement

continuous
{
pure type 1© : (Chaps. 2–9)
mixed type 2© : Sec.4.4
bounded
{
pure type 3© : Chaps. 10, 11
mixed type 4© : Notes 10.4, 11.3
In this preprint we mainly devote ourselves to classical pure measurement ( 1© and 3©) and not classical
mixed measurement. However, in what follows, only a few will describe this.
Let Ω be a locally compact space, BΩ be its Borel field. M(Ω) and M+1(Ω) are defined as follows.
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(b)

The space of complex valued measures : M(Ω)
= {ν(= ν1 − ν2 +
√−1(ν3 − ν4)) | νk (k = 1, 2, 3, 4) is a finite measure on Ω }
The space of probability measures : M+1(Ω)
= {ν | ν is a finite measure on Ω such that ν(Ω) = 1 }
In measurement theory, the M+1(Ω) is called a mixed state space (or, statistical state space,
compound state space), ν(∈ M+1(Ω)) is said to be a mixed state(or, statistical state, compound state).
In what follows, we shall explain mixed measurement.
Example 4.13 [Urn problem and coin tossing] In Problem 4.3[urn problem] (and Answer 4.6), putting
Ω = {ω1, ω2}, and consider a measurement MC(Ω)(O=({w, b}, 2{w,b}, F ), S[∗]), where O = ({w,b}, 2{w,b},
F ) is defined by the formula (2.5). That is,
F ({w})(ω1) = 0.8, F ({b})(ω1) = 0.2
F ({w})(ω2) = 0.4, F ({b})(ω2) = 0.6
Let us write Fig. 4.2(=Fig. 4.11) again.
✲ ✛[∗]
You do not know which the urn behind the curtain is, U1 or U2.
Assume that you pick up a white ball from the urn.
The urn is U1 or U2? Which do you think?
U1 U2
Figure 4.11: Inference interval Which is the hidden urn, U1 or U2? (= Fig. 4.2)
A mixed measurement is characterized such as ”measurementMC(Ω)(O=({w, b}, 2{w,b}, F ), S[∗])” + ” prob-
abilistic property of the unknown state[∗]”. Let us explain it. Consider the following two procedures (c)
and (d)(Fig. 4.12):
(c) Consider an unfair coin-tossing (Tp,1−p) such that (0 ≦ p ≦ 1): That is,
{
the possibility that ”head” appears is 100p%
the possibility that ”tail” appears is 100(1− p)%
If ”head” [resp. ”tail”]appears, put an urn U1(≈ω1) [resp. U2(≈ω2)] behind the curtain. Assume
that you do not know which urn is behind the curtain, U1 or U2). The unknown urn is denoted by
[∗](∈ {ω1, ω2}).
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This situation is represented by
ν0 = pδω1 + (1 − p)δω2 (That is, ν0({ω1}) = p, ν0({ω2}) = 1− p)
where δω is the point measure at ω. That is, it suffices to consider that ν0 is the distribution of [∗].
(d) Consider the ”measurement” such that a ball is picked out from the unknown urn. This ”measure-
ment” is denoted by MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)), and called a mixed measurement.
p
✲
1-p
✛[∗]
You do not know which the urn behind the curtain is, U1 or U2, but the probability: p and 1− p.
Assume that you pick up a white ball from the urn.
The urn is U1 or U2? Which do you think?
U1 U2
Figure 4.12: Which is the hidden urn, U1 or U2? ( Mixed measurement)
Now consider the following problem:
(e1) Calculate the probability that a white ball is picked out by the mixed measurementMC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0))!
(e2) And further, when a white ball is picked out by the mixed measurementMC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)), do you
infer the unknown urn U1 or U2?
( See (Fig. 4.12). )
Answer (e1) The following is clear:
(i) The possibility that ”[ ∗ ] = ω1” is 100p%. Also, The possibility that ”[ ∗ ] = ω2” is 100(1− p)%.
Further,
(ii) the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ {w, b}) is obtained by a measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[ω1]) is
[F ({x})](ω1) = 0.8 (when x = w), = 0.2 (when x = b)
the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ {w, b}) is obtained by a measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[ω2]) is
[F ({x})](ω1) = 0.4 (when x = w), = 0.6 (when x = b)
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Therefore, by (i) and (ii), the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ {w, b}) is obtained by a mixed
measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)) is
P ({x}) =
∫
Ω
[F ({x})](ω)ν0(dω) = p[F ({x})](ω1) + (1− p)[F ({x})](ω2)
=
{
0.8p+ 0.4(1− p) (x = w and )
0.2p+ 0.6(1− p) (x = b and ) (4.5)
This is the answer to Problem (e1).
Answer(e2) Problem (e2) will be presented in Note 4.8.
♠ Note 4.7 The following question is natural That is,
In the above (i) (or, (c)), why is ”the possibility that [∗] = ω1 is 100p% · · · ” replaced by ”the probability
that [ ∗ ] = ω1 is 100p% · · · ” ?
However, the Copenhagen interpretation says that
there is no probability without measurements.
This is the reason why the term ”probability” is not used.
4.4.2 Mixed measurement theory
As seen in the above, we say that
(a) Pure measurement theory is fundamental, Adding the concept of ”mixed state”, we can construct
mixed measurement theory as follows.
mixed measurement theory
MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν))
:= pure measurement theory
MC(Ω)(O, S[∗])
+ mixed state
ν
Thus we can present the following Axiommc 1.
Axiommc 1 (measurement: continuous mixed type)
Consider a mixedmeasurement MC(Ω)
(
O= (X,F , F ), S[∗](ν)
)
formulated in C(Ω). The,
the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ X) obtained by the mixed measurement
MC(Ω)
(
O, S[∗](ν)
)
belongs to Ξ ( ∈ F) is given by∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)ν(dω)
Thus we see:
(b) a mixed measurement is characterized as the following correspondence:
(mixed state, observable )
mixed measurement−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
probabilistic
measured value
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In statistics, both ”fluctuation ” and ”measurement error” are represented by random variable. Thus,
we sometimes confuse the two. On the other hand, in measurement theory, the two have different mathe-
matical structures, that is,
(c)

(i) : [pure state] −−−−−−−→
fluctuation
[mixed state]
(ii) : [exact observable] −−−−−−−−−−−−→
measurement error
[non-projective observable]
Thus, in classical measurement theory, we can avoid the confusions. However, as seen in Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle(Theorem 3.4), in quantum mechanics, even pure state has a fluctuation.
The following example will promote the understanding of mixed measurements.
Example 4.14 [Coin-tossing] The coin-tossing is described in the following three situations:
(i): Let Ω be a state space of states of a coin. Let ω0 (∈ Ω) be a state of a fare coin. Consider a
measurementMC({Ω})(O=({h, t}, 2{h,t}, F ), S[ω0]) (where, ”h” and t respectively means ”head” and ”tail”.
And F ({h})(ω0) = F ({t})(ω0) = 1/2). Of course, by the measurement, the probability that a measured
value ”h” is obtained is equal to [F ({h})](ω0) = 1/2.
(ii): Someone (or, a robot) tosses a fair coin. And the measurement is defined by the check of the result
(i.e., ”h” or ”t” ). Define the state space Ω such that Ω = {h, t}. Then the mixed exact measurement is
considered as MC({h,t})(O(exa), S[∗](12 (δh+δt))) where δω(∈ M+1(Ω)) is the point measure at ω. Of course,
the probability that a measured value ”h” is obtained is given by
∫
{h,t}[F
(exa)({h})](ω) · 12 (δh + δt)(dω) =
1/2.
(iii): Someone intentionally grasped coin with the (right or left) hand, and asked you ”right or left?”. In
this case, you may think that the right or the left is half-and-half. The reason that you think so is due to
the principle of equal weight. Here,
(d) the justification of the principle of equal weight — unless we have sufficient reason to regard one
possible case as more probable than another, we treat them as equally probable — is the most famous
problem in statistics.
This will be solved in Sec. 6.4.5 (cf. [11, 19]).
Remark 4.15 [Bayes’ theorem in measurement theory] In this book, we are not closely related to
mixed measurement theory. But, we have to mention only Bayes’s theorem in mixed measurement theory
as follows.
(e) [Bayes’s theorem in mixed measurement theory ( cf. [15, 20])] Consider a mixed measurement
MC(Ω)
(
O= (X,F , F ), S[∗](ν)
)
. When we know that a measured value belong to Ξ ( ∈ F), we can
understand that the mixed stateν changes to a new mixed stateνnew(∈M+1(Ω)) such that
νnew(D) =
∫
D
[F (Ξ)](ω)ν(dω)∫
Ω[F (Ξ)](ω)ν(dω)
(∀D ∈ BΩ) (4.6)
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♠ Note 4.8 Now we can answer Problem (e2) inSec. 4.4.2: Since ”white ball” is obtained by a statical
measurement
MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)), a new mixed stateνnew(∈M+1(Ω)) is given by
νnew(D) =
∫
D
[F ({w})](ω)ν0(dω)∫
Ω
[F ({w})](ω)ν0(dω) =

0.8p
0.8p + 0.2(1− p) (when D = {ω1})
0.2(1− p)
0.8p + 0.2(1− p) (when D = {ω2})
♠ Note 4.9 According to the Copenhagen interpretation, (cf. Note 4.6) the (e) in Remark 4.15 should be
described as the following (e)′: ( cf. [20] ) .
(e)′ Consider a simultaneous observable O × O1 =(X × Y,F × G, F × G) in C(Ω), and a simultaneous
measurement MC(Ω)(O× O1, S[∗](ν)).
When we know that a measured value (x, y) belongs to Ξ× Y (∈ F × G),
the probability PΓ (i.e., the probability that y ∈ Γ(∈ G) ) is given by
PΓ =
∫
Ω
[F (Ξ) ·G(Γ)](ω)ν(dω)∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)ν(dω)
The (e) should be regarded as the abbreviation of the (e)′.
As an easy example, we shall study Monty Hall problem in measurement theory.
Problem 4.16 [Monty Hall problem (Continued from Problem 4.9) (cf. [11, 19] ) ]
Suppose you are on a game show, and you are given the choice of three doors (i.e., “number 1”, “number
2”, “number 3”). Behind one door is a car, behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say number 1. Then,
the host, who set a car behind a certain door, says
(♯1) the car was set behind the door decided by the cast of the distorted dice. That is, the host set the
car behind the k-th door (i.e., “number k”) with probability pk (or, weight such that p1+p2+p3 = 1,
0 ≤ p1, p2, p3 ≤ 1 ).
And further, the host says, for example,
(♭) the door 3 has a goat.
He says to you, “Do you want to pick door number 2?” Is it to your advantage to switch your choice of
doors?
Answer Recalling Problem 4.9 (Monty Hall problem), in what follows we study this problem. Let Ω
and O1 be as in Section 3.1. Under the hypothesis (♯1), define the mixed state ν0 ( ∈ M+1(Ω)) such that:
ν0({ω1}) = p1, ν0({ω2}) = p2, ν0({ω3}) = p3
Thus we have a mixed measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]({ν0})). Note that
a) “measured value 1 is obtained by the mixed measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]({ν0}))”
⇔ the host says “Door 1 has a goat”
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b) “measured value 2 is obtained by the mixed measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]({ν0}))”
⇔ the host says “Door 2 has a goat”
c) “measured value 3 is obtained by the mixed measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗]({ν0}))”
⇔ the host says “Door 3 has a goat”
Here, assume that, by the mixed measurement MC(Ω)(O1, S[∗](ν0)), you obtain a measured value 3, which
corresponds to the fact that the host said “Door 3 has a goat”. Then, Theorem 3 (Bayes’ theorem) says
that the posterior state νpost ( ∈ M+1(Ω)) is given by
νpost =
F1({3})× ν0〈
ν0, F1({3})
〉 .
That is,
νpost({ω1}) =
p1
2
p1
2 + p2
, νpost({ω2}) = p2p1
2 + p2
, νpost({ω3}) = 0.
Particularly, we see that
(♯2) if p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/3, then it holds that νpost({ω1}) = 1/3, νpost({ω2}) = 2/3, νpost({ω3}) = 0, and
thus, you should pick Door 2.
♠ Note 4.10 It is not natural to assume the rule (♯1) in Problem 4.16. That is because the host may
intentionally set the car behind a certain door. Thus we think that Problem 4.16 is temporary. For our
formal proposal, see Sec. 6.4.5.
4.4.3 Entropy — The value of eyewitness information
As one of applications (of Bayes theorem), we now study the “entropy” of the measurement(cf. [31]). Here
we have the following definition.
Definition 4.17 [Entropy(cf. [10])] Consider a mixed measurement MC(Ω)
(
O ≡ (X, 2X , F ), S(ρ0)
)
in
a commutative basic algebra C(Ω), where the label set X is assumed to be at most countable, i.e., X =
{x1, x2, ..., xn, ...}. Then, the H(M), the (fuzzy) entropy of MC(Ω)(O, S(ρ0)), is defined by
H
(
MC(Ω)(O, S(ρ0))
)
=
∞∑
n=1
( ∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω)
∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω) log
[F ({xn})](ω)∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω)ρ0(dω)
)
=
∞∑
n=1
P ({xn}) · I({xn}) (4.7)
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where, P ({xn}) =
∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω)(
= the probability that a measured value xn is obtained
)
I({xn}) =
∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω) log
[F ({xn})](ω)∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω)ρ0(dω)
=
1
P ({xn})
∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω) log[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω)− logP ({xn})(
= the information quantity when a measured value xn is obtained
)
The following is clear:
H(M) =
∞∑
n=1
∫
Ω
[F ({xn})](ω) log[F ({xn})](ω)ρ0(dω)−
∞∑
n=1
P ({xn}) logP ({xn}). (4.8)
Example 4.18 [The offender is man or female? fast or slow?] Assume that
(a) There are 100 suspected persons such as {s1, s2, . . . , s100}, in which there is one criminal.
Define the state space Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ω100} such that
stateωn · · · the state such that suspect sn is a criminal (n = 1, 2, ..., 100)
Define a male-observable Om = (X = {ym, nm}, 2X ,M) in C(Ω) by
[M({ym})](ωn) = mym(ωn) =
{
0 (n is odd)
1 (n is even)
[M({nm})](ωn) = mnm(ωn) = 1− [M({ym})](ωn)
For example,
Taking a measurement MC(Ω)(Om, S[ω17]) — the sex of the criminal s17 —, we get the measured
value nm(=).
Also, define the fast-observable Of = (Y = {yf , nf}, 2Y , F ) in C(Ω) by
[F ({yf})](ωn) = fyf (ωn) =
n− 1
99
,
[F ({nf})](ωn) = fnf (ωn) = 1− [F ({yf})](ωn)
According to the principle of equal weight (due to Theorem 6.21 later), there is a reason to consider that
a mixed stateν0 (∈ M+1(Ω) is equal to the stateνe such that ν0({ωn}) = νe({ωn}) = 1/100 (∀n). Thus,
consider two mixed measurement MC(Ω)(Om, S[∗](νe)) and MC(Ω)(Of , S[∗](νe)). then, by (4.8), we see:
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H
(
MC(Ω)(Om, S[∗](νe) =
∫
Ω
mym(ω)νe(dω) · log
∫
Ω
mym(ω)νe(dω)
−
∫
Ω
m{nm}(ω)νe(dω) · log
∫
Ω
mnm(ω)νe(dω)
= −1
2
log
1
2
− 1
2
log
1
2
= log2 2 = 1 (bit)
,
H
(
MC(Ω)(Of , S[∗](νe))
)
=
∫
Ω
fyf (ω) log fyf (ω)νe(dω)
+
∫
Ω
fnf (ω) log fnf (ω)νe(dω)−
∫
Ω
fyf (ω)νe(dω) · log
∫
Ω
fyf (ω)νe(dω)
−
∫
Ω
fnf (ω)νe(dω) · log
∫
Ω
fnf (ω)νe(dω)
+2
∫ 1
0
λ log2 λdλ + 1 = −
1
2 loge 2
+ 1 = 0.278 . . . (bit)
Therefore, as eyewitness information, ”male of female” has more valuable than ”fast or slow”.
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5 Practical Logic
The term ”practical logic” means the logic in measurement theory. It is certain that pure logic is merely
a kind of rule in mathematics (or meta-mathematics). If it is so, the logic is not guaranteed to be applicable
to our world. For instance, mathematical logic does not assure the following famous statement:
(♯1) Since Socrates is a man and all men are mortal, it follows that Socrates is mortal.
That is, we think that
(♯2) the above (♯1) is not clarified yet.
In this chapter, we prove the (♯1) in classical systems. As seen in Note 3.2, it should be recalled that syllogism
does not hold in quantum systems.
5.1 Reconsider the logic of ordinary language
Logic has various aspects such as the following (A1)–(A3):.
(A1) [Logic in mathematics or mathematical logic]. It is natural to believe that logic in mathematics is
most reliable. But, it should be noted that mathematical logic is independent of our world. Thus,
mathematical logic can say nothing to our world, unless some interpretation is added. For example,
the following syllogism is obvious.
(♯) ”A⇒ B, B ⇒ C” then ”A⇒ C”
This is a rule in mathematical logic. However, the syllogism(♯) is closed in mathematics, and thus,
it is not guaranteed to be related to our world.
(A2) [Ordinary language]. There is logic buried in ordinary language. This logic is various, for example,
”logic in marital dispute”, ”logic in a court”, etc. However, the rule of ordinary language is not
clear, and therefore, the following (♯1)–(♯4) have the room for reconsideration (Problem 5.1 and Note
5.1–5.3).
(♯1) Since Socrates is a man and all men are mortal, it follows that Socrates is mortal.
(♯2) Flying arrow is not moving (Zeno’s paradoxes)
(♯3) I think, therefore I am. (Descartes)
(♯4) ”1 (kg) + 1 (kg) =2 (kg)” (Edison; the master of invention) (cf. Sec.11.5)
(A3) [Logic in the world-descriptions]. As mentioned frequently, we have to say that
(♯1) mathematics, independent of our world, can not assert anything to the world without the world-
description (e.g., Newtonian mechanics, measurement theory, etc. ).
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The spirit of world-description says that,
(♯2) First, describe each phenomenon by a language (induced by world-description). Next, calculate
its numerical representation.
As in the above, there is various logic (A1)–(A3). However, recall our standing point 3.5(=Chap. 1(X4))
Describe any theory (which is not yet described by measurement theory) in terms of measurement
theory.
♠ Note 5.1 As seen in Chap. 1(X1), we have the following diagram;
(X1)
(Chap,1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic method
(Newtonian mechanics,etc.)
2©linguistic method
(measurement theory)
Here, it is natural to see that
(♯1) ”widely ordinary language 0©” includes
(♭) the statement (♯1) – (♯4) in (A2), statistics (=dynamical system theory)
(Chaps. 4,7,11)
However, the framework of ordinary language is not clear. Therefore, according to Our standing point 3.5
(=Chap. 1(X4)), our purpose is to reconsider this (♭) in measurement theory 2©
About 2500 years ago, Zeno (BC490-BC430) pointed out the ambiguity of the logic in ordinary language
as follows.
Problem 5.1 [Flying arrow is not moving]
(B1) [Problem ]: Is flying arrow is moving or not?
(B2) [Zeno’s answer] Consider a flying arrow. In any one instant of time, the arrow is not moving.
Therefore, If the arrow is motionless at every instant, and time is entirely composed of instants, then
motion is impossible.
If Zonon’s logic (B2) is not true, it is natural to consider that the (♯1) – (♯4) in (A2) in ordinary language
cannot be believed easily. Hence, Zeno’s paradoxes urge us to ask the following question:
(B3) By what kind of world-description should the flying arrow be described?
This problem (B3) may be the most famous unsolved problem in science. This problem (B3) will be solved
in Answer 11.11 in Chap. 11.
As an answer to Problem (B3), some consider Newtonian mechanics. However, the ”flying arrow” is
a symbol of various motion·change, e.g., the growth of a tree, economic growth of a country, etc. Thus,
Newtonian mechanics is not proper. Of course, some may assert Laplace’s demon. However, we think that
even a physical supremacist hesitates to say Laplace’s demon.
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♠ Note 5.2 If we know the present state of the universe and the kinetic equation (=the theory of everything),
and if we calculate it, we can know everything (from past to future). There may be a reason to believe this
idea. This intellect is often referred to as Laplace’s demon. Laplace’s demon is sometimes discussed as the
realistic-view over which the degree passed. Although the discussion about
Laplace’s Demon vs. measurement theory
is interesting, we do not concerned with Laplace demon in this book.
♠ Note 5.3 Recall the classification of measurement theory a follows.
(Y)
(Chap.1)
measurement theory
 quantum measurement theoryclassical measurement theory
If we, from the quantum mechanical point of view, discuss (♯1) – (♯4) in (A2). these meaning will be clearer.
In what follows, we mention them as our final answers:
(♯1) the syllogism — (♯1) in (A2) — does not hold in quantum systems (Note 3.8), but it is true in classical
systems (Theorem 5.11(i)).
(♯2) The (♯2) (flying arrow) in (A2)] — the trajectories of electron — is meaningless (Note 11.8) in quantum
systems, but it is true in classical systems(Sec.11.5).
(♯3) The statement ”I think, · · · ” ((♯3) in (A2)) is nonsense in both classical and quantum systems (Sec.5.3.2).
(♯4) Edison’s problem (♯4) is true(Sec.11.5).
If it be so, the readers may agree that it is worth while studying (♯1) – (♯4) in (A2).
5.2 Quasi-product observable and marginal observable
As a generalization of a simultaneous observable (Definition 2.14), we introduce the following ”quasi-
product observable”.
Definition 5.2 [Quasi-product observable ] For each k = 1, 2, . . . , n, consider an observable Ok =
(Xk, Fk, Fk) in C(Ω). An observable O12...n = (×nk=1Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk, F12...n) in C(Ω) is called a quasi-
product observable of {Ok}nk=1, and denoted by
qp
×k=1,2,...,nOk = (×nk=1Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk, qp× k=1,2,...,nFk),
if it satisfied that
F12...n(X1 × · · · ×Xk−1 × Ξk ×Xk+1 × · · · ×Xn) = Fk(Ξk)
(∀Ξk ∈ Fk, ∀k = 1, 2, . . . , n)
Of course, a simultaneous observable is a kind of quasi-product observable, and thus, a quasi-product
observable is not generally determined uniquely.
♠ Note 5.4 Recall (Example 2.10; Urn problem). Putting Ω = {ω1, ω2}, we, by (2.5), define an observable
Owb = ({w, b}, 2{w,b}, F ) in C(Ω). Now we can define the quasi-product observable O
qp
× O = O12 = ({w, b}×
{w, b}, 2{w,b}×{w,b}, F12) in C(Ω)
F12({(w,w)})(ω1) = 8× 7
90
, F12({(w, b)})(ω1) = 8× 2
90
F12({(b, w)})(ω1) = 2× 8
90
, F12({(b, b)})(ω1) = 2× 1
90
F12({(w,w)})(ω2) = 4× 3
90
, F12({(w, b)})(ω2) = 4× 6
90
F12({(b, w)})(ω2) = 6× 4
90
, F12({(b, b)})(ω2) = 6× 5
90
Here, note that O12 is a quasi-product observable and not a simultaneous observable.
5 PRACTICAL LOGIC 85
Definition 5.3 [Marginal observable ] Consider an observable O12...n = (×nk=1Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk, F12...n)
in C(Ω). For each 1 ≦ j ≦ n, define F
(j)
12...n by
F
(j)
12...n(Ξj) = F12...n(X1 × · · · ×Xj−1 × Ξj ×Xj+1 × · · · ×Xn) (∀Ξj ∈ Fj)
Here, O
(j)
12...n = (Xj , Fj , F (j)12...n) is an observable in C(Ω). The O(j)12...n is called a marginal observable
(precisely, (j)-marginal observable ) of O12...n. This can be generalized as follows. For example, putting
O
(12)
12...n = (X1 ×X2, F1 ×F2, F (12)12...n),
F
(12)
12...n(Ξ1 × Ξ2) = F (12)12...n(Ξ1 × Ξ2 ×X3 × · · · ×Xn) (∀Ξ1 ∈ F1, ∀Ξ2 ∈ F2)
we have the observable O
(12)
12...n = (X1 ×X2, F1 ×F2, F (12)12...n). Of course, it holds that F12...n = F (12...n)12...n .
An observable O = (X,F , F ) in C(Ω) has another representation as follows.
RepΞω[O] =
[
[F (Ξ)](ω), [F (Ξc)](ω)
]
Ξc = {x ∈ X | x /∈ Ξ}, i.e., the copmpliment of Ξ. Similarly, an observable O12 = (X1 ×X2,F1×F2, F12)
in C(Ω) is represented by
RepΞ1×Ξ2ω [O12] =
[
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) [F12(Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω)
[F12(Ξ
c
1 × Ξ2)](ω) [F12(Ξc1 × Ξc2)](ω)
]
where, it should be noted that
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) + [F12(Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω) = [F (1)12 (Ξ1)](ω)
[F12(Ξ
c
1 × Ξc2)](ω) + [F12(Ξc1 × Ξ2)](ω) = [F (1)12 (Ξc1)](ω)
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) + [F12(Ξc1 × Ξ2)](ω) = [F (2)12 (Ξ2)](ω)
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω) + [F12(Ξc1 × Ξc2)](ω) = [F (2)12 (Ξc2)](ω)
Lemma 5.4 [The condition of quasi-product observables (cf. [8]) ] Let O1 = (X1,F1, F1) and O2
= (X2,F2, F2) be observables in C(Ω). Let O12 = (X1 ×X2,F1 × F2, F12=F1
qp
× F2) be a quasi-product
observable of O1 and O2. That is, it holds that
F1 = F
(1)
12 , F2 = F
(2)
12
Then, putting αΞ1×Ξ2 (ω) = [F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω), we see
RepΞ1×Ξ2ω [O12] =
[
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) [F12(Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω)
[F12(Ξ
c
1 × Ξ2)](ω) [F12(Ξc1 × Ξc2)](ω)
]
=
[
α
Ξ1×Ξ2
(ω) [F1(Ξ1](ω)− αΞ1×Ξ2 (ω)
[F2(Ξ2](ω)− αΞ1×Ξ2 (ω) 1 + αΞ1×Ξ2 (ω)− [F1(Ξ1](ω)− [F2(Ξ2](ω)
]
(5.1)
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and
max{0, [F1(Ξ1)](ω) + [F2(Ξ2)](ω)− 1} ≦ αΞ1×Ξ2 (ω) ≦ min{[F1(Ξ1)](ω), [F2(Ξ2)](ω)}
(∀Ξ1 ∈ F1, ∀Ξ2 ∈ F2, ∀ω ∈ Ω) (5.2)
Reversely, for any αΞ1×Ξ2 ( ∈ C(Ω)) such that (5.2), the observable O12 defined by (5.1) is a quasi-product
observable of O1 and O2. Also, it holds that
[F (Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω) = 0 ⇐⇒ αΞ1×Ξ2 (ω) = [F1(Ξ1)](ω) =⇒ [F1(Ξ1)](ω) ≦ [F2(Ξ2)](ω) (5.3)
Consider yes-no observables O1 ≡ (X1, 2X1 , F1) and O2 ≡ (X2, 2X2 , F2) in C(Ω) such that:
X1 = {y1, n1} and X2 = {y2, n2}.
Let O12 ≡ (X1×X2, 2X1×X2 , F ≡ F1×O12 F2) be a quasi-product observable with the marginal observ-
ables O1 and O2.
Put
Rep[O12] =
[
[F ({(y1, y2)})](ω) [F ({(y1, n2)})](ω)
[F ({(n1, y2)})](ω) [F ({(n1, n2)})](ω)
]
=
[
α(ω) [F1({y1})](ω)− α(ω)
[F2({y2})](ω)− α(ω) 1 + α(ω)− [F1({y1})](ω)− [F2({y2})](ω)
]
,
where α ∈ C(Ω).
(
Note that [F ({(y1, y2)})](ω) + [F ({(y1, n2)})](ω) = [F1({y1})](ω) and [F ({(y1, y2)})](ω)
+ [F ({(n1, y2)})](ω) = [F2({y2})](ω)
)
.
That is,
F1F2 [F2({y2})](ω) [F2({n2})](ω)
[F1({y1})](ω) α(ω) [F1({y1})](ω)− α(ω)
[F1({n1})](ω) [F2({y2})](ω)− α(ω) 1 + α(ω)− [F1({y1})](ω)− [F2({y2})](ω)
Then, it holds that
max{0, [F1({y1})](ω) + [F2({y2})](ω)− 1} ≤ α(ω) ≤ min{[F1({y1})](ω), [F2({y2})](ω)}
(∀ω ∈ Ω).
Conversely, for any α ( ∈ C(Ω)) that satisfies (5.2), the observable O12 defined by (5.1) is a quasi-product
observable with the marginal observables O1 and O2. Also, note that
[F ({(y1, n2)})](ω) = 0 ⇔ α(ω) = [F1({y1})](ω) ⇒ [F1({y1})](ω) ≤ [F2({y2})](ω).
Proof. Though this lemma is easy, we add a brief proof for completeness. Since 0 ≤
[F ({(x11, x22)})] (ω) ≤ 1, (∀x1, x2 ∈ {y, n}), we see, by (5.1) that
0 ≤ α(ω) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ [F1({y1})](ω)− α(ω) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ [F2({y2})](ω)− α(ω) ≤ 1,
0 ≤ 1 + α(ω)− [F1({y1})](ω)− [F2({y2})](ω) ≤ 1,
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which clearly implies (5.2). Conversely. if α satisfies (5.2), then we easily see (5.1). Also, (5.2) is obvious.
This completes the proof.
Let O12 = (X1×X2,F1×F2, F12=F1
qp
×F2) be a quasi-product observable (in C(ω)) of O1 = (X1,F1, F1)
and O2 = (X2,F2, F2). Assume that a measured value (x1, x2) (∈ X1×X2) is obtained by a measurement
MC(Ω)(O12 =(X1 ×X2,F1 ×F2, F12=F1
qp
×F2), S[ω])). If we know that x1 ∈ Ξ1, then we can calculate the
probability P that x2 ∈ Ξ2 (that is, the conditional probability ) is given by
P =
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω)
[F1(Ξ1)](ω)
=
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω)
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) + [F12(Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω)
And it is, by (5.2), estimated as follows.
max{0, [F1(Ξ1)](ω) + [F2(Ξ2)](ω)− 1}
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) + [F12(Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω)
≦ P ≦
min{[F1(Ξ1)](ω), [F2(Ξ2)](ω)}
[F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) + [F12(Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω)
Example 5.5 [Tomatos] Let Ω = {ω1, ω2, ...., ωN} be a set of tomatoes, which is regarded as a compact
Hausdorff space with the discrete topology. Consider yes-no observables ORD ≡ (XRD, 2XRD , FRD) and OSW
≡ (XSW, 2XSW , FSW) in C(Ω) such that:
XRD = {yRD, nRD} and XSW = {ySW, nSW},
where we consider that “yRD” and “nRD” respectively mean “RED” and “NOT RED”. Similarly, “ySW”
and “nSW” respectively mean “SWEET” and “NOT SWEET”.
For example, the ω1 is red and not sweet, the ω2 is red and sweet, etc. as follows.
ω1
yRD
nSW
ω2
yRD
ySW
ω3
nRD
ySW
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
ωK
nRD
nSW
Figure 5.1: Tomatos ( Red?, Sweet? )
Next, consider the quasi-product observable as follows.
O12 = (XRD ×XSW, 2XRD×XSW , F=FRD
qp
×FSW)
That is,
Rep{(yRD,ySW)}ωk [O12] =
[
[F ({(yRD, ySW)})](ωk) [F ({(yRD, nSW)})](ωk)
[F ({(nRD, ySW)})](ωk) [F ({(nRD, nSW)})](ωk)
]
=
[
α
{(yRD,ySW)}
[FRD({yRD})]− α{(yRD,ySW)}
[FSW({ySW})]− α{(yRD,ySW)} 1 + α{(yRD,ySW)} − [FRD({yRD})]− [FSW({ySW})]
]
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where α
{(yRD,ySW)}
(ωk) satisfies the (5.2). When we know that a tomato ωk is red, the probability P that
the tomato ωk is sweet is given by
P =
[F ({(yRD, ySW)})](ωk)
[F ({(yRD, ySW)})](ωk) + [F ({(yRD, nSW)})](ωk) =
[F ({(yRD, ySW)})](ωk)
[FRD({yRD})](ωk)
Since [F ({(yRD, ySW)})](ωk) = α{(yRD,ySW)}(ωk), the conditional probability P is estimated by
max{0, [F1({yRD})](ωk) + [F2({ySW})](ωk)− 1}
[FRD({yRD})](ωk) ≦ P ≦
min[F1({ySW})](ωk), [F2({ySW})](ωk)}
[FRD({yRD})](ωk)
5.3 Implication — The definition of ”⇒”
5.3.1 Implication and contraposition
In Example 5.5, consider the case that [F ({(yRD, nSW)})](ω) = 0. In this case, we see
[F ({(yRD, ySW)})](ω)
[F ({(yRD, ySW)})](ω) + [F ({(yRD, nSW)})](ω) = 1
Therefore, when we know that a tomato ω is red, the probability that the tomato ω is sweet ig equal to 1.
That is,
“[F ({(yRD, nSW)})](ω) = 0” ⇐⇒
[
“Red” =⇒ “Sweet”
]
Motivated by the above argument, we have the following definition.
Definition 5.6 [Inplication] Let O12...n = (×nk=1Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk, F12...n = qp×
k=1,2,...,n
Fk) be a quasi-
product observable in C(Ω). Let Ξ1 ∈ P(X1) and Ξ2 ∈ P(X2). Then, the condition
F
(ij)
12...n(Ξi × (Ξcj))](ω) = 0
is denoted by
[O
(i)
12...n; Ξi] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O12...n,S[ω])
[O
(j)
12...n; Ξj ]
///
Of course, it should be read as follows.
Assume that a measured value (x1, x2)(∈ X1 ×X2) is obtained by a measurementMC(Ω)(O12, S[ω]).
When we know that x1 ∈ Ξ1, then we can assure that x2 ∈ Ξ2.
Theorem 5.7 [Contraposition] Let O12 = (X1 × X2, F1 × F2, F12=F1
qp
×F2) be a quasi-product
observable in C(Ω). Let ω ∈ Ω. Let Ξ1 ∈ F1 and Ξ2 ∈ F2. If it holds that
[O
(1)
12 ; Ξ1] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O12,S[ω])
[O
(2)
12 ; Ξ2] (5.4)
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then we see:
[O
(1)
12 ; Ξ
c
1] ⇐=
MC(Ω)(O12,S[ω])
[O
(2)
12 ; Ξ
c
2]
Proof. The proof is easy, but we add it. Assume the condition (5.4). That is,
[F12(Ξ1 × (X2 \ Ξ2))](ω) = 0
Since Ξ1 × Ξ2c = (Ξc1)c × Ξc2 we see
[F12((Ξ
c
1)
c × Ξc2)](ω) = 0
Therefore, we get
[O
(1)
12 ; Ξ
c
1] ⇐=
MC(Ω)(O12,S[ω])
[O
(2)
12 ; Ξ
c
2]
♠ Note 5.5 In what follows, reconsider the statistical hypothesis testing (Sec. 4.3.4). Consider the observable
ONH =(Y (= {0, 1}), 2{0,1}, FNH ) in C(Ω) such that
[FNH ({1})](ω) =
{
1 (ω ∈ NH)
0 (ω /∈ NH) , [FNH ({0})](ω) = 1− [FNH ({1})](ω)
( Even if FNH ({1}) /∈ C(Ω), we do not mind it (cf. Chap. 10)). And consider the simultaneous measurement
MC(Ω)(ONH ×O =(Y ×X, 2{0,1} ×F , FNH × F ), S[∗]). If the measured value (y, x) belongs to {1} ×X, the
probability that x /∈ [D]ε
0.05
max
NH
is estimated by
[(FNH × F )({1} × (X \ [D]ε
0.05
max
NH
))](ω)
[(FNH × F )({1} ×X)](ω)
= [F (X \ [D]ε0.05maxNH )](ω) ≥ 0.95
That is, ”y = 1” implies ”mostly, x /∈ [D]ε
0.05
max
NH
”. This contraposition ( i.e., if ”x ∈ [D]ε
0.05
max
NH
”, then it is rare
that y = 1) is similar to statistical hypothesis testing (cf. [20]).
5.3.2 ”I think, therefore I am” is doubtful
The following example is somewhat unnatural, it may be dispensable for the understanding of dualism.
Example 5.8 [Brain death] Let ωn (∈ Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωN}) be the state of Peter. Let O12 = (X1×X2,
2X1×X2 , F12=F1
qp
×F2) be the brain death observable in C(Ω) such that X1 = {T, T} X2 = {L,L}, where
T = ”think”, T = ”not think”, L = ”live”, L = ”not live”. For each ωn (n = 1, 2, . . . , N), O12 satisfies
the condition in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Brain death observable O12 = (X1 ×X2, 2X1×X2 , F12)
F1F2 [F2({L})](ωn) [F2({L})](ωn)
[F1({T})](ωn) (1 + (−1)n)/2
(=[F12({T}×{L})](ωn))
0
(=[F12({T}×{L})](ωn))
[F1({T})](ωn) 0
(=[F12({T}×{L})](ωn))
(1− (−1)n)/2
(=[F12({T}×{L})](ωn))
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Since [F12({T} × {L})](ωn) = 0, the following formula holds:
[O
(1)
12 ; {T}] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O12,S[ωn])
[O
(2)
12 ; {L}]
Of course, this implies that
Peter thinks, therefore, Peter lives.
This is the same as the statement concerning brain death. Note that in the above example, we see that
observer←→doctor, system←→Peter,
This should not be confused with the following famous Descartes’ saying:
”I think, therefore I am”.
in which the following identification may be assumed:
observer←→I, system←→I
And thus, the above is not a statement in dualism (=measurement theory). In order to propose Fig. 1.1
(i.e., dualism) ( that is, in order to establish the concept “I” in science), he started from the ambiguous
statement ”I think, therefore I am”. Summing up, we want to say the following irony:
Descartes proposed the dualism (i.e., Fig. 1.1) by the statement (♯1) which is not understandable
in dualism.
Even in physic, there is a case that a meaningless statement, which is useful to create the theory,
becomes famous. This (i.e., Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle(Proposition 3.1) ) is already pointed out in
Sec.3.4.
♠ Note 5.6 It is not true to consider that every phenomena can be describe in terns of measurement theory.
readers may think that the following can be described in measurement theory, but I believe that it is
impossible. For example,
(♯1) ”observer’s space-time”, ”tense—past, present, future —”, ”Heidegger’s saying: “In-der-Welt-sein””,
”the measurement of a measurement”, ”Only the present exists”, ”subjective time (Note 6.7)”,
Although these words can not be understood, we think that these are inconsistent with the Copenhagen
interpretation [Chap. 1(U1)–(U7))].
5.4 Practical syllogism — Is Socrates mortal?
The term: ”practical syllogism” means ”syllogism in measurement theory. And thus, the syllogism should
be proved in measurement theory.
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5.4.1 Combined observable — Observable is only one
The Copenhagen interpretation says that observable must be only one. Thus, many observables must be
combined.
Theorem 5.9 [Combined observable(cf. [8])] Let O12=(X1 ×X2,F1 ×F2, F12) and O23= (X2 ×X3,
F2 × F3, F23) be observables in C(Ω). Here, for simplicity, assume that Xi={x1i , x2i , . . . , xnii } (i = 1, 2, 3)
is finite, Also, assume that Fi = 2Xi . Further assume that
O
(2)
12 = O
(2)
23 (That is, F12(X1 × Ξ2) = F23(Ξ2 ×X3) (∀Ξ2 ∈ 2X2))
Then, we have the observable O123=(X1 ×X2 ×X3,F1 ×F2 ×F3, F123) in C(Ω) such that
O
(12)
123 = O12, O
(23)
123 = O23
That is,
F
(12)
123 (Ξ1 × Ξ2 ×X3) = F12(Ξ1 × Ξ2), F (23)123 (X1 × Ξ2 × Ξ3) = F23(Ξ2 × Ξ3)
(∀Ξ1 ∈ F1, ∀Ξ2 ∈ F2, ∀Ξ3 ∈ F3)) (5.5)
The O123 is called the combined observable of O12 and O23.
Proof. O123 = (X1 ×X2 ×X3, F1 ×F2 ×F3, F123) is, for example, defined by
[F123({(x1, x2, x3)})](ω)
=

[F12({(x1, x2)})](ω) · [F23({(x2, x3)})](ω)
[F12(X1 × {x2})](ω)
([F12(X1 × {x2})](ω) 6= 0 and )
0
([F12(X1 × {x2})](ω) = 0 and )
(∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀(x1, x2, x3) ∈ X1 ×X2 ×X3)
This clearly satisfies (5.5).
Remark 5.10 [Bell’s inequality is useful] Put X1 = X2 = X3 = X4 = {−1, 1}. Let O13=(X1 ×
X3, 2
X1 × 2X3 , F13), O14=(X1×X4, 2X1 × 2X4 , F14), O23= (X2×X3, 2X2 × 2X3 , F23) and O24= (X2×X3,
2X2 × 2X4 , F24) be observables in C(Ω) such that
O
(1)
13 = O
(1)
14 , O
(2)
23 = O
(2)
24 , O
(3)
13 = O
(3)
23 , O
(4)
14 = O
(4)
24
Define the probability measure νab on {−1, 1}2 by the formula (3.6). Assume that there exists a state
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ω0 ∈ Ω such that
[F13({(x1, x3)})](ω0) = νa1b1({(x1, x3)},
[F14({(x1, x4)})](ω0) = νa1b2({(x1, x4)}
[F23({(x2, x3)})](ω0) = νa2b1({(x2, x3)},
[F24({(x2, x4)})](ω0) = νa2b2({(x2, x4)}
Now we have the following problem:
(a) Does the observable O1234=(×4k=1Xk,×4k=1 Fk, F1234) in C(Ω) satisfying the following (♯)?
(♯) O
(13)
1234 = O13, O
(14)
1234 = O14, O
(23)
1234 = O23, O
(24)
1234 = O24
In what follows, we show that the above observable O1234 does not exist.
Assume that the observable O1234=(×4k=1Xk, ×4k=1 Fk, F1234) exists. Then, it suffices to show the
contradiction. Define C13(ω0), C14(ω0), C23(ω0) and C24(ω0) such that
C13(ω0) =
∫
×4k=1Xk x1 · x3 [F1234(
4×
k=1
dxk)](ω0)(
=
∫
X1×X3 x1 · x3 νa1b1(dx1dx3)
)
C14(ω0) =
∫
×4k=1Xk x1 · x4 [F1234(
4×
k=1
dxk)](ω0)(
=
∫
X1×X4 x1 · x4 νa1b2(dx1dx4)
)
C23(ω0) =
∫
×4k=1Xk x2 · x3 [F1234(
4×
k=1
dxk)](ω0)(
=
∫
X2×X3 x2 · x3 νa2b1(dx2dx3)
)
C24(ω0) =
∫
×4k=1Xk x2 · x4 [F1234(
4×
k=1
dxk)](ω0)(
=
∫
X2×X4 x2 · x4 νa2b2(dx2dx4)
)
Then, we can easily get the following Bell’s inequality (cf. Note 3.4).
|C13(ω0)− C14(ω0)|+ |C23(ω0) + C24(ω0)|
≦
∫
×4k=1Xk|x1| · |x3 − x4| +|x2| · |x3 + x4|
[
F1234(
4×
k=1
dxk)
]
(ω0)
≦ 2 (since xk ∈ {−1, 1}) (5.6)
However, the formula (3.7) says that this (5.6) must be 2
√
2. Thus, by contradiction, we says that O1234
satisfying (a) does not exist. Thus we can not take a measurement MC(Ω)(O1234, S[ω0]).
However, it should be noted that
(b) in stead of MC(Ω)(O1234, S[ω0]). we can take a parallel measurement MC(Ω4)(O13 ⊗O14 ⊗O23 ⊗O24,
S[(ω0,ω0,ω0,ω0)]). In this case, we easily see that (5.6) = 2
√
2 as the formula (3.7).
That is,
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(c) in the case of a parallel measurement, Bell’s inequality is broken in both quantum and classical
systems.
♠ Note 5.7 In the above argument, Bell’s inequality is used in the framework of measurement theory. This is
of course true. However, since mathematics is of course independent of the world, now we have the following
question:
(♯) In order that mathematical Bell’s inequality asserts something to quantum mechanics, what kind of
idea do we prepare?
We can not answer this question.
5.4.2 Practical syllogism and its variations
Now we show several theorems of practical syllogisms (i.e., theorems concerning “implication” in Definition
5.6).
Theorem 5.11 [Practical syllogism (cf. [8])]
Let O123 = (X1 ×X2 ×X3, F1 ×F2 ×F3, F123=
qp
×k=1,2,3Fk) be an observable in C(Ω) Fix ω ∈ Ω, Ξ1
∈ F1, Ξ2 ∈ F2, Ξ3 ∈ F3 Then, we see the following (i) – (iii).
(i).(practical syllogism)
[O
(1)
123; Ξ1] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ω])
[O
(2)
123; Ξ2], [O
(2)
123; Ξ2] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ω])
[O
(3)
123; Ξ3]
implies
RepΞ1×Ξ3ω [O
(13)
123 ] =
[
[F
(13)
123 (Ξ1 × Ξ3)](ω) [F (13)123 (Ξ1 × Ξc3)](ω)
[F
(13)
123 (Ξ
c
1 × Ξ3)](ω) [F (13)123 (Ξc1 × Ξc3)](ω)
]
=
[
[F
(1)
123(Ξ1)](ω) 0
[F
(3)
123(Ξ3)](ω)− [F (1)123(Ξ1)](ω) 1− [F (3)123(Ξ3)](ω)
]
That is, it holds:
[O
(1)
123; Ξ1] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ω])
[O
(3)
123; Ξ3] (5.7)
(ii).
[O
(1)
123; Ξ1] ⇐=
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ω])
[O
(2)
123; Ξ2], [O
(2)
123; Ξ2] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ω])
[O
(3)
123; Ξ3]
implies
RepΞ1×Ξ3ω [O
(13)
123 ] =
[
[F
(13)
123 (Ξ1 × Ξ3)](ω) [F (13)123 (Ξ1 × Ξc3)](ω)
[F
(13)
123 (Ξ
c
1 × Ξ3)](ω) [F (13)123 (Ξc1 × Ξc3)](ω)
]
=
[
α
Ξ1×Ξ3
[F
(1)
123(Ξ1)](ω)− αΞ1×Ξ3
[F
(3)
123(Ξ3)](ω)− αΞ1×Ξ3 1− αΞ1×Ξ3 − [F
(1)
123(Ξ1)]− [F (3)123(Ξ3)]
]
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where
max{[F (2)123(Ξ2)](ω), [F (1)123(Ξ1)](ω) + [F (3)123(Ξ3)](ω)− 1}
≦ α
Ξ1×Ξ3
(ω) ≦ min{[F (1)123(Ξ1)](ω), [F (3)123(Ξ3)](ω)} (5.8)
(iii).
[O
(1)
123; Ξ1] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ω])
[O
(2)
123; Ξ2], [O
(2)
123; Ξ2] ⇐=
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ω])
[O
(3)
123; Ξ3]
implies
RepΞ1×Ξ3ω [O
(13)
123 ] =
[
[F
(13)
123 (Ξ1 × Ξ3)](ω) [F (13)123 (Ξ1 × Ξc3)](ω)
[F
(13)
123 (Ξ
c
1 × Ξ3)](ω) [F (13)123 (Ξc1 × Ξc3)](ω)
]
=
[
αΞ1×Ξ3 (ω) [F
(1)
123(Ξ1)](ω)− αΞ1×Ξ3 (ω)
[F
(3)
123(Ξ3)](ω)− αΞ1×Ξ3 (ω) 1− αΞ1×Ξ3 (ω)− [F
(1)
123(Ξ1)](ω)− [F (3)123(Ξ3)](ω)
]
where
max{0, [F (1)123(Ξ1)](ω) + [F (3)123(Ξ3)](ω)− [F (2)123(Ξ2)](ω)}
≦ αΞ1×Ξ3 (ω) ≦ min{[F
(1)
123(Ξ1)](ω), [F
(3)
123(Ξ3)](ω)}
Proof. (i): By the condition, we see
0 = [F
(12)
123 (Ξ1 × Ξc2)](ω) = [F123(Ξ1 × Ξc2 × Ξ3)](ω) + [F123(Ξ1 × Ξc2 × Ξc3)](ω)
0 = [F
(23)
123 (Ξ2 × Ξc3)](ω) = [F123(Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξc3)](ω) + [F123(Ξc1 × Ξ2 × Ξc3)](ω)
Therefore,
0 = [F123(Ξ1 × Ξc2 × Ξ3)](ω) = [F123(Ξ1 × Ξc2 × Ξc3)](ω)
0 = [F123(Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξc3)](ω) = [F123(Ξc1 × Ξ2 × Ξc3)](ω)
Hence,
[F
(13)
123 (Ξ1 × Ξc3)](ω) = [F123(Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξc3)](ω) + [F (13)123 (Ξ1 × Ξc2 × Ξc3)](ω) = 0
Thus, we get, (5.7).
For the proof of (ii) and (iii), see [8].
Example 5.12 [Continued from Example 5.5] Let O1 = OSW = (XSW, 2
XSW , FSW) and O3 = ORD =
(XRD, 2
XRD , FRD) be as in Example 5.5. Putting XRP = {yRP, nRP}, consider the new observable O2 =
ORP = (XRP, 2
XRP , FRP). Here, “yRP” and “nRP” respectively means ”ripe” and ”not ripe”. Put
Rep[O1] =
[
[FSW({ySW})](ωk), [FSW({nSW})](ωk)
]
Rep[O2] =
[
[FRP({yRP})](ωk), [FRP({nRP})](ωk)
]
Rep[O3] =
[
[FRD({yRD})](ωk), [FRD({nRD})](ωk)
]
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Consider the following quasi-product observable:
O12 = (XSW ×XRP, 2XSW×XRP , F12=FSW
qp
×FRP)
O23 = (XRP ×XRD, 2XRP×XRD , F23=FRP
qp
×FRD)
Let ωk ∈ Ω. And assume that
[O
(1)
123; {ySW}] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ωk])
[O
(2)
123; {yRP}],
[O
(2)
123; {yRP}] =⇒
MC(Ω)(O123,S[ωk])
[O
(3)
123; {yRD}] (5.9)
Then, by Theorem 5.11(i), we get:
Rep[O13] =
[
[F13({ySW} × {yRD})](ωk) [F13({ySW} × {nRD})](ωk)
[F13({nSW} × {yRD})](ωk) [F13({nSW} × {nRD})](ωk)
]
=
[
[FSW({ySW})](ωk) 0
[FRD({yRD})](ωk)− [FSW({ySW})](ωk) 1− [FRD({yRD})](ωk)
]
Therefore, when we know that the tomato ωk is sweet by measurement MC(Ω)(O123, S[ωk]), the probability
that
ωk is red is given by
[F13({ySW} × {yRD})](ωk)
[F13({ySW} × {yRD})](ωk) + [F13({ySW} × {nRD})](ωk) =
[FRD({yRD})](ωk)
[FRD({yRD})](ωk) = 1 (5.10)
Of course, (5.9) means
“Sweet” =⇒ “Ripe” “Ripe” =⇒ “Red”
Therefore, by (5.10), we get the following conclusion.
“Sweet” =⇒ “Red”
However, it is not useful in the market. What we want to know is such as
“Sweet” =⇒ “Sweet”
This will be discussed in the following example.
Example 5.13 [Continued from Example 5.12, [8]]. Instead of (5.9), assume that
O
{y1}
1 ⇐=
MC(Ω)(O12,S[δωn ])
O
{y2}
2 , O
{y2}
2 =⇒
MC(Ω)(O23,S[δωn ])
O
{y3}
3 . (5.11)
When we observe that the tomato ωn is “RED”, we can infer, by the fuzzy inference MC(Ω)(O13, S[δωn ]),
the probability that the tomato ωn is “SWEET” is given by
Q =
[F13({ySW}×{yRD})](ωn)
[F13({ySW}×{yRD})](ωn) + [F13({nSW}×{yRD})](ωn)
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which is, by (5.8), estimated as follows:
max
{
[FRP({yRP})](ωn)
[FRD({yRD})](ωn) ,
[FSW({ySW})] + [FRD({yRD})]− 1
[FRD({yRD})](ωn)
}
≤ Q ≤ min{ [FSW({ySW})](ωn)
[FRD({yRD})](ωn) , 1}.
(9.12)
Note that (5.11) implies (and is implied by)
“RIPE” =⇒ “SWEET” and “RIPE” =⇒ “RED” .
And note that the conclusion (5.12) is somewhat like
“RED” =⇒ “SWEET” .
Therefore, this conclusion is peculiar to “fuzziness”.
///
♠ Note 5.8 Recall the (A2) in Sec.5.1, that is,
(♯1) Since Socrates is a man and all men are mortal, it follows that Socrates is mortal.
(♯2) Flying arrow is not moving.
(♯3) I think, therefore I am.
(♯4) Edison’s ”1 + 1 = 2”
In this chapter, the above (♯1) and (♯3) are clarified.
If these four statements are childish, we can not explain the fact that these tales have been transmitted from
generation to generation, and these have been continuously passed by many persons with sharp sensibility.
However, measurement theory urges us to understand (♯1)–(♯4) without sharp sensibility. Recall Chap. 1
(X1):
(X1)
(Chap. 1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic method
(realistic world-view)
2©linguistic method
(linguistic world-view)
If we believe in this, our problem is as follows.
Should each (♯1)–(♯4) be discussed in 0©, 1© or 2© ?
In this chapter, (♯1) and (♯3) are explained. The (♯2) and (♯4) will be discussed in Chap. 11.
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6 Axiompm
c
2 - causality
Measurement theory is formulated as follows:
measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom 1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
Although the preceding chapter was introduction of the Axiom 1 about measurement, from this chapter, I
explain the Axiom 2 about movement and change(≈causality). If I say definitely roughly,
(♯) Science is the learning of causality, i.e., the learning about the phenomenon which can be expressed in
the word ”causality.”
Therefore, in this chapter, we arrived at ”causal relationship” in the main question at last. However, in
dualism, after understanding ”measurement” enough, unless it comes out, we cannot understand ”movement
and change.” In dualism, it is because we understand ”movement and change” as a debt of ”measurement”
and ”causality.”
6.1 Outstanding-problem -What is causality?
6.1.1 Modern science started from the discovery of ”causality.”
When a certain thing happens, the cause exists. This is called causality. You should just remember
the proverb of ”smoke is not located on the place which does not have fire.” It is not so simple
although you may think that it is natural. For example, if you consider
Is it because that my feeling feels it refreshed this morning went to sleep well last night? ,or is it
because I go to favorite golf from now on?
you may be able to understand the difficulty of how to use the word ”causality. In daily conversation, it is
used in many cases, mixing up ”a cause (past)”, ”a reason (connotation)”, and ”the purpose and a motive
(future).”
It may be supposed that Heraclitus’s(BC.540 -BC.480) ”Everything changes.” and ”Movement does
not exist.” of Parmenides (born around BC. 515)who is Zeno’s teacher are the beginning of research of
movement and change. However, those meanings are not clear. However, these two pioneers - Heraclitus
and Parmenides - noticed first that ”movement and change” were the primary importance keywords in
science(= ”world description”) , i.e., it is
[World description ]= [Description of movement and change ]
However, Aristotle(BC384–BC322) further investigated about the essence of movement and change,
and he thought that all the movements had the ”purpose.” For example, supposing a stone falls, that is
because there is the purpose that the stone tries to go downward. Supposing smoke rises, that is because
there is the purpose that smoke rises upwards. Under the influence of Aristotle, ”Purpose” continued
remaining as a mainstream idea of ”Movement” for a long time of 1500 or more.
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Although ”the further investigation” of Aristotle was what should be praised, it was not able to be
said that ”the purpose was to the point.” In order to free ourselves from Purpose and for human beings
to discover that the essence of movement and change is ”causal relationship”, we had to wait for the
appearance of Galileo, bacon, Descartes, Newton, etc.
Revolution to ”Causality” from ”Purpose”
is the greatest history-of-science top paradigm shift - It is not an overstatement even if we call it ”birth
of modern science. - , and determined the ”scientific revolution” after it.
6.1.2 Four answers to ”what is causality?”
As mentioned above, about ”what is an essence of movement and change?”, it was once settled with the
word ”causality.” However, not all were solved now. We do not yet understand ”causality” fully. In fact,
”What is causality?” is the most important outstanding problems in science.
There may be a reader who is surprised with saying like this although it is the outstanding problems in
the present. Below, I arrange the history of the answer to this problem.
(a) [Realistic causality]: Newton advocated the realistic describing method of Newtonian mechanics
as a final settlement of accounts of ideas, such as Galileo, bacon, and Descartes, and he thought as
follows. :
”Causality” actually exists in the world. The equation of motion of Newton described faithfully
this ”causality” that exists in fact by the differential equation - the equation of a causal chain
-.
This realistic causality may be a very natural idea, and you may think that you cannot think in addition
to this. In fact, probably, we may say that the current of the realistic causal relationship which continues
like ”Newtonian mechanics−→ Electricity and magnetism−→ Theory of relativity−→ · · · ” is a scientific
flower.
However, there is also another idea and there is three ”nonexistent causalities” as follows.
(b) [Cognitive causality]: Hume, Kant, etc. who are philosophers thought as follows. :
We can not say that ”Causality” actually exists in the world, or that it do not exist in the
world. And when we think that ”something” in the world is ”causality”, we should just believe
that the it has ”causality”.
Several readers may regard this as it being ”a kind of rhetoric”, moreover, several readers may be convinced
in ”That is right if you say so.” Surely, since you are looking through the prejudice ”causality”, you may
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look such. It is Kant’s famous ”Copernican revolution”(that is, ”recognition constitutes the world.” ) which
is considered that the recognition circuit of causality is installed in the brain, and when it is stimulated
by ”something” and reacts, ”there is causal relationship.” (Refer to later Section 8.1.) Probably, many
readers doubt about the substantial influence which this (b) had on the science after it. However, in this
book(Refer to later Section 8.1.) , I adopted the friendly story to the utmost to Kant.
(c) [Mathematical causality(Dynamical system theory)]: Since dynamical system theory has
developed as the mathematical technique in engineering, they have not investigated ”What is causal-
ity?” thoroughly. However,
In dynamical system theory, we think that there is mathematics of an equation of state pre-
viously (i.e., the time first degree alliance differential equation of the variable (1.1)) , and the
phenomenon described with the equation has ”causality.” (Refer to Chap. 1(E1)).
With the ordinary feeling of science, you may tend to understand this (c) because you thinks somehow
”=.” However, you should be cautious of it being a typical example of the form of the mathematics buried
into ordinary language. However, for the purpose of ”Being helpful”, I think that (c) should be evaluated
more.
(d) [Linguistic causal relationship (MeasurementTheory)]: The causal relationship of measure-
ment theory is decided by the Axiom 2 of this chapter. If I say in detail,:
Although measurement theory consists of the two Axioms 1 and 2, it is the Axiom 2 that is
concerned with causal relationship. When describing a certain phenomenon in a language called
measurement theory and using the Axiom 2, we think that the phenomenon has causality.
Although it is above, it is the next difference when (a)–(d) is summarized.
(a) World is first (b) Recognition is first
(c) Mathematics(buried into ordinary language) is first
(d) Language (Measurement Theory) is first
Now, in measurement theory, we assert the next as said repeatedly. :
Measurement theory is a basic language which describes various sciences.
Supposing this is recognized, we can assert the next. Namely,
In science, causality is claimed in upper (d).
This is an answer of measurement theory to ”What is causality?”, and I explain these details after the
following paragraph.
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♠ Note 6.1 For the question ”What is space-time?”, there are two answers as follows.
(♯1) world description
(Chap. 1(O))

1© : realistic method
(realistic space-time)
· · ·Newton’s space-time
−−−−−−→
evolution
Einstein’s space-time −−−−−−→
evolution
· · ·
2© : linguistuc method
(metaphysical space-time)
· · · Leibniz’s relationalism
(litery representation)
−−−−−−→
evolution
time-space in measurement theory
Concerning ”What is causality?”, a similar argument is possible.
(♯2) world description
(Chap. 1(O))

1© : realistic method
(realistic causality)
· · ·Newton’s causality
2© : linguistuc method
(metaphysical causality)
· · ·causality in measurement theory
Also,
(♯3) In Sec. 8.1, we discuss the relation among (b), (c) and (d).
♠ Note 6.2 As one of the by-products of measurement theory, I can reply to the outstanding problems
(♯1) What are time, space, causality, and probability?
in a metaphysical position(linguistic position of an anti physics supreme principle). In metaphysics, answering
to ”What is ” is defining how to use the language . ( Note 2.3, Note 5.6 ). Therefore, this (♯1) is equivalent
to the following (♯2).
(♯2) To propose the linguistic universe describing method containing the word ”time, space, causality, and
probability.”
Of course, in this book, measurement theory (i.e., establishment of the linguistic method) is proposed as this
answer.
6.2 Causality — No smoke without fire
6.2.1 The Heisenberg picture and the Schro¨dinger picture
Let Ω be a state space. state space. Let C(Ω) be a space of all real continuous valued functions on Ω.
Also, recall M(Ω) and M+1(Ω) in Sec.4.4.1(b).
Definition 6.2 [Causal operator(causal operator)] Let Ω1 and Ω2 be state spaces. a continuous linear
operator Φ1,2 : C(Ω2) → C(Ω1) is called a causal operator (or, Markov causal operator) if it satisfies
(i)—(iii):
(i) f2 ∈ C(Ω2), f2 ≧ 0 =⇒ Φ12f2 ≧ 0
(ii) Φ1212 = 11 where, 1k(ωk) = 1 (∀ωk ∈ Ωk, k = 1, 2)
(iii) There exists a continuous linear operatorΦ∗1,2 :M(Ω1)→M(Ω2) such that :∫
Ω1
[Φ1,2f2](ω1) ρ1(dω1) =
∫
Ω2
f2(ω2) (Φ
∗
1,2ρ1)(dω2)
(∀ρ1 ∈M(Ω1), ∀f2 ∈ C(Ω2))
If Ω is compact, this condition is a consequence of the above (i) and (ii).
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The causal operator Φ1,2 : C(Ω2)→ C(Ω1) is regarded as the Heisenberg picture representation of the
”causality”. Also, the dual causal operator Φ∗1,2 Φ1,2 is called the Schro¨dinger picture representation of
the ”causality”. In addition, the causal operatorΦ1,2 is called a deterministic causal operator, if there
exists a continuous map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 such that
[Φ1,2f2](ω1) = f2(φ1,2(ω1)) (∀f2 ∈ C(Ω2), ∀ω1 ∈ Ω1) (6.1)
This continuous map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 is said to be a deterministic causal map.
ω1 φ1,2(ω1)
Ω2Ω1
f2Φ1,2f2
Figure 6.1: deterministic causal mapφ1,2 and deterministic causal operatorΦ1,2
Theorem 6.3 [Causal operator and observable ] For any observable O2 = (X,F , F2) in C(Ω2), the
(X,F ,Φ1,2F2) is an observable in C(Ω1). We denote that Φ1,2O2 = (X,F ,Φ1,2F2).
Proof. For any Ξ (∈ F), consider the countable decomposition {Ξ1,Ξ2, . . . ,Ξn, . . .}
(
that is,
Ξ =
∞⋃
n=1
Ξn, Ξn ∈ F , (n = 1, 2, . . .), Ξm ∩ Ξn = ∅ (m 6= n)
)
. Recalling the condition: (2.3), we see, for
any ρ1(∈ M(Ω1)),∫
Ω1
[
[Φ1,2F2](
∞⋃
n=1
Ξn)
]
(ω1) ρ1(dω1) =
∫
Ω2
[F2(
∞⋃
n=1
Ξn)](ω2) Φ
∗
1,2ρ1(dω2)
=
∞∑
n=1
∫
Ω2
[F2(Ξn)](ω2) Φ
∗
1,2ρ1(dω2) =
∞∑
n=1
∫
Ω1
[
[Φ1,2F2](Ξn)
]
(ω1) ρ1(dω1)
Thus, Φ1,2O2 = (X,F ,Φ1,2F2) is an observable in C(Ω1).
Theorem 6.4 Consider a continuous map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2. The operatorΦ1,2 : C(Ω2)→ C(Ω1) is defined
by the formula (6.1), that is,
[Φ1,2f2](ω1) = f2(φ1,2(ω1)) (∀f2 ∈ C(Ω2), ∀ω1 ∈ Ω1)
Then, the operator Φ1,2 : C(Ω2)→ C(Ω1) is a deterministic causal operator. This means that ”continuous
map =deterministic causal map”.
Proof. It suffices to show the existence of the dual causal operatorΦ∗1,2 : M(Ω1) → M(Ω2). This is
shown as follows.
[Φ∗1,2ρ1](D2) = ρ1(φ
−1
12 (D2)) (∀D2 ∈ BΩ2 , ∀ρ1 ∈ M(Ω1)) (6.2)
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Thus, we get the dual causal operator Φ∗1,2 :M(Ω1)→M(Ω2).
Theorem 6.5 Let Φ1,2 : C(Ω2)→ C(Ω1) be a deterministic causal operator. Then, it holds:
Φ1,2(f2 · g2) = Φ1,2(f2) · Φ1,2(g2) (∀f2, ∀g2 ∈ C(Ω2))
Proof. Let f2, g2 be elements in C(Ω2) Let φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 be a deterministic causal operator of a
deterministic causal operator Φ1,2 : C(Ω2)→ C(Ω1). Then, we see:
[Φ1,2(f2 · g2)](ω1) = (f2 · g2)(φ1,2(ω1)) = f2(φ1,2(ω1)) · g2(φ1,2(ω1))
=[Φ1,2(f2)](ω1) · [Φ1,2(g2)](ω1) = [Φ1,2(f2) · Φ1,2(g2)](ω1) (∀ω1 ∈ Ω1)
This completes the proof.
6.2.2 A simple example — A matrix representation in the case of finite state space
Example 6.6 [Deterministic causal operator, deterministic dual causal operator, deterministic
causal map] Define the two states space Ω1 and Ω2 such that Ω1 = Ω2 = R. Define the deterministic
causal map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 such that
ω2 = φ1,2(ω1) = 3ω1 + 2 (∀ω1 ∈ Ω1 = R)
Then, by (6.2), we get the deterministic dual causal operator Φ∗1,2 :M(Ω1)→M(Ω2) such that
Φ∗1,2δω1 = δ3ω1+2 (∀ω1 ∈ Ω1)
where δ(·) is the point measure. Also, the deterministic causal operatorΦ1,2 : C(Ω2) → C(Ω1) is defined
by
[Φ1,2(f2)](ω1) = f2(3ω1 + 2) (∀f2 ∈ C(Ω2), ∀ω1 ∈ Ω1)
Example 6.7 [Dual causal operator·causal operator] Put Ω1 = {ω11, ω21 , ω31} and Ω2 = {ω12, ω22}.
And define ρ1(∈ M+1(Ω1)) such that
ρ1 = a1δω11 + a2δω21 + a3δω31 (0 ≦ a1, a2, a3 ≦ 1, a1 + a2 + a3 = 1)
Then, the dual causal operator Φ∗1,2 :M+1(Ω1)→M+1(Ω2) is represented by
Φ∗1,2(ρ1) =(c11a1 + c12a2 + c13a3)δω12 + (c21a1 + c22a2 + c23a3)δω22
(0 ≦ cij ≦ 1,
2∑
i=1
cij = 1)
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and . Consider the identification:M(Ω1) ≈ R3, M(Ω2) ≈ R2, That is,
M(Ω1) ∋ α1δω11 + α2δω21 + α3δω31 ←→(identification)
α1α2
α3
 ∈ R3
M(Ω2) ∋ β1δω12 + β2δω22 ←→(identification)
[
β1
β2
]
∈ R2
Then, putting
Φ∗1,2(ρ1) = β1δω12 + β2δω12 =
[
β1
β2
]
,
ρ1 = α1δω11 + α2δω21 + α3δω31 =
α1α2
α3

write, by matrix representation, as follows.
Φ∗1,2(ρ1) =
[
β1
β2
]
=
[
c11 c12 c13
c21 c22 c23
]α1α2
α3

Next, from this dual causal operator Φ∗1,2 : M(Ω1) → M(Ω2), we shall construct a causal operator
Φ1,2 : C(Ω2)→ C(Ω1). Consider the identification:C(Ω1) ≈ R3, C(Ω2) ≈ R2, that is,
C(Ω1) ∋ f1 ←→
(identification)
f1(ω11)f1(ω21)
f1(ω
3
1)
 ∈ R3, C(Ω2) ∋ f2 ←→
(identification)
[
f2(ω
1
2)
f2(ω
2
2)
]
∈ R2
Let f2 ∈ C(Ω2), f1 = Φ1,2f2. Then, we seef1(ω11)f1(ω21)
f1(ω
3
1)
 = f1 = Φ1,2(f2) =
c11 c21c12 c22
c13 c23
[f2(ω12)
f2(ω
2
2)
]
Therefore, the relation between the dual causal operatorΦ∗1,2 and causal operatorΦ1,2 is represented as the
the transposed matrix.
Example 6.8 [Deterministic dual causal operator, deterministic causal map, deterministic
causal operator] Consider the case that dual causal operator Φ∗1,2 :M(Ω1)(≈R3)→M(Ω2)(≈R2) ha s
the matrix representation such that
Φ∗1,2(ρ1) =
[
b1
b2
]
=
[
0 1 1
1 0 0
]a1a2
a3

In this case, it is the deterministic dual causal operator. This deterministic causal operator Φ1,2 : C(Ω2)→
C(Ω1) is represented by f1(ω11)f1(ω21)
f1(ω
3
1)
 = f1 = Φ1,2(f2) =
0 11 0
1 0
[f2(ω12)
f2(ω
2
2)
]
with the deterministic causal map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 such that
φ1,2(ω
1
1) = ω
2
2 , φ1,2(ω
2
1) = ω
1
2 , φ1,2(ω
3
1) = ω
1
2
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6.2.3 Sequential causal operator — A chain of causalities
Let (T,≤) be a tree, i.e., a partial ordered finite set such that “t1 ≤ t3 and t2 ≤ t3” implies “t1 ≤ t2 or
t2 ≤ t1”. Assume that there exists an element t0 ∈ T , called the root of T , such that t0 ≤ t (∀t ∈ T ) holds.
Put T 2≤ = {(t1, t2) ∈ T 2 : t1 ≤ t2}. An element t0 ∈ T is called a root if t0 ≤ t (∀t ∈ T ) holds.
Since we usually consider the subtree Tt0 ( ⊆ T ) with the root t0, we assume that the tree-like ordered
set has a root. In this chapter, assume, for simplicity, that T is finite (though it is sometimes infinite in
applications).
For simplicity, assume that T is finite, or a finite subtree of a whole tree. Let T ( = {0, 1, ..., N}) be a
tree with the root 0. Define the parent map π : T \{0} → T such that π(t) = max{s ∈ T : s < t}. It is clear
that the tree (T ≡ {0, 1, ..., N},≤ ) can be identified with the pair (T ≡ {0, 1, ..., N}, π : T \ {0} → T ).
Also, note that, for any t ∈ T \ {0}, there uniquely exists a natural number h(t) (called the height
of t ) such that πh(t)(t) = 0. Here, π2(t) = π(π(t)), π3(t) = π(π2(t)), etc. Also, put {0, 1, ..., N}2
≤
= {(m,n) | 0 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ N}. In Fig. 6.2, see the root t0, the parent map: π(t3) = π(t4) = t2,
π(t2) = π(t5) = t1, π(t1) = π(t6) = π(t7) = t0
t0
t1
t2
t3
t4
t5
t6
t7
✮
✐
❦
✰
❦
✮
❦
π
π
π
π
π
π
π
Figure 6.2: Tree
///
Definition 6.9 [Sequential causal operator] The family
{Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) → C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦
(
or, { C(Ωt2)
Φt1,t2→ C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦
)
is called a sequential
causal operator, if it satisfies that (Fig. 6.3):
(i) For eacht (∈ T ), a basic algebra C(Ωt) is determined.
(ii) For each (t1, t2) ∈ T 2≦, a causal operator Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) → C(Ωt1) is defined such as Φt1,t2Φt2,t3 =
Φt1,t3 (∀(t1, t2), ∀(t2, t3) ∈ T 2≦). Here, Φt,t : C(Ωt)→ C(Ωt) is the identity operator.
C(Ω0)
C(Ω1)
C(Ω2)
C(Ω3)
C(Ω4)
C(Ω5)C(Ω6)
C(Ω7)
✮
✐
❦
✰
❦
✮
❦
Φ0,6
Φ0,1
Φ0,7
Φ1,2
Φ1,5
Φ2,3
Φ2,4
M(Ω0)
M(Ω1)
M(Ω2) M(Ω3)
M(Ω4)
M(Ω5)M(Ω6)
M(Ω7)
✶
q
s
✸
s
✿
③
Φ∗0,6
Φ∗0,1
Φ∗0,7
Φ∗1,2
Φ∗1,5
Φ∗2,3
Φ∗2,4
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Figure 6.3: Sequential causal operator and dual sequential causal operator in the case of Fig. 6.2
The dual family {Φ∗t1,t2 : M(Ωt1) → M(Ωt2)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ is called the dual sequential causal operator
of a sequential causal operator { C(Ωt2)
Φt1,t2→ C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ .
6.2.4 Sequential causal operator — Simultaneous differential equation of the first order
Example 6.10 [Pheasants and rabbits problem] Consider the following situation:
(a) [Pheasants and rabbits problem] A number of m pheasants and n rabbits are placed together in the
same cage. Then there are m+ n heads and 2m+ 4n legs.
In what follows, this statement in ordinary language will be changed to the measurement theoretical
statement. Putting N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, define state space Ω0, Ω1, Ω2 such that
Ω0 = N0 × N0, Ω1 = N0, Ω2 = N0
Put T (0) = {0, 1, 2} with the parent mapπ : {1, 2} → {0, 1, 2} such that
π(1) = 0, π(2) = 0
Then, the deterministic causal map φ0,1 : Ω0 → Ω1 and φ0,2 : Ω0 → Ω2 is respectively represented by
φ0,1(m,n) = m+ n, φ0,2(m,n) = 2m+ 4n
Therefore, by Theorem 6.4, the deterministic causal operator Φ0,1 : C(Ω1) → C(Ω0) and Φ0,2 : C(Ω2) →
C(Ω0) are defined as follows.
[Φ0,1(f1)](m,n) = f1(m+ n) (∀f1 ∈ C(Ω1), ∀(m,n) ∈ Ω0)
[Φ0,2(f2)](m,n) = f2(2m+ 4n) (∀f2 ∈ C(Ω2), ∀(m,n) ∈ Ω0)
Thus, we get a deterministic sequential causal operator {C(Ωt) Φ0,t→ C(Ω0)}t=1,2.
Example 6.11 [State equation] Let T = R be the time axis. For each t(∈ T ), consider the state space
Ωt = Rn (n-dimensional real space). And consider simultaneous differential equation of the first order
dω1
dt (t) = v1(ω1(t), ω2(t), . . . , ωn(t), t)
dω2
dt (t) = v2(ω1(t), ω2(t), . . . , ωn(t), t)· · · · · ·
dωn
dt (t) = vn(ω1(t), ω2(t), . . . , ωn(t), t)
(6.3)
(=(1.1))
which is called a state equation (Chap. 1(1.1)). Let φt1,t2 : Ωt1 → Ωt2 , (t1 ≦ t2) be a deterministic
causal map induced by the state equation (6.3). It is clear that φt2,t3(φt1,t2(ωt1)) = φt1,t3(ωt1) (ωt1 ∈
Ωt1 , t1 ≦ t2 ≦ t3). Therefore, by Theorem 6.4, we have the deterministic sequential causal operator {Φt1,t2 :
C(Ωt2)→ C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ .
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Example 6.12 [Difference equation of the second order ] Consider the discrete time T = {0, 1, 2, . . .}
with the parent map π : T \ {0} → T such that π(t) = t − 1 (∀t = 1, 2, ...). For each t(∈ T ), consider
a state space Ωt such that Ωt = R. For example, consider the following difference equation: That is,
φ : Ωt × Ωt+1 → Ωt+2 satisfies as follows.
ωt+2 = φ(ωt, ωt+1) = ωt + ωt+1 + 2 (∀t ∈ T )
Here, note that the state ωt+2 depends on both ωt+1 and ωt (i.e., multiple markov property). This must
be modified as follows. For each t(∈ T ) consider a new state space Ω˜t = Ωt × Ωt+1 = R× R. And define
the deterministic causal map φ˜t,t+1 : Ω˜t → Ω˜t+1 as follows.
(ωt+1, ωt+2) = φ˜t,t+1(ωt, ωt+1) = (ωt+1, ωt + ωt+1 + 2)
(∀(ωt, ωt+1) ∈ Ω˜t, ∀t ∈ T )
Therefore, by Theorem 6.4, the deterministic causal operator Φ˜t,t+1 : C(Ω˜t+1)→ C(Ω˜t) is defined by
[Φ˜t,t+1f˜t](ωt, ωt+1) = f˜t(ωt+1, ωt + ωt+1 + 2)
(∀(ωt, ωt+1) ∈ Ω˜t, ∀f˜t ∈ C(Ω˜t+1), ∀t ∈ T \ {0}))
Thus, we get the deterministic sequential causal operator {Φ˜t,t+1 : C(Ω˜t+1)→ C(Ω˜t)}t∈T\{0}.
♠ Note 6.3 In measurement theory, multiple markov process and time-lag process are prohibited.
Example 6.13 [Random walk] Put Z = {0,±1,±2, . . .}. Define the dual causal operatorΦ∗ :
M+1(Z)→M+1(Z) such that
Φ∗(δi) =
δi−1 + δi+1
2
(i ∈ Z)
where δ(·)(∈M+1(Z)) is a point measure. Therefore, the causal operatorΦ : C(Z)→ C(Z) is defined by
[Φ(f)](i) =
f(i− 1) + f(i+ 1)
2
(∀f ∈ C(Z), ∀i ∈ Z)
Now, consider the discrete time T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}. For each t(∈ T ), a state space Ωt is define by Ωt = Z.
Then, we have the sequential causal operator {Φπ(t),t(= Φ) : C(Ωt)→ C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0}
6.3 Realized causal observable — Only one measurement
Let (T (t0), ≦ ) (or, T (t0) = {t0, t1, . . . , tN} ) be a semi-ordered tree with the root t0. Mainly consider the
parent map representation (T={t0, t1, . . . , tN}, π : T \ {t0} → T ).
Definition 6.14 [Sequential observable] Consider a sequential causal operator {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) →
C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ . Assume that for each t ∈ T , an observable Ot=(Xt,Ft, Ft) in C(Ωt) is determined. The,
the pair [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2)→ C(Ωt1 )}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ] is called a sequential observable, and denoted
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by [OT ] or [OT (t0)]. That is, [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) → C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ]. Using the parent
mapπ : T \ {0} → T , we also write that [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {C(Ωt)
Φpi(t),t−−−−→ C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0})].
According to the Copenhagen interpretation (i.e., only one observable is permitted ), we must regard
many observables {Ot}t∈T in a sequential observable [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2 )→ C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦
] as only one observable. This is realized as follows.
Definition 6.15 [Realized causal observable ] Let [OT (t0)] = [{Ot}t∈T ,
{Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt) → C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{t0} ] be a sequential observable. For each s ( ∈ T ), put Ts = {t ∈
T | t ≧ s}. And define the observable Ôs=(×t∈Ts Xt, ⊠ t∈TsFt, F̂s) in C(Ωs) as follows.
Ôs =

Os (s ∈ T \ π(T ) and )
Os×(×t∈π−1({s}) Φπ(t),tÔt) (s ∈ π(T ) and )
(6.4)
using this iteratively, after all we get the observable Ôt0 = (×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0) in C(Ωt0). Put
Ôt0 = ÔT (t0). The ÔT (t0) = (×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0) is called the realized causal observable of the
sequential observable[OT (t0)] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt)→ C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{t0} ].
Example 6.16 [Simple example(Continued from Fig. 6.3)] Suppose that a tree (T ≡ {0, 1, ..., 6, 7}, π)
has an ordered structure such that π(1) = π(6) = π(7) = 0, π(2) = π(5) = 1, π(3) = π(4) = 2.
(
See Fig.
(6.3).
)
Consider a sequential observable [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {C(Ωt)Φpi(t),t→ C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0})]. Now, we shall
construct its realized causal observable ÔT (t0) = (×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0) in what follows.
Put
Ôt = Ot and thus F̂t = Ft (t = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7).
First we construct the product observable Ô2 in C(Ω2) such as
Ô2 = (X2 ×X3 ×X4,F2 ⊠F3 ⊠F4, F̂2) where F̂2 = F2×( ×
t=3,4
Φ2,tF̂t),
Iteratively, we construct the following:
C(Ω0)
Φ0,1←−−−− C(Ω1)P Φ1,2←−−−− C(Ω2)
F0×Φ0,6F̂6×Φ0,7F̂7 F1×Φ1,5F̂5y y
F̂0
(F0×Φ0,6F̂6×Φ0,7F̂7×Φ0,1F̂1)
Φ0,1←−−−− F̂1
(F1×Φ1,5F̂5×Φ1,2F̂2)
Φ1,2←−−−− F̂2
(F2×Φ2,3F̂3×Φ2,4F̂4)
.
That is, we get the product observable Ô1 ≡ (×5t=1Xt, ⊠ 5t=1Ft, F̂1) of O1, Φ1,2Ô2 and Φ1,5Ô5, and finally,
the product observable
Ô0 ≡ (×7t=0Xt, ⊠ 7t=0Ft, F̂0(= F0 × ( ×
t=1,6,7
Φ0,tF̂t))
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of O0, Φ0,1Ô1, Φ0,6Ô6 and Φ0,7Ô7. Then, we get the realization of a sequential observable [{Ot}t∈T ,
{C(Ωt)
Φpi(t),t→ C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0}]. For completeness, F̂0 is represented by
F̂0(Ξ0 × Ξ1 × Ξ2 × Ξ3 × Ξ4 × Ξ5 × Ξ6 × Ξ7)]
=F0(Ξ0)× Φ0,1
(
F1(Ξ1)× Φ1,5F5(Ξ5)× Φ1,2
(
F2(Ξ2)× Φ2,3F3(Ξ3)× Φ2,4F4(Ξ4)
))
× Φ0,6(F6(Ξ6))× Φ0,7(F7(Ξ7)) (6.5)
Remark 6.17 In the above example, consider the case that Ot (t = 2, 6, 7) is not determined. In this
case,it suffices to define Ot by the existence observable O
(exi)
t =(Xt, {∅, Xt}, F (exi)t ). Then, we see that
F̂0(Ξ0 × Ξ1 ×X2 × Ξ3 × Ξ4 × Ξ5 ×X6 ×X7)
=F0(Ξ0)× Φ0,1
(
F1(Ξ1)× Φ1,5F5(Ξ5)× Φ1,2
(
Φ2,3F3(Ξ3)× Φ2,4F4(Ξ4)
))
(6.6)
This is true. However, the following is not wrong. Putting T ′ = {0, 1, 3, 4, 5}, consider the [OT ′ ] =
[{Ot}t∈T ′ , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) → C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈(T ′)2≦ ]. Then, the realized causal observable ÔT ′(0) =
(×t∈T ′ Xt, ⊠ t∈T ′Ft, F̂ ′0) is defined by
F̂ ′0(Ξ0 × Ξ1 × Ξ3 × Ξ4 × Ξ5) = F0(Ξ0)
× Φ0,1
(
F1(Ξ1)× Φ1,5F5(Ξ5)× Φ1,4F4(Ξ4)× Φ1,3F3(Ξ3)× Φ1,4F4(Ξ4)
)
(6.7)
which is different from the true (6.6). W e may sometimes omit ”existence observable”. However, if we do
so, we omit it on the basis of careful cautions.
Theorem 6.18 [Deterministic sequential observablerealized causal observable ] Let (T (t0), ≦ )
be a tree. Let [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2 )→ C(Ωt1 )}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ] be deterministic causal observable.
Then, the realization Ôt0 ≡ (×t∈TXt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0) is represented by
Ôt0 = ×
t∈T
Φt0,tOt
That is, it holds that
[F̂t0(×
t∈T
Ξt )](ωt0) = ×
t∈T
[Φt0,tFt(Ξt)](ωt0) = ×
t∈T
[Ft(Ξt)](φt0,tωt0)
(∀ωt0 ∈ Ωt0 , ∀Ξt ∈ Ft)
Proof. It suffices to prove the classical case of Example 4.15. Using Theorem 4.2 repeatedly, we see
that
(4.31) = F̂0 = F0 × ( ×
t=1,6,7
Φ0,tF̂t)
=F0 × (Φ0,1F̂1 × Φ0,6F̂6 × Φ0,7F̂7) = F0 × (Φ0,1F̂1 × Φ0,6F6 × Φ0,7F7)
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=
( ×
t=0,6,7
Φ0,tFt
)
× (Φ0,1F̂1) =
( ×
t=0,6,7
Φ0,tFt
)
× Φ0,1(F1 × ( ×
t=2,5
Φ1,tF̂t))
=
( ×
t=0,1,6,7
Φ0,tFt
)
× Φ0,1( ×
t=2,5
Φ1,tF̂t) =
( ×
t=0,1,6,7
Φ0,tFt
)
× Φ0,1(Φ1,2F̂2 × Φ1,5F̂5)
=
( ×
t=0,1,5,6,7
Φ0,tFt
)
× Φ0,1(Φ1,2F̂2) =
( ×
t=0,1,5,6,7
Φ0,tFt
)
× Φ0,1(Φ1,2(F2 × ( ×
t=3,4
Φ2,tF̂t)))
=
7×
t=0
Φ0,tFt
This completes the proof.
♠ Note 6.4 Note that a simultaneous observable (and a parallel observable) can be regarded as a kind of
realized causal observable.
6.4 Axiompmc 2 —”No smoke without fire”
@No smoke without fire
6.4.1 The Heisenberg picture
Summing up the arguments in the previous section, we assert Axiompmc 2 as follows. ,
Axiompmc 2 (causality : continuous type)
(i) A chain of causalities
A chain of causalities is represented by sequential causal operator {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) →
C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ .
(ii) realized causal observable
A sequential observable [OT (t0)] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) → C(Ωt1 )}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ] is realized
by its realized causal observable ÔT (t0) = (×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0).
Therefore, we get a continuous·pure type classical measurement theory as follows.
pure measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
c 1]
(pure) measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
pm
c 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
Thus, we say that
(a) The probability that a measured value (xt)t∈T obtained by the measurement MC(Ωt0)(ÔT , S[ωt0 ])
belongs to Ξ̂(∈ ⊠ t∈TFt) is given by [F̂t0(Ξ̂)](ωt0).
For completeness, note that
(b) A state ω0 is fixed, and thus, it does not change.
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♠ Note 6.5 The (i) in Axiompmc 2 is fundamental. However, the (ii) may be regarded as is the consequence of
”Only one observable is permitted” (i.e., the Copenhagen interpretation).
Remark 6.19 [Mixed measurement theory ] In mixed measurement theory, Axiompmc 2 is valid.
That is, it is common in pure and mixed measurement theories. Thus, we get mixed measurement theory
as follows.
mixed measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
c 1]
mixed measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
pm
c 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
That is,
(c) The probability that a measured value (xt)t∈T obtained by the measurement MC(Ωt0)(ÔT , S[∗](ν))
belongs to Ξ̂(∈ ⊠ t∈TFt) is given by
∫
Ωt0
[F̂t0(Ξ̂)](ωt0)νt0(dωt0)
Also, a mixed state νt0 is fixed, and thus, it does not change.
6.4.2 How should time be represented? — Leibniz’s relationalism
In Sec. 2.3.3, we conclude that
(d) The space of our world is described as a kind of state space (or precisely, spectrum).
In , Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Sec. 2.3.3), Leibniz says ”Time is an order of occurring in succession
which changes one after another”. Measurement theory agrees to Leibniz’s opinion as follows.
(e) Time axis R ( or, Z) is described as a kind of the semi-ordered tree (T,≦).
♠ Note 6.6 After Newton, physical space-time may be superior to metaphysical space-time. The reason may
be as follows.
(♯1) The classification of the world-description(Chap. 1 (O)) — realistic method and linguistic method —
is not firm.
(♯2) Many people investigate ”What is space-time?” and not ”How should space-time be represented?”
For example, the following two definitions are famous:
(♯3) [Leibniz]: ”Time is an order of occurring in succession which changes one after another”.
(♯4) [Augustinus(354–430)]: Only present exists. Past is in memory. Future is in presentiment.
However, these are rather literary. than scientific.
♠ Note 6.7 In this section, the space-time in measuring object is explained. However, measurement theory
assert that observer’s space-time does not exist. Thus, there is no tense — past, present, future — in science.
For example, note that
(♯) In Axiompc 1, ”the probability that a measured value was obtained” and ”the probability that measured
value will be obtained” are confused.
That is, measurement theory is not concerned with observer’s time (or, subjective time).
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6.4.3 Why does measurement theory hold?
Now we have several key-words in measurement theory.
(f1) [Axiom
p
c 1]: measurement(observer, measuring object, measurement, observable , state, measured
value , probability )
(f2) [Axiom
pm
c 2]: causality (semi-ordered tree, sequential causal operator, realized causal observable
(f3) [The Copenhagen interpretation]: space as a kind of state space (or, precisely, spectrum) , time as a
kind of semi-ordered tree.
Measurement theory says that these words should be used according to modeled on Axiompc s 1 and 2.
Thus, the following question is natural:,
(g) Why can various sciences be described by the only two axioms?
♠ Note 6.8 The above question (g) may be deeper than the question such that
(F5)
(Chap.1)
Why are two mathematical theories (differential equation and probability theory) useful in science?
That is because this is solved if the (g) is answered. Thus, what is important is the following.
(♯) Why is measurement theory measurement theory — the language of quantum mechanics — applicable
to various sciences? Why is the absurd theory (i.e., dualism and the Copenhagen interpretation)
necessary?
We have no answer to this problem.
6.4.4 State change —the Schro¨dinger picture—
The Copenhagen interpretation — Chap. 1(U4) — says that ”only one measurement is permitted”,
which implies ”Only one state and only one observable” Thus, we construct the realized causal observ-
able ÔT = (×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0) from the sequential observable [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2) →
C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ]. And we take a measurementMC(Ω0)(ÔT , S[ω0]).
♠ Note 6.9 Summing up the above argument as follows. classical mechanical world-viewcausality ,
[ only one measurement is permitted]
(the Copenhagen interpretation)
=⇒ [Only one observable] =⇒ [realized causal observable ]
(Axiom
pm
c 2(ii))
However, as a convenient method, we sometimes use the state change due to the Schro¨dinger picture.
This is not general but it may be understandable. Thus, in what follows, we explain this view-point (i.e.,
state change).
We begin with the simplest example. Put T = {0, 1}, Consider a deterministic causal operator Φ0,1 :
C(Ω1)→ C(Ω0) with a deterministic causal map φ0,1 : Ω0 → Ω1. Let O1 = (X1,F1, F1) be an observable
in C(Ω1).
be and . O1 = (X1,F1, F1) C(Ω1)deterministic causal operator and . O1 = (X1,F1, F1) in C(Ω1)
Consider a measurement MC(Ω0)(Φ0,1O1, S[ω0]). Axiom
p
c 1(measurement says that
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(a) The probability that a measured value obtained by a measurement MC(Ω0)(Φ0,1O1, S[ω0]) belongs to
Ξ1(∈ F1) is given by [Φ0,1F1(Ξ1)](ω0).
Next, consider a measurement MC(Ω1)(O1, S[φ0,1(ω0)]) The, Axiom
p
c 1(measurement ) also says that
(b) The probability that a measured value obtained by a measurement MC(Ω1)(O1, S[φ0,1(ω0)]) belongs to
Ξ1(∈ F1) is given by [F1(Ξ1)](φ0,1(ω0))
Here, note that [Φ0,1F1(Ξ1)](ω0) = [F1(Ξ1)](φ0,1(ω0)). Thus, (a) and (b) imply that
(c) MC(Ω0)(Φ0,1O1, S[ω0]) and MC(Ω1)(O1, S[φ0,1(ω0)]) can be identified.
Also, we may consider that
(d) ω0 is a state at time t = 0, and φ0,1(ω0) is a state at time t = 1. Writing it in diagram as follows.
Ω0 ∋ ω0
(time 0)
−−−−−−−−−→
(change)
φ0,1(ω0)
(time 1)
∈ Ω1
Now we shall generalize the above argument. Consider a sequential causal operator {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2)→
C(Ωt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ Its dual sequential causal operator is {Φ
∗
t1,t2 : M(Ωt1) → M(Ωt2)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ . Further,
define the sequential observable [OT (t0)] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : C(Ωt2)→ C(Ωt1 )}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ]. Let ω0 ∈ Ωt0
be a state at time t. The {Φ∗0,tδω0}t∈T is called a state change due to the Schro¨dinger picture. Therefore,
(e) the Schro¨dinger picture urges us to image that a state changes as follows.
M+1(Ω0) ∋ δω0
(time 0)
−−−→ Φ∗0,t(δω0)
(time 1)
∈M+1(Ωt)
Here it should be noted that, Φ∗0,tδω0 is not generally a point measure but a mixed state (i,e., Φ∗0,tδω0 ∈
M+1(Ωt)).
Consider a mixed measurement MC(Ωt)(Ot, S(Φ
∗
0,tδω0)). Then, by Axiom
m
c 1(mixed measurement) in
Sec. 4.4, we see:
(f) The probability that a measured value obtained by a mixed measurement MC(Ωt)(Ot, S(Φ
∗
0,tδω0))
belongs to Ξt(∈ Ft) is given by∫
Ωt
Ft(Ξt)[Φ
∗
0,tδω0 ](dωt)
(
= [Φ0,tFt(Ξt)](ω0)
)
Thus, for each t(∈ T ), we have the following identification:
MC(Ωt0)(Φt0,tOt, S[ω0]) = MC(Ωt)(Ot, S[∗](Φ
∗
t0,tδω0))
However, it should be noted that
×
t∈T
∫
Ωt
Ft(Ξt)[Φ
∗
0,tδω0 ](dωt) 6= [F̂t0(×
t∈T
Ξt)](ω0) (6.8)
As seen in Theorem 6.18, in the particular case of deterministic sequential causal operator, 6= can be
replaced by = in (6.8).
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6.4.5 The principle of equal weight — Famous unsolved problem
Reconsidering
Monty Hall problem (Problem 4.9, Problem 4.16), we present the final answer of Monty Hall problem.
Problem 6.20 [Monty Hall problem (Continued from Problem 4.9, Problem 4.16) (cf. [11, 19])]
Suppose you are on a game show, and you are given the choice of three doors (i.e., “number 1”, “number
2”, “number 3”). Behind one door is a car, behind the others, goats.
(♯2) You choose a door by the cast of the fair dice, i.e., with probability 1/3.
According to the rule (♯2), you pick a door, say number 1, and the host, who knows where the car is, opens
another door, behind which is a goat. For example, the host says that
(♭) the door 3 has a goat.
He says to you, “Do you want to pick door number 2?” Is it to your advantage to switch your choice of
doors?
Answer As Problem 4.9 (Monty Hall problem), consider a state space Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}. And the
observable O = (X,F , F ) is defined by the formula (4.2). The map φ : Ω→ Ω is defined by
φ(ω1) = ω2, φ(ω2) = ω3, φ(ω3) = ω1
we get a causal operator Φ : C(Ω)→ C(Ω) by [Φ(f)](ω) = f(φ(ω)) (∀f ∈ C(Ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω). Assume that a
car is behind the door k (k = 1, 2, 3). Then, we say that
(a) By the dice-throwing, you get
 1, 23, 4
5, 6
 , then, take a measurement
 MC(Ω)(O, S[ωk])MC(Ω)(ΦO, S[ωk])
MC(Ω)(Φ
2O, S[ωk])

We, by Sec.6.4.4(c), see the following identifications: MC(Ω)(ΦO, S[ωk]) = MC(Ω)(O, S[φ(ωk)]), MC(Ω)(Φ
2O,
S[ωk]) = MC(Ω)(O, S[φ2(ωk)]). Thus, the above (a) is equal to
(b) By the dice-throwing, you get
 1, 23, 4
5, 6
 then, take a measurement
 MC(Ω)(O, S[ωk])MC(Ω)(O, S[φ(ωk)])
MC(Ω)(O, S[φ2(ωk)])

Here, note that 13 (δωk + δφ(ωk) + δφ2(ωk)) =
1
3 (δω1 + δω2 + δω3) (∀k = 1, 2, 3). Thus, the (b) is identified
with the mixed measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](νe)) where νe = 13 (δω1 + δω2 + δω3). Therefore, Problem 6.20
is the same as Problem 4.16. Hence, you should choose the door 2.
♠ Note 6.10 The above argument is easy. That is, since you have no information, we choose the door by a fair
dice throwing. In this sense, the principle of equal weight — unless we have sufficient reason to regard one
possible case as more probable than another, we treat them as equally probable — is clear in measurement
theory. However, it should be noted that the above argument is based on dualism.
The following is the measurement theoretical formulation of ”the principle of equal weight”. Theorem
6.21 [The principle of equal weight] Consider a finite state space Ω, that is, Ω = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn}.
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Let O = (X,F , F ) be an observable in C(Ω). Consider a measurementMC(Ω)(O, S[∗]). If the observer has
no information for the state [∗], there is a reason to that this measurement is identified with the mixed
measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](νe)), where νe = 1n
n∑
i=1
δωi(∈M+1(Ω)).
Proof. The proof is a easy consequence of the above Monty Hall problem (or, see [11, 20].
6.5 Examples in ”Axiompc 1(measurement) + Axiom
pm
c 2(causality )”
In dualism(measurement theory), Axiompmc 2(causality) is not independently used, but it is used with
Axiompc 1(measurement).
6.5.1 Parallel structure
Consider a semi-ordered tree (T (0)={0, 1, . . . , N}, π : T \ {0} → T ) with parallel structure such that
π(t) = 0 (∀t ∈ T \ {0}).
C(Ω1)
C(Ω2)
C(ΩN )
C(Ω0)
✰
✮
❦
Φ0,1
Φ0,2
· · · · · ·
· · · · · ·
Φ0,N
Figure 6.4: Parallel structure
Consider a sequential observable[OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt) → C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0} ] and its realized
causal observable ÔT = (×Nt=0Xt, ⊠ Nt=0Ft, F̂0), That is,
F̂0(Ξ0 × Ξ1 × Ξ2 × · · · × ΞN ) = ×
t∈T
Φ0,tFt(Ξt)
Thus, we have the measurement MC(Ω)(ÔT=(×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂0), S[ω0]). Therefore, in the case of
parallel structure, note that the equality ”=” holds in (6.8).
That is, we see
the probability that a measured value obtained by a parallel measurement MC(Ω)(ÔT= (×t∈T Xt,
⊠ t∈TFt, F̂0), S[ω0]) belongs to Ξ0 × Ξ1 × · · · × ΞN is given by
[F̂0(×
t∈T
Ξt)](ω0) = ×
t∈T
[Φ0,tFt(Ξt)](ω0)
Example 6.22 [Before pheasants and rabbits problem([Example 6.10]+[measurement])] Like Ex-
ample 6.10, consider the following problem:
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(a) [Pheasants and rabbits problem] A number of m pheasants and n rabbits are placed together in the
same cage. Then m + n heads and 2m + 4n legs are counted. Find the number of pheasants and
rabbits.
ordinary language
In Example 6.10, the statement (a) in ordinary language is understood as
”m”, ”n”, ”m+ n” and ”2m+ 4n” are states
However, here we understand as follows.
”m” and ”n” are states, but ”m+ n” and ”2m+ 4n” are measured values
As mentioned in Example 6.10, put
Ω0 = N0 × N0, Ω1 = N0, Ω2 = N0
Putting T = {0, 1, 2}, π(1) = 0, π(2) = 0. then we get a sequential causal operator {C(Ωt)
Φpi(t),t→
C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0}. For each t ∈ {1, 2}, consider exact observable O(exa)t = (N0, 2N0 , F (exa)t ) in C(Ωt). Thus,
we get the sequential observable[OT ] = [{Ot}t=1,2, {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt) → C(Ωπ(t))}t=1,2 ] and its realized
causal observable Ô0=(N0 × N0, 2N0×N0 , F̂0) such that
[F̂0(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](m,n) = [Φ0,1F (exa)1 (Ξ1)](m,n) · [Φ0,2F (exa)2 (Ξ2)](m,n)
= [F
(exa)
1 (Ξ1)](m+ n) · [F (exa)2 (Ξ2)](2m+ 4n)
(∀Ξ1, ∀Ξ2 ∈ 2N0 , ∀(m,n) ∈ Ω0)
Hence, we get the measurement MC(Ω0)(Ô0, S[(m,n)]). It is clear that
(b) By measurement MC(Ω0)(Ô0, S[(m,n)]), we get a measured value (m+n, 2m+4n) with probability 1.
Here, it should be noted that there are many interpretations in dualism (measurement theory).
6.5.2 Series structure — Measurement of time
Assume that the semi-ordered tree (T={0, 1, . . . , N}, π) has the series structure such that That is, π(t) =
t− 1 (∀t ∈ T \ {0}). Consider a sequential causal operator {C(Ωt) Φt−1,t→ C(Ωt−1)}t∈T\{0} such that
C(Ω0)
Φ0,1←−C(Ω1) Φ1,2←−C(Ω2) Φ2,3←−· · · · · · · · ·ΦN−2,N−1←− C(ΩN−1)ΦN−1,N←− C(ΩN )
Now, consider a sequential observable[OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt) → C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0} ]. And let us
construct the realized causal observable ÔT = (×Nt=0Xt, ⊠ Nt=0Ft, F̂0).
Firstly, put, ÔN (= (XN ,FN , F̂N )) = ON (= (XN ,FN , FN )). We have the simultaneous observable
ÔN−1 = ON−1×ΦN−1,NON = (XN−1 ×XN ,FN−1 ⊠ Fn, F̂N−1) in C(ΩN−1). That is,
F̂N−1(ΞN−1 × ΞN ) =
(
FN−1×
(
ΦN−1,NFN )
)
(ΞN−1 × ΞN )
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Similarly, we get the simultaneous observable ÔN−2 = ON−2×ΦN−2,N−1ÔN−1 = (XN−2 ×XN−1 ×XN ,
FN−2 ⊠ FN−1 ⊠ Fn, F̂N−2) in C(ΩN−2). That is,
F̂N−2(ΞN−2 × ΞN−1 × ΞN ) =
(
FN−2×(ΦN−2,N−1F̂N−1)
)
(ΞN−2 × ΞN−1 × ΞN )
Iteratively,
[C(Ω0)]
Φ0,1
←−−−−− [C(Ω1)]
Φ1,2
←−−−−− · · ·
ΦN−2,N−1
←−−−−−−−− [C(ΩN−1)]
ΦN−1,N
←−−−−−− [C(ΩN )]
F0 F1 · · · FN−1 FNy y y y
(F0×ΦF̂1)
=F̂0
Φ0,1
←−−−−−
(F1×ΦF̂2)
=F̂1
Φ1,2
←−−−−− · · ·
ΦN−2,N−1
←−−−−−−−−
(FN−1×ΦF̂N )
=F̂N−1
ΦN−1,N
←−−−−−−
(FN )
=F̂N
And finally, we get the simultaneous observable Ô0 = O0×Φ0,1Ô1 = (×Nt=0Xt, ⊠ Nt=0Ft, F̂0) in C(Ω0).
That is,
F̂0(Ξ0 × Ξ1 × Ξ2 × · · · × ΞN ) =
(
F0×(Φ0,1F̂1)
)
(Ξ0 × Ξ1 × Ξ2 × · · · × ΞN )
Here, Ô0 is the realized causal observable ÔT of the sequential observable [{Ot}t∈T , {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt) →
C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0} ]. Thus, we get measurement:
MC(Ω0)(ÔT=(×
t∈T
Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂0), S[ω0])
Example 6.23 [Measurement of discrete time] Considering a state space Z = {0,±1,±2, . . .}, define
the deterministic causal mapφ : Z→ Z by
Z ∋ i 7→ i + 1 ∈ Z
and thus, define the deterministic causal operator Φ : C(Z)→ C(Z) by
[Φ(f)](i) = f(i− 1) (∀i ∈ Z, ∀f ∈ C(Z))
Consider the exact observable O(exa) = (Z, 2Z.F (exa)) in C(Z). Let T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} be the discrete
time, that is, (T (0), ≦ ). For t(∈ T ), consider a state space Ωt = Z. Define the deterministic causal
operator Φm,n : C(Ωn)→ C(Ωm) (0 ≦ m ≦ n ≦ N) such that
Φm,n =
n−m︷ ︸︸ ︷
Φ · Φ · · · · · ·Φ = Φn−m
Putting O
(exa)
t = O
(exa) (∀t ∈ T ), we have the sequential deterministic causal exact observable [{O(exa)t }t∈T , {Φ :
C(Ωm) → C(Ωm−1)}m∈T\{0}}] Thus, by Theorem 6.18, we get the realized causal observable Ô =
(×m∈T Z, ⊠m∈T 2Z, F̂ ) such that
F̂ ( ×
m∈T
Ξm) = ×
m∈T
ΦmF (exa)(Ξm)
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Therefore, for the initial state ω0(∈ Ω0), we get the ”time measurement” MC(Ω0)(Ô, S[ω0]). The measured
value is clearly
(ω0, ω0 + 1, ω0 + 2, . . . , ω0 +N)
That is, if the initial state space Ω0 is assumed to be at time ω0, then the clock (at time t) shows time
ω0 + t.
♠ Note 6.11 The above example says that each time t (∈ T = {0, 1, . . . , N}) is not a state, but a state of the
clock is a state, i.e., ωt. And thus it can be measured.
Example 6.24 [Random walk(Continued from Example 6.13)] Z = {0,±1,±2, . . .} and . In
Example 4.10, put
C(Ωt) = C(Z) (∀t ∈ T = {0, 1, ..., N})
where Z is the set of all integers, i.e., Z = {0,±1,±2, ...}. And define a causal operator Φt−1,t( ≡ Φ) :
C(Ωt)( ≡ C(Z))→ C(Ωt−1)( ≡ C(Z)) such that:
(Φf)(n) = (Φt−1,tf)(n) =
f(n+ 1) + f(n− 1)
2
(∀f ∈ C(Ωt)( ≡ C(Z)), ∀n ∈ Z).
Further, define the sequence observable [{Ot}t∈T , {Φπ(t),t(= Φ) : C(Ωt) → C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{0} ] as follows:
Putting Xt = Ωt = Z, for example, define
Ot =

exact observable:O
(exa)
t = (Z( = Xt), 2
Z, F
(exa)
t ) (t = 2, 4)
existence observable:O
(exi)
t = (Z( = Xt), {∅,Z}, F (exi)t ) (otherwise)
Since existence observables can be ignored, we have the realized observable Ô0 = (Z2(= X2×X4), 2Z×2Z, F̂ )
such that
F̂ (Ξ2 × Ξ4) = Φ2
(
F (exa)(Ξ2)× Φ2(F (exa)(Ξ4))
)
(∀Ξ2 ∈ 2X2 , ∀Ξ4 ∈ 2X4)
Let 0 (∈ Ω0 = Z) be a state. Consider the measurement measurementMC(Ω0)(Ô0, S[0]). For example, we
shall calculate
(F) the probability that the measured value belongs to {0, 1}× {−1, 0} =Ξ2×Ξ4(⊆ X2×X4)is equal to
1
4 .
This is easily shown as follows. Using the characteristic function χ{·}, we see
[F
(exa)
2 (Ξ2)](ω) = χΞ2 (ω) = χ{0}(ω) + χ{1}(ω) (∀ω ∈ Ω2 = Z)
[F
(exa)
4 (Ξ4)](ω) = χΞ4 (ω) = χ{0}(ω) + χ{−1}(ω) (∀ω ∈ Ω4 = Z)
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And therefore,
(Φχ
{m}
)(ω) =
1
2
(χ
{m}
(ω + 1) + χ
{m}
(ω − 1)) = χ{m−1}(ω) + χ{m+1}(ω)
2
thus,
Φ2(F (exa)(Ξ4)) = Φ
(χ
{−1}
+ χ
{1}
2
+
χ
{−2}
+ χ
{0}
2
)
=
1
4
(
χ
{−3}
+ χ
{−2}
+ 2χ
{−1}
+ 2χ
{0}
+ χ
{1}
+ χ
{2}
)
.
further
F (exa)(Ξ2)× Φ2(F (exa)(Ξ4)) =(χ{0} + χ{1})×
1
4
(
χ
{−3}
+ χ
{−2}
+ 2χ
{−1}
+ 2χ
{0}
+ χ
{1}
+ χ
{2}
)
=
1
4
(2χ
{0}
+ χ
{1}
).
From this,
Φ2
(
F (exa)(Ξ2)× Φ2(F (exa)(Ξ4))
)
=
1
8
Φ
(
2χ
{−1}
+ 2χ
{1}
+ χ
{0}
+ χ
{2}
)
=
1
16
(
2χ
{−2}
+ 2χ
{0}
+ 2χ
{0}
+ 2χ
{2}
+ χ
{−1}
+ χ
{1}
+ χ
{1}
+ χ
{3}
)
=
1
16
(
2χ
{−2}
+ χ
{−1}
+ 4χ
{0}
+ 2χ
{1}
+ 2χ
{2}
+ χ
{3}
)
Thus, we conclude that
(F) =F̂ ({0, 1} × {−1, 0})](0)
=
1
16
(
2χ
{−2}
(0) + χ
{−1}
(0) + 4χ
{0}
(0) + 2χ
{1}
(0) + 2χ
{2}
(0) + χ
{3}
(0)
)
=
4
16
=
1
4
///
6.6 Two kinds of absurdness — idealism and dualism
As mentioned in Note 1.10, measurement theory has two kinds of absurdness. That is,
(♯2) Two kinds of absurdness

idealism · · · linguistic world-view
(Fit feet to shoes)
dualism · · · the Copenhagen interpretation
(A spectator does not go up to the stage)
In what follows, we explain these.
6.6.1 The Copenhagen interpretation — A spectator does not go up to the stage
Remark 6.25[ A spectator does not go up to the stage ] Consider the elementary problem with
two steps (a) and (b):
(a) Consider an urn, in which 3 white balls and 2 black balls are. Consider the following trial:
Pick out one ball from the urn. If it is black, you return it in the urn If it is white, you do not
return it and have it. Assume that you take three trials.
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.
(b) Then, calculate the probability that you have 2 white ball after (a)(i.e., three trials).
Answer Put N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Assume that there are m white balls and n black balls in the urn. This
situation is represented by a state (m,n) ∈ N20. We can define the dual causal operator Φ∗ : M+1(N20)
→M+1(N20) such that
Φ∗(δ(m,n)) =
{
m
m+nδ(m−1,n) +
n
m+nδ(m,n) (when m 6= 0 )
δ(0,n) (when m = 0 ).
where δ(·) is the point measure.
Let T = {0, 1, 2, 3} be discrete time. For each t ∈ T , put Ωt = N20. Thus, we see:
[Φ∗]3(δ(3,2)) = [Φ∗]
2
(
3
5
δ(2,2) +
2
5
δ(3,2)
)
= Φ∗
(
(
3
5
(
2
4
δ(1,2) +
2
4
δ(2,2)) +
2
5
(
3
5
δ(2,2) +
2
5
δ(3,2))
)
=
3
10
(
1
3
δ(0,2) +
2
3
δ(1,2)) +
27
50
(
2
4
δ(1,2) +
2
4
δ(2,2)) +
4
25
(
3
5
δ(2,2) +
2
5
δ(3,2))
=
1
10
δ(0,2) +
47
100
δ(1,2) +
183
500
δ(2,2) +
8
125
δ(3,2)
Define the observable O = (N0, 2N0 , F ) in C(Ω3) such that
[F (Ξ)](m,n) =
{
1 (m,n) ∈ Ξ× N0 ⊆ Ω3
0 (m,n) /∈ Ξ× N0 ⊆ Ω3
Therefore, the probability that a measured value ”2” is obtained by the measurementMC(N20)(Φ
3O, S[(3,2)])
is given by
[Φ3(F ({2}))](3, 2) =
∫
Ω3
[F ({2})](ω)([Φ∗]3(δ(3,2)))(dω) = 183
500
The above may be easy, but we should note that
(c) the part (a) is related to causality, and the part (b) is related to measurement.
Thus, the observer is not in the (a). Figuratively speaking, we say:
A spectator does not go up to the stage
Thus, someone in the (a) should be regard as ”robot”.
♠ Note 6.12 The part (a) is not related to ”probability”. That is because The spirit of measurement theory
says that
there is no probability without measurements.
although something like ”probability” in the (a) is called ”Markov probability”.
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6.6.2 linguistic world-view — Fit feet to shoes
Ordinary language has everything, i,e., monism, dualism, tense and so on. Also, in ordinary language,
there is no clear rule how to use the terms: ”measurement” and ”causality”.
Remark 6.26 [Confusion of Measurement and causality (Continued from Example 2.7)] Recall
Example 2.7 [The measurement of ”cold or hot” for water]. Consider the measurement MC(Ω)(Och, S[ω])
where ω = 5( ◦C). Then we say that
(a) By the measurement MC(Ω)(Och, S[ω(=5)]), the probability that a measured value
x(∈ X = {c, h}) belongs to a set

∅(= empty set)
{c}
{h}
{c, h}
 is equal to

0
[F ({c})](5) = 1
[F ({h})](5) = 0
1

Here, we should not think:
”5 ◦C” is the cause and ”cold” is a result.
That is, we never consider that
(b) 5 ◦C
(cause)
−→ cold
(result)
The reason is that Axiompmc 2 is not used in (a), though the (a) may be sometimes regarded as the causality
(b) in ordinary language.
♠ Note 6.13 However, from the different point of view, the above (b) can be justified as follows. Define the
dual causal operator Φ∗ :M([0, 100])→M({c, h}) by
[Φ∗δω](D) = fc(ω) · δC(D) + fh(ω) · δH(D) (∀ω ∈ [0, 100], ∀D ⊆ {c, h})
Then, the (b) can be regarded as ”causality”. That is,
(♯) ”measurement or causality” depends on how to describe a phenomenon.
This is the linguistic world-description method.
Remark 6.27 [Confusion of mixed measurement and Markov causality ] Reconsider Ex-
ample 4.13(urn problem:mixed measurement). Consider a state space Ω = {ω1, ω2}, and define the
observable O = ({w, b}, 2{w,b}, F ) in C(Ω) by the formula (2.5). Define the mixed state by ν0 =
pδω1 + (1 − p)δω2 . Then the probability that a measured value x ( ∈ {w, b}) is obtained by the mixed
measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)) is, by (4.5), given by
P ({x}) =
∫
Ω
[F ({x})](ω)ν0(dω) = p[F ({x})](ω1) + (1− p)[F ({x})](ω2)
=
{
0.8p+ 0.4(1− p) (when x = w )
0.2p+ 0.6(1− p)) (when x = b ) (6.9)
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Now, define a new state space Ω0 by Ω0 = {ω0}. And define the dual Markov causal operator Φ∗ :M+1(Ω0)
→M+1(Ω) by Φ∗(δω0) = pδω1+(1−p)δω2. Thus, we have the Markov causal operator Φ : C(Ω)→ C(Ω0).
Here, consider a pure measurement MC(Ω0)(ΦO, S[ω0]). Then, the probability that a measured value x
( ∈ {w, b}) is obtained by the measurement is given by
P ({x}) = [Φ(F ({x}))](ω0) =
∫
Ω
[F ({x})](ω)ν0(dω)
=
{
0.8p+ 0.4(1− p) (when x = w )
0.2p+ 0.6(1− p)) (when x = b )
which is equal to the (6.9). Therefore, the mixed measurement MC(Ω)(O, S[∗](ν0)) can be regarded as the
pure measurement MC(Ω0)(ΦO, S[ω0]).
♠ Note 6.14 In the above arguments, we see that
(♯) Concept depends on the description
This is the linguistic world-description method. As mentioned in Note 2.3, we are not concerned with the
question ”what is ©©?”. The reason is due to the (♯).
♠ Note 6.15 As mentioned in Note 6.13, ”Measurement or Causality” depends on the description. Some may
recall Nietzsche’s famous saying:
There are no facts, only interpretations.
This is just the linguistic world-description method with the spirit: ”Fit feet (=world) to shoes (language)”.
7 Fisher statistics II
As mentioned before, measurement theory is formulted as follows. That is,
measurement theory
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
c 1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
pm
c 2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
In Chap. 5, we studied Fisher statistics in Axiompc 1. In this chapter,
Fisher statistics will be discussed in Axiompc 1 and 2.
7.1 Measurement (= the view from the front), Inference·Control (= the view
from the back)
7.1.1 inference problem(statistics)
Problem 7.1 [Inference problem and regression analysis] Let Ω ≡ {ω1, ω2, ..., ω100} be a set of all
students of a certain high school. Define h : Ω→ [0, 200] and w : Ω→ [0, 200] such that:
h(ωn) = “the height of a student ωn” (n = 1, 2, ..., 100)
w(ωn) = “the weight of a student ωn” (n = 1, 2, ..., 100) (7.1)
For simplicity, put, N = 5. For example, see Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: Height and weight
Height· Weight  Student ω1 ω2 ω3 ω4 ω5
Height (h(ω)) 150 160 165 170 175
Weight(w(ω)) 65 55 75 60 65
Assume that:
(a1) The principal of this high school knows the both functions h and w. That is, he knows the exact
data of the height and weight concerning all students.
Also, assume that:
(a2) Some day, a certain student helped a drowned girl. But, he left without reporting the name. Thus,
all information that the principal knows is as follows:
(i) he is a student of his high school.
(ii) his height [resp. weight] is about 170 cm [resp. about 80 kg].
Now we have the following question:
(b) Under the above assumption (a1) and (a2), how does the principal infer who is he?
This will be answered in Answer 5.4.
7.1.2 control problem(dynamical system theory)
Adding measurement equation g : R3 → R to state equation(6.3), we get dynamical system theory(7.2).
That is,
dynamical system theory =

(i) : dω(t)dt = v(ω(t), t, e1(t), β)
(initialω(0)=α)
· · · ( state equation)
(ii) : x(t) = g(ω(t), t, e2(t)) · · · ( measurement)
(7.2)
where α, β are parameters,, e1(t) is noise, e2(t) is measurement error.
The following examole is the simplest problem concerning inference.
Problem 7.2 [Control problem and regression analysis] We have a rectangular water tank filled
with water. Assume that the height of water at time t is given by the following function h(t):
dh
dt
= β0, then h(t) = α0 + β0t, (7.3)
where α0 and β0 are unknown fixed parameters such that α0 is the height of water filling the tank at the
beginning and β0 is the increasing height of water per unit time. The measured height hm(t) of water at
time t is assumed to be represented by
hm(t) = α0 + β0t+ e(t)
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where e(t) represents a noise (or more precisely, a measurement error) with some suitable conditions. And
assume that we obtained the measured data of the heights of water at t = 1, 2, 3 as follows:
hm(1) = 0.5, hm(2) = 1.6, hm(3) = 3.3. (7.4)
h(t)
❄
✻
Figure 7.1: Water tank
Under this setting, we consider the following problem:
(c1) [Control]: Settle the state (α0, β0) such that measured data (7.4) will be obtained.
or, equivalently,
(c2) [Inference]: when measured data (7.4) is obtained, infer the unknown state (α0, β0).
This will be answered in Answer 5.4.
Note that (c1)=(c2) from the theoretical point of view. Thus we consider that
(d) Inference problem and control problem are the same problem. And these are charac-
terized as the reverse problem of measurements.
and Remark (Sec.4.2.2(c)).
7.2 Regression analysis — causality + Fisher maximum likelihood method
Combining Axiompmc 2(causality) and Fisher maximum likelihood method(Theorem 4.5)), we can easily
prove the following.
Theorem 7.3 [regression analysis (cf. [15]) ] Let (T={t0, t1, . . . , tN}, π : T \ {t0} → T ) be semi-
ordered tree. Let ÔT =(×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0) be the realized causal observable of a sequential observable
[{Ot}t∈T , {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt)→ C(Ωπ(t))}t∈T\{t0} ]. Consider a measurement
MC(Ωt0 )(ÔT=(×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0), S[∗])
Assume that a measured value by the measurement belongs to Ξ̂ (∈ ⊠ t∈TFt). Then, there is a reason to
infer that
[ ∗ ] = ωt0
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where ωt0 (∈ Ωt0) is defined by
[F̂t0 (Ξ̂)](ωt0) = max
ω∈Ωt0
[F̂t0(Ξ̂)](ω)
The poof is a direct consequence of Axiompmc 2(causality) and Fisher maximum likelihood method(Theorem
4.5)). Thus, we omit it.
Now we can present the answer to Problem 7.1.
Answer 7.4 [(Continued from Problem 7.1(inference problem))regression analysis] For each
t = 1, 2, let OGσt=(R,BR, Gσt) be the normal observable with a standard deviation σt > 0 in C(Ωt). That
is,
[Gσt(Ξ)](ω) =
1√
2πσ2t
∫
Ξ
e
− (x−ω)2
2σ2t dx (∀Ξ ∈ BR, ∀ω ∈ Ωt)
Thus, we have a deterministic sequence observable [{OGσt}t=1,2, {Φ0,t : C(Ωt) → C(Ω0)}t=1,2]. Its real-
ization ÔT = (R2,FR2 , F̂0) is defined by
[F̂0(Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω) = [Φ0,1Gσ1 ](ω) · [Φ0,2Gσ2 ](ω) = [Gσ1(Ξ1)](φ0,1(ω)) · [Gσ2(Ξ2)](φ0,2(ω))
(∀Ξ1,Ξ2 ∈ BR, ∀ω ∈ Ω0 = {ω1, ω2, . . . , ω5})
Let N be sufficiently large. Define intervals Ξ1,Ξ2 ⊂ R by
Ξ1 =
[
165− 1
N
, 165 +
1
N
]
, Ξ2 =
[
65− 1
N
, 65 +
1
N
]
The measured data obtained by a measurement MC(Ω0)(ÔT , S[∗]) is
(165, 65) (∈ R2)
Thus, measured value belongs to Ξ1 × Ξ2. Using Regression analysis ( Theorem 7.3), Problem 7.1(b) is
characterized as follows:
(♯) Find ω0 (∈ Ω0) such as
[F̂0({Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω0) = max
ω∈Ω
[F̂0({Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω)
Since N is sufficiently large,
(♯) =⇒ max
ω∈Ω0
1√
(2π)2σ21σ
2
2
∫ ∫
Ξ1×Ξ2
exp [− (x1 − h(ω))
2
2σ21
− (x2 − w(ω))
2
2σ22
]dx1dx2
=⇒ max
ω∈Ω0
exp [− (165− h(ω))
2
2σ21
− (65− w(ω))
2
2σ22
]
=⇒ min
ω∈Ω0
[
(165− h(ω))2
2σ21
+
(65− w(ω))2
2σ22
] ( for simplicity, assume that σ1 = σ2)
=⇒When ω4, minimum value (165− 170)
2 + (65− 60)2
2σ21
is obtained
=⇒The student is ω4
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Therefore, we can infer that the student who helps the girl is ω4.
Next we shall present the answer to Problem 7.2.
Answer 7.5 [(Continued from Problem 7.2(control problem))regression analysis]
In what follows, from the measurement theoretical point of view, we shall answer Problem (7.2). Let
T = {0, 1, 2} be a series ordered set such that the parent map π : T \ {0} → T is defined by π(t) = t− 1
(t = 0, 1, 2). Put Ω0 = [0, 2]× [0, 2], Ω1 = [0, 4]× [0, 2], Ω2 = [0, 6]× [0, 2]. For each t = 1, 2, consider
a continuous map φπ(t),t : Ωπ(t) → Ωt such that
φ0,1(α, β) = (α + β, β) (∀ω0 = (α, β) ∈ Ω0)
φ1,2(α, β) = (α + β, β) (∀ω1 = (α, β) ∈ Ω1).
Then, we get the deterministic causal operators thus, {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt)→ C(Ωπ(t))}t∈{1,2} such that
(Φ0,1f1)(ω0)=f1(φ0,1(ω0)) (∀f1 ∈ C(Ω1), ∀ω0 ∈ Ω0)
(Φ1,2f2)(ω1)=f2(φ1,2(ω1)) (∀f2 ∈ C(Ω2), ∀ω1 ∈ Ω1).
Thus, we have the causal relation as follows.
C(Ω0)
Φ0,1←−C(Ω1) Φ1,2←−C(Ω2).
Put φ0,2(ω0) = φ1,2(φ0,1(ω0)), Φ0,2 = Φ0,1 · Φ1,2.
Let R be the set of real numbers. Fix σ > 0. For each t = 0, 1, 2, define the normal observable
Ot≡(R,BR, Gnσ) in C(Ωt) such that
[Gnσ(Ξ)](ωt) =
1√
2πσ2
∫
Ξ
exp(− (x− α)
2
2σ2
)dx
(∀Ξ ∈ BR, ∀ωt = (α, β) ∈ Ωt=[0, 2t+ 2]× [0, 2]).
Thus, we get the sequential deterministic causal observable [OT ] = [{Ot}t=0,1,2, {Φπ(t),t : C(Ωt) →
C(Ωπ(t))}t=1,2]. Then, from Theorem 6.12, the realized causal observable Ô0 ≡ (R3,BR3 , F̂0) in C(Ω0)
is obtained as follows:
[F̂0(Ξ0 × Ξ1 × Ξ2)](ω0) =
[(
Gnσ(Ξ0)Φ0,1(G
n
σ(Ξ1)Φ1,2(G
n
σ(Ξ2)))
)]
(ω0)
=[Gnσ(Ξ0)](ω0) · [Gnσ(Ξ1)](φ0,1(ω0)) · [Gnσ(Ξ2)](φ0,2(ω0))
(∀Ξ0,Ξ1,Ξ2 ∈ BR, ∀ω0 = (α, β) ∈ Ω0).
We have the measurement MC(Ω0)(Ô0, S[∗] ). We see that the measured value (x0, x1, x2) obtained by the
measurement MC(Ω0)(Ô0, S[∗] ) is equal to
(0.5, 1.6, 3.3) (∈ R3).
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Define the closed interval Ξt (t = 0, 2, 3) such that
Ξ0 = [0.5− 1
2N
, 0.5 +
1
2N
], Ξ1 = [1.6− 1
2N
, 1.6 +
1
2N
], Ξ2 = [3.3− 1
2N
, 3.3 +
1
2N
],
for sufficiently large N . Here, Fisher’s method says that it suffices to solve the problem.
(♯) Find (α0, β0) such as
max
(α,β)∈Ω0
[F̂0(Ξ0 × Ξ1 × Ξ2](α, β)
Putting
U(x0, x1, x2, α, β) =
2∑
k=0
(xk − (α + kβ))2
we have the following problem that is equivalent to (♯):
Calculate
∂
∂α
U(0.5, 1.6, 3.3, α, β) = 0,
∂
∂β
U(0.5, 1.6, 3.3, α, β) = 0,
Then, we get
(α, β) = (0.4, 1.4)
Therefore, in order to get the measured value (1.9, 3.0, 4.7), the control state (α, β) should be defined
by (0.4, 1.4).
Here, again note the equivalence of control problem(c1) and inference problem(c2).
Example 7.6 [Pheasants and rabbits problem ] Consider the following situation:
(a) [Pheasants and rabbits problem] A number of pheasants and rabbits are placed together in the same
cage. 7 heads and 22 feet are counted. Find the numberm of pheasants and the number n of rabbits.
Answer This problem — Pheasants and rabbits problem — has various aspects. Usually, we consider
that,
(b) The statement (a) is in ordinary language.
This aspect (b) may assert that ”5”, ”14”, ”(m,n)” should be states. However, in what follows, we regard
the problem (a) as the inference problem. That is,
(c) Regarding (5, 15) as an exact measured value, infer the state (m,n).
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Put N0 = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, Ω0 = N0 × N0, Ω1 = N0 and Ω2 = N0. Define the causal operator Φ0,1 :
C(Ω1)→ C(Ω0) and Φ0,2 : C(Ω2)→ C(Ω0) such that
[Φ0,1(f1)](m,n)=f1(m+ n), [Φ0,2(f2)](m,n) = f2(2m+ 4n)
(∀fi ∈ C(Ωi), i = 1, 2, ∀(m,n) ∈ Ω0)
For each t ∈ {1, 2}, consider the exact observable O(exa)t in C(Ωt). That is, O(exa)t = (N0, 2N0 , F (exa))
satisfies
[F (exa)](Ξ)](n) =
{
1 (n ∈ Ξ)
0 (n /∈ Ξ)
Hence, we get the sequential deterministic causal exact observable [{O(exa)t }t=1,2, {Φ0,t : C(Ωt) → C(Ω0)
}t∈{1,2}]. Then, the realized causal observable Ô0 = (N0 × N0, 2N0×N0 , F̂ ) in C(Ω0) is defined by
[F̂ (Ξ1 × Ξ2)](m,n) = [Φ0,1F (exa)](m,n) · [Φ0,2F (exa)](m,n) = [F (exa)(Ξ1)](m+ n) · [F (exa)(Ξ2)](2m+ 4n)
(∀Ξ1,Ξ2 ∈ 2N0 , ∀(m,n) ∈ Ω0)
Assume that a measured value
(5, 14) ∈ N0 × N0
is obtained by the measurement MC(Ω0)(Ô0, S[∗]).
Therefore, Fisher maximum likelihood method(Theorem 4.5) says that
(♯) find (m,n)(∈ N0 × N0) such that
[F̂ ({5} × {14})](m,n) = max
(m,n)(∈N0×N0)
[F̂ ({5} × {14})](m,n)
Therefore,
(♯) =⇒ max
(m,n)∈N0×N0
(
[F (exa)({5})](m+ n) · [F (exa)({14})](2m+ 4n))
=⇒ [F (exa)({5})](m+ n) = 1 and [F (exa)({14})](2m+ 4n) = 1
=⇒ m+ n = 5 2m+ 4n = 14
=⇒ m = 3, n = 2
Thus, there is a reason to infer that (m,n) = (3, 2).
♠ Note 7.1 Since measurement theory is based on dualism, it has several interpretations of ”Pheasants and
rabbits problem” as follows.
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Table 7.2: Several interpretations of ”Pheasants and rabbits problem”
Variations  (m,n, (5, 14)) m n (5, 14)
usual interpretation in monism
(i.e., without mrasurement)
state state state
dualism(Example 7.6) state state measured value
dualism
(cf. Example 11.11)
measured value measured value measured value
Recall Chap. 1(X1), that is,
(X1)
(Chap.1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic scientific language
(Newtonian mechanics, etc.)
2©linguistic scientific language
(measurement theory, etc.)
And recall Chap. 1(X3), that is,
(X3) ” 0© widely ordinary language” includes
(♯) the arithmetical word problems ( (Example 7.6) or (Chap.11 (A2)) and so on), statistics (=dy-
namical system theory)
And our standing point is to reconsider each in the (♯) from the measurement theoretical point of view. If
fact we can see several ”pheasants and rabbits problems as in Table 7.2.
7.3 Measurement theory is valueless if not used
Two world-views (i.e., the realistic world-view and the linguistic world-view) are composed of different
principles. That is,
(a) The realistic world-view needs official guarantee of the experts. The number of specialists may be
about 100. On the other hand, The linguistic world-view does not need official guarantee of the
specialists but popular support.
In other words,
(b) The linguistic world-view is worthless if it is used by many persons.
In chapters 4,7, we assert that
(c) statistics·dynamical system theory is characterized as the abbreviation of measurement theory
If it is so, measurement theory satisfies the condition (b).
8 Reconsideration of traditional philosophies in measurement
theory
If we investigate ”language” , a philosophical domain must be trodden in somewhat inevitably. This
chapter explains the genealogy of the idealism shown in Fig. 8.2 later:
DescartescotKant
(Recognition constitutes world)
−−−→ linguist philosohy
(language constitutes world )
−−−−→ measurement theory
(language constitutes world )
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Although this was the scenery seen from measurement theory, I wrote that the reader of science also under-
stood. Of course, there is no classification of liberal arts and science, and
if you do not understand measurement theory, I think that you do not idealism.
8.1 Genealogy of dualism idealism
8.1.1 Descartes and Kant
Although measurement theory is metaphysics (i.e., a learning which cannot decide whether right or wrong
by experiments ), if you only master measurement theory, it is not necessarily indispensable to understand
measurement theory in relation with philosophy.
However, the consideration of the relation of measurement theory and philosophy is indispensable to
check a position of measurement theory in the science(i.e., to verify the opinion of this book:
Science is describing by measurement theory.
). The head family of metaphysics is philosophy and philosophers consider many things truly. And
measurement theory is subject to influences of some from their work. Although the philosopher has not
argued in ordinary language and the author could not necessarily fully understand their ideas, I thought
that what was suggested from philosophy should have been written.
(a) The spirit of measurement theory (Copenhagen interpretation) resembles the philosophy made into
the main stream to the extent that it will be called surreptitious use of originality, if I do not write.
This chapter explains this. Now, I will put up the image (Fig. 1.1 of Chap. 1) of measurement again.
•
observer
(I(=mind))
system
(matter)
✛
✲
[observable]
[measured value]
a©interfere
b©perceive a reaction
[state]
Figure 8.1 (=Fig. 1.1): The image of “measurement(= a©+ b©)” in dualism
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 8.2, we consider that
(b) Measurement theory is also the linguistic version of not only quantum mechanics but Descartes-Kant
philosophy.”
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If written by diagram,
(c)
(♯1) :
(world is before language)
quantum mechanics
(physics)
proverbalizing−−−−−−−−−→
linguistic turn
(♯2) :
(recognition is is before world)
Descartes – Kant philosophy
(recognition)
axomatization−−−−−−−−−→
linguistic turn

−→
(language is before world)
measurement theory
(scientific language)
Chapter 3 explained the portion of this quantum mechanics of (c)(♯1). This section explains a lower
portion(♯2).
If a conclusion is described previously, correspondence of the keyword of Descartes-Kant philosophy
and measurement theory (Copenhagen interpretation) will become as it is shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Descartes–Kant philosophy and measurement theory (cf. [14, 16])
Descartes–Kant
(recognition)
1© : I
2© : body
(sense organ, secondary quantity)
3©:mind
(brain)
4© : matter
( primary quantity)
measurement
(language)
1© : observer
2© : observable
(measuring instrument)
3© : measured value
(perceive by brain)
4© : measuring object
(state=property of measuring object)
If you see this table, you can guess a correspondence-related meaning generally, but I will add some
notes.
1© [”I”↔”observer”] :I think that this does not need to explain.
2© [”body”↔”observable”]: Probably, this will also be good since Body↔Sense organ ↔Observable ↔
Observable.
3© [”mind”↔”measured value”]: This may be unexpected. However, measurement is perceiving a signal
with an observer’s brain. And the ”perceived value” is then called ”measured value.” For example, if
an observer does not look at the value even if the scale of the voltmeter has pointed out 1.5V (namely,
if it does not reach to the observer’s brain ), we can not call it measurement. The phenomenon ”the
scale of a voltmeter points out 1.5V” is a perfect physical phenomenon, and if it becomes so much,
it can be said that the world of monism (only ”thing”) is enough. Therefore, if it says in motto, we
can say ”measured value does not exist without a brain. ”(Chapter 3.3), and this is ”the standard
interpretation of quantum mechanics.” I think that dualism is to consider that ”self (Brain·Heart)”
is a special existence.
4© [”matter”↔”measuring object”] This is also natural and it will not be necessary to explain it.
As mentioned above, there is correspondence of Table 8.1 about the basic keywords of Descartes-Kant
philosophy and measurement theory. Therefore, about the basic keywords, we may consider that ”Descartes
Kantianism = measurement theory.” Of course, since both are dualism, the similarity may be natural one.
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♠ Note 8.1 Since there is the ” 2©:body(= Observable)” in the middle of ”self” and a ”thing” so that it may
understand, if Fig. 1.1 (image figure of measurement) of Chap. 1 is seen, it is good though it belongs to the
direction of a ”thing.” When thinking so, it may be called ”mind-body dualism”, but ”to which it belonging”
and ”how to call” are not important. Moreover, if I think ”Body↔Observable”, there may be quite big
”Body.” I think that it is so much comfortable even if it considers that ”glasses” is a part of body. However,
as an example of ”the measuring instrument to a measuring object”, if it considers ”the scale of the voltmeter
to voltage should shake”, ”the jet stream to an airplane”, ”the Polesta r( for checking a direction)” may be
sufficient. Since ”Body(=Observable)” is ”what exists in the middle of a brain and a measuring object ”, we
can consider that a jet stream is the body(=Observable). However,
it should be the same as arguing about ”What is a monkey? What is a tree? ” in ”Even monkeys fall
from trees” of an idiom to have such a discussion — namely, ”What is the body? ” etc. — , and we
should notice that a productive argument is not expectable.
If too earnest to a question of ”What is ©©?” as the Note 2.3 described, it will fit into a dead end. It is
because
a concept is decided in the context in a linguistic science view. (Note 6.14)
♠ Note 8.2 Although monism and materialism won a great success in physics. On the other hand, in philosophy,
they adhered to dualism and idealism. If it carries out from the common sense feeling of science, we think
that the following question is natural.
(♯1) Why has ”strange theories”, such as idealism and dualism, clung to many wise people with the talent
which is equal to Newton or Einstein?
This question will not be canceled if there is no diagram of the following world description in mind.
(X1)
(Chap.1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic scientific language
(monism, materialism)
2©linguistic scientific language
(dualism, idealism)
Supposing philosophy has a difficult portion, it is to use ambiguous ordinary language0 (Of course,there are
also philosophical fields (ethical philosophy etc.) which must be done so plentifully.), but I would like to
think that it is true about the strong will which refused the realistic world view, and sharp intuition.
Immanuel Kant(1724–1804) is a philosopher with the biggest influence in modernization, and advo-
cated what is called ”Copernican revolution” (that is, ”recognition constitutes the world.” ) in epistemology.
As general explanation of ”pure reason criticism” of Kant [24], explanation of MSN (Encarta encyclopedia
) is quoted below.
(d) [Pure reason criticism ] It is ”pure reason criticism” that makes the basis of Kant’s critical philosophy,
and the target suited seeing and reaching to an extreme of man’s cognitive ability. As a result, it is clarified
that man’s cognitive ability is merely passively struck with things of the world, and it does not only take, and
that it is working actively in the world rather and completes the object of the recognition itself. Although
built, the world is not necessarily completed from nothing like God. The world is a certain form and there
is already it, and in order to materialize recognition, the information from this world acquired by pushing
in feeling is required as a material. However, this information is only the disorderly confused thing as it
is. Man’s cognitive ability must be pushed in a fixed form with which he is originally endowed, and must
give orderly order to the information on this confused feeling. Moreover, it is since the object of the first
recognition to unify by it is summarized. According to Kant, the form with which man is endowed is as
follows.
(i) : Form of sensitivity(intuition)(Space-time (=R× R3))
(ii) : Form of understanding(thinking) (For example, the concept of a quantity,
whether it is single or a large number, the concept of a relation like causality, etc.)
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If that is right, in spite of being unable to prove the proposition ”all the thing is among time and space”,
and ”all follow causal relationship”, they will be unconditionally applied to the object of all the experiences
experientially. It is because the object will not be constituted without space, time, and the form of causal
relationship. It is like it being considered that the utterance ”the world is green” is right for all human
beings, when all human beings see the world for example, having covered green sunglasses. (MSN – ( the
Encarta encyclopedia. 2009 DVD Japanese version(translated by the author)) ).
Probably, we may consider the following correspondence compared with measurement theory because
Kant has said that it related to space, time, or causal relationship in upper (i) of (d), and the portion of
(ii).
(e)
{
Sensitivity
Understanding
}
←→
{
Axiompc 1 (measurement)
Axiompmc 2 (causality)
}
8.1.2 Linguistic revolution and measurement theory — Idealism which a monkey can not
understand
Now, Descartes-Kant philosophy develops for the purpose of ”theory of basing of science”, and, probably,
may conclude that the compilation was made by Kant. Possibly the intention suffered a setback. However,
if we may regard it as
”Theory of basing of science”
(Kantianism)
= ”The basic language which describes science”
(Measurement theory )
the purpose of Descartes-Kant philosophy and measurement theory will become the same.
However,
(f1) Although Descartes-Kant philosophy and measurement theory are dualism with the same purpose
and the correspondence (Table 8.1 and (e)) mentioned above is among both, even if both are alike,
why have not they resembled it closely?
I think that the reason — Although it is having stated repeatedly since Note 2.3 — is the next ((f2),(f3)).
(f2) Descartes Kant philosophy investigates in detail about the basic keywords ”I” ( ”body” , ”mind”,
etc.).
On the other hand,
(f3) Measurement theory tells the world as directions of the Axioms 1 and 2. and not investigates the
keywords ”observer” ( ”observable”, ”measured value” , etc. ).
That is, I think that it is the difference between ”Philosophy told about” and ”Philosophy told by”. In
this sense, Newtonian mechanics is also ”Philosophy told by”.
Although this difference is decisive, Descartes-Kant philosophy and measurement theory (Copenhagen
interpretation) are considerably alike. For example, there is the next resemblance. :
(g1) The importance of ”space-time”, ”causal relationship”, and ”measurement (≈ recognition)” was
observed. (Therefore, it means that Kant was sure of ”the miracle of Section 6.4.3 (g)”. )
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(g2) [Recognition constitutes world]
(Copernican turn)
⇐⇒ [ Observable is before state ]
(the Copenhagen interpretation(Chap. 1(U6))
Moreover, it is as follows, if explanation of the Encarta encyclopedia of (d) is imitated and measurement
theory is described.
(h) [Measurement Theory ] Measurement Theory is the linguistic describing method about an everyday
phenomenon. The description by measurement theory does not simply describe things of the world as it
is passively. It is working actively in the world rather, completes the object as a fiction and describes it.
Although completed as a fiction, it does not necessarily complete from nothing. Since the world is a certain
form and is already there, in order to materialize description, the information from this world acquired by
pushing in feeling is required as a material. However, this information is only the disorderly confused thing
as it is. The description by measurement theory must be pushed in a fixed form with which measurement
theory is originally equipped, must give orderly order to this confused information, and must summarize the
first description(fiction) to unify by it. The form with which measurement theory is equipped is as follows.{
(i) : Axiompc 1( Measurement)
(ii) : Axiom
p
c 2(Causal relationship)
If that is right, in spite of being unable to prove ”all the thing is among time and space”, and the proposition
”all follow causal relationship”, they will be unconditionally applied to the object of all the experiences
experientially. Space, time, and causal relationship are because the object will not be described without the
form (Axiompc 1 and 2 ). Supposing it has the rule that only the word ”green” can be used as a color, it is
like what we can only describe ”the color in the world is green.”
From the above thing, we understand the similarity of a Kantianism and measurement theory.
The differences among both are a ”recognition version” and a ”language version.” Supposing that
is right, you will think that you want the proposition which is unconditionally applied to the object
of all the experiences to correspond with measurement theory(Axiompc 1 and 2 ) in spite of a priori
overall judgment of Kant (That is, a proposition which is unconditionally applied to the object of all
the experiences in spite of the ability not to prove experientially (empirical validation cannot be carried
out)). I would like to think so, since both aim at establishment of metaphysics.
♠ Note 8.3 Measurement theory is materialized from the following two beliefs(Section 2.3.1 (a)).{
Faithful to Axiom 1 and 2
Reliance to man’s linguistic competence and cognitive ability
In measurement theory, about the portions of ”the linguistic competence and cognitive ability of man”, we
only merely wonder and we do not do investigation beyond it. However, it may be thought that the direction
of ”wonder of the linguistic competence and cognitive ability of man” was trodden in in the Kantianism.
Even if the learning which tells ”recognition” was inherited in a modern style to science (= material study
(Psychology, cognitive science, brain science, artificial intelligence, etc. )), the direction which Kant aimed
at must be metaphysical world description. As analogy of ”atomism (Demokritos) to atomism (theory of
elementary particles)”, there may be some some readers who think ”the unripe state of science (= material
study) is philosophy”. However, if the Kantianism (pure reason criticism) is considered so, Kant does not
rest in peace. Although the metaphysical opinion is carried out, if it is misunderstood and criticized in case
of material study, Kant may be embarrassed. Of course, there is no philosopher who is doing confusion of
metaphysics and material study.
♠ Note 8.4 I have heard the opinion said ”It is because that Gauss(1777–1855) refrained from the official
announcement of non-Euclidean geometry wanted to avoid friction with the Kantists who claim ”Space-time
(= R×R3) is the sensitivity with which man is endowed.” .” Although this truthfulness is not certain, I think
that it is a fact that the influence of the Kantianism of those days was so greatest that it was not amusing
even if there was a talk said like this. If it considers from now on, it is natural to doubt ”why generally it was
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supported?”, but I would like to make as a fiction the plot in which the Kantianism greatly affected modern
science, in the evolution
Kant −−−−−−−−−−−−→
(linguistic turn)
the philosophy of language
(axiomatization)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(quantification)
measurement theory
It is because only a negative answer will be contemporarily thought of to a problem :
What on earth was the dualism idealism (Plato, Descartes, Kant) made into a philosophical main
stream?
if our fiction does not exist.
As mentioned above, though it is [(d):Pure reason criticism (epistemology) ]+[(h):Measurement theory
(language) ], ”[Recognition] 6=[Language]” is also worried too. When becoming it so, ”the linguistic turn”
— namely, revolution to ”linguistic philosophy” from ”epistemology”— carried out by philosophers, such as
Saussure(1857–1913) and Wittgenstein(1889-1951), after Kant has a meaning important for measurement
theory. That is,
from ”recognition” to ”language”
If it writes diagrammatically,
(i)
(recognition constitutes world)
Kant
( epistemology )
[recognition]→[language]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
linguistic turn
(language constitutes world)
the philosophy of language
(ordinary language)
[language]→[scientific language]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
scientification
(language constitutes world)
measurement theory
(sientific language)
Note that ”Recognition constitutes the world. ” is used in two meanings((g2),(i)). Although (g2) is still
used in the Copenhagen interpretation of measurement theory(Chap. 1(U5)), it was revolved in (i) to
”Language constitutes the world.”
That is, the phrases:
”Language is before the world” ”The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” ”Lan-
guage constitutes the world” ”Language game”
of the linguistic philosophy which philosophers like and use is borrowed, and it is only a cut about these
at the basic spirit of measurement theory.
We are impressed by the sharp sensitivity of the philosophers who arrived at such a phrase in ordinary
language, without having an easy concrete model called measurement theory (i.e., Axioms 1 and 2). Even
though that was right, the author was taught the following fact (j) from the students of my seminar and
not from Saussure (Refer to Note 3.9):
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(j) Even if we do not know a ”monkey” and a ”tree”, we can use the proverb that ”Even monkeys fall
from trees”.
Ordinary language is a monster language taken in vaguely -even in case of a realistic science view
and linguistic scientific view. In ordinary language, no clear things can be said in a strict meaning. For
example, ”Which came first, the world or the language? also has the side like ”which came first, the
chicken or the egg?” and it is not that ”which came first” is so clear. On the other hand, in measurement
theory, it can be said completely that ”language is first” That is because Axioms 1 and 2 are ”perfect
mystic words”, and it does not exist from the starts, such as the world of corresponding (any fields other
than quantum mechanics).
It follows,
(k) Measurement theory presented the meaning of idealism (the spirit of ”language is before world”) in
the form which everyone can understand.
If that is right, idealism should be known also by whom, but regrettably a monkey does not understand
it. That is because
(l) measurement theory is based on man’s linguistic competence.
But a monkey can count some apples, and there is also computer software comparable as the world
champion of chess. However, it will be thought at least for about 50 years from now on that idealism
belongs only to man.
Wittgenstein does not have a worldly way of speaking like ”fitting feet with shoes(Note 6.15).” He said
lucidly as follows more smartly.
(m) Language constitutes the world. . Therefore, since we decided that measurement theory de-
scribed science, what it described is the world of many science and engineering. (Note 6.15(♯2)).
That is, I understand that all the following (m1)–(m3) is the same meaning.
(m1) Engineering and science are the worlds described by measurement theory.
(m2) The limit of a language called measurement theory is the limit of the world of
engineering and science.
(m3) Measurement theory = The language of engineering and science (Note 1.2)
I think that there are very beneficial to measurement theory. If we trust Wittgenstein, it means that he
had answered by upper (m) about
(n)
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♠ Note 8.5 The above (m) is not ”an eternal definition” of ”science.” It is because there is a best-before date
in measurement theory as Section 2.4.2 [space colony] described. Moreover, it is because you should propose
another linguistic science language and constitute ”the world of another science” , if you are not pleased with
this ”world of science (measurement theory constitutes)”.
8.2 Where is measurement theory in traditional philosophies
The argument to this chapter is summarized as the following Fig. 8.2.
Kant −−−−−−−−−−−→
Sec.8.1
linguistic philosohy −−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Sec.8.1
(classical mechanical world-view)
statistics:(trial) ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
abbreviation
(language)
measurement theory
(idealism)
Newton −→

state equation method(Chap. 1(E1))
(the causal world-view)
quantum mechanics
Sec.3.1
−→

(1)
(linguistic)
−−−−−−−−−→
Sec.3.2
(2)
(realistic)
−−−−−→
the theory of relativity
(Einstein)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
✻
❄
(missing link)
 −→
(physics)
the theory of everything
(realism)
[realistic world-view(unsolved)]
[linguistic world-view]
Figure 8.2: The development of the world-descriptions
Here, although the branch
(
i.e., quantum mechanics −→
{
(1) −→
(2) −→
)
of quantum mechanics was de-
scribed in the Note 3.6, it argues in Section 9.3.
♠ Note 8.6 The Note 3.9 also described,
The author progressed in the order
from ”Quantum mechanics(Theorem 3.4 (Formulation within the quantum mechanics of the uncertainty
principle of Heisenberg ))” to ”Classic measurement theory [8, 9]”
I expected that classic measurement theory became a completely different thing from dynamical system
theory and statistics at the beginning. In this meaning,
dynamical system theory·statistics ←−−−−−−−−
abbreviation
measurement theory
of Fig. 8.2 was too appropriate and a disappointment. Conversely, I got the firm belief ”there is only
measurement theory for world description.”
8.3 Supplement: About ordinary language
It is how to use the word ”ordinary language” that I strayed most while writing this book, and I do not
still define it clearly. Therefore, I am getting confused and using the word ”ordinary language” in whole
this book. That is, since I am getting confused and using ”Case 1” and ”Case 2” like
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{
Case 1 : [ordinary language] ∩ [measurement theory] = ∅
Case 2 : [ordinary language] ⊃ [measurement theory]
, I would like to add some ”supplement:ordinary language” here. However, since it does not necessarily
become clear in particular in this section, you may skip this section.
Although we do not know in the time of when human beings invented language, language is continuing
developing continuously after it. Therefore, we may consider that ”development of language” is almost
synonymous( that is, proportional) with ”development of civilization.”
In this sense, we may think that
(♯1) the theme of this book is one of the trials which make power of expression of ordinary language rich.
I explain this below. I persisted in the following diagram in this book.
(X1)
(Chap. 1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic scientific language
(world is before language)
2©linguistic scientific language
(language is before world)
And since it could not say that the framework of ordinary language 0© in a broad sense was clear, I
chose to start from measurement theory 2©. However, if it further gives a broad interpretation of ordinary
language, it is reasonable also for thinking as follows.
(♯2) ( 0©∪ 1©∪ 2©) ⊂ ”more widely ordinary language”
Rather, it is more natural to think like this.
Mathematics and physics may also be ”ordinary language” for a mathematician or a physicist. More-
over, I will not deny the opinion that it is an expedient diagram for this (X1) to make contrast with
physics and measurement theory conspicuous. That is, I will not argue about ”Ordinary language of (X1)
vs. Ordinary language of (♯1)”. It is because avoiding the argument in connection with ordinary language
as much as possible must have been the plan which cohered.
If that is right, it is the same as (♯1) to have carried out in this book. If I repeat,
(♯3) Into a lawless area called ordinary language, a steadfast small dualism language area called mea-
surement theory was found out (adding), and power of expression of ordinary language was made
somewhat rich.
Of course, it is not only measurement theory to make ordinary language rich.
(♯4) ”Mathematics”, ”physics”, ”the good”, ”justice”, ”love”, ”freedom”, ”art”, ”the theory of evolution”,
”DNA”,”the Internet”, ”democracy”, ”economy”, ”environment” · · ·
That is, all the things learned in the education of primary schools and junior and senior high schools,
and the language and the concept and theory of the special field of study of the extension also make
ordinary language rich.
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if that is right, we would like to come to compare each of (♯4) and measurement theory
It is possible for a certain grade to carry out this comparison. As mentioned above, it is because it will
be quite fair to consider
(♯5) all the researches of all learning are estimated by the measure ”which made language powerful richly.”
if ”Development of language ∝
proportionality
Development of civilization” is right
Measurement theory made language rich. However, in addition to it, the language of
Kant, Fischer, Wittgenstein, von Neumann
was swung, for example, and language was made still more powerful.
Moreover, I think that this measure(♯5) is almost the same as ”the standard of the importance of this
book” - ”Is it how much helpful for construction and settlement of a space colony?” , namely, ”Is it how
much helpful in order that human beings may survive?” -.
9 Equilibrium statistical mechanics
Our purpose is to establish the following spirit:
(♯1) Describing ordinary phenomena by a metaphysical language (i.e., measurement theory), we make engi-
neering (or, science).
Following this spirit,
(♯2) we study equilibrium statistical mechanics in measurement theory
And therefore, we conclude that equilibrium statistical mechanics is not physics. In addition, we assert that
(♯3) quantum mechanics is the greatest examples of the applications of measurement theory.
9.1 equilibrium statistical mechanics
It is usual to consider that equilibrium statistical mechanics is constructed on the base of dynamical system
theory. On the other hand, we construct equilibrium statistical mechanics in measurement theory.
Thus, we have the following problem:
equilibrium statistical mechanics
(new method due to measurement theory)
vs. equilibrium statistical mechanics
(the conventional method due to dynamical system theory)
This ”vs.” must be settled in future.
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9.1.1 The dynamical aspect of equilibrium statistical mechanics — Ergodic hypothesis
Assume that about N(≈1024) particles (for example, hydrogen molecules) move in a box. It is natural to
assume the following phenomena 1© – 4©:
1© Every particle obeys Newtonian mechanics.
2© Every particle moves uniformly in the box. For example, a particle does not halt in a corner.
3© Every particle moves with the same statistical behavior concerning time.
4© The motions of particles are (approximately) independent of each other.
In what follows we shall devote ourselves to the problem:
(a) how to describe the above equilibrium statistical mechanical phenomena 1© – 4© in terms of mea-
surement theory.
For completeness, again note that measurement theory is a kind of language.
In this preprint, the knowledge of statistical mechanics is not required. Thus, we add the allegory as
follows.
♠ Note 9.1 The original idea may be due to L. Boltzmann: (Vorlesungen u¨ber Gastheorie, 1895, J Ambrosius
Barth, 1923). Let us explain 2© – 4© as allegory as follows. 100 kindergarteners are carrying out a swing
[SW], a sliding way [SL], and sand play [SN] to the lunch break of 1 hour in the yard of the kindergarten.
Then, 2© – 4© can be understood as the following allegory:.
2© Every kindergartner is fickle and changes play one after another. For example, a kindergartner plays
as follows.
(♯) SW
(5 min.)
→ SL
(3 min.)
→ SN
(6 min.)
→ SL
(7 min.)
→ SW
(9 min.)
→ SL
(8 min.)
→ SW
(9 min.)
→ SN
(6 min.)
→ SW
(7 min.)
3© Every kindergartner has the same palatability. Therefore, the sum total time of each three play is the
same. For example, for every kindergartner, we see that
the time which played the swing is 30 minutes
the time which played the sliding way is 18 minutes
the time which played the sand play is 12 minutes
4© Every kindergartner is independently playing It is hardly influenced by other kindergarteners’ play.
They do not do group action.
Imaging the above 2©– 4©, readers may read as follows.
About 1©
In Newtonian mechanics, any state of a system composed of N( ≈ 1024) particles is represented by a
point (q, p)
(≡ (position, momentum) = (q1n, q2n, q3n, p1n, p2n, p3n)Nn=1 ) in a phase (or state) space R6N .
Let H : R6N → R be a Hamiltonian such that
H((q1n, q2n, q3n, p1n, p2n, p3n)Nn=1) = [ N∑
n=1
∑
k=1,2,3
(pkn)
2
2× particle’s mass ]+U((q1n, q2n, q3n)
N
n=1). (2)
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Let {ψEt }−∞<t<∞ be the flow on the energy surface ΩE induced by the Newton equation with the Hamil-
tonian H, or equivalently, Hamilton’s equation:
dqkn
dt
=
∂H
∂pkn
,
dpkn
dt
= − ∂H
∂qkn
, (k = 1, 2, 3, n = 1, 2, . . . , N). (9.1)
Fix E > 0. And define the measure ν
E
on the energy surface Ω
E
(≡ {(q, p) ∈ R6N | H(q, p) = E}) such
that
ν
E
(B) =
∫
B
|∇H(q, p)|−1dm6N−1(∀B ∈ BΩ
E
, the Borel field of Ω
E
)
where
|∇H(q, p)| = [
N∑
n=1
∑
k=1,2,3
{( ∂H
∂pkn
)2 + (
∂H
∂qkn
)2}]1/2
and dm6N−1 is the usual surface measure on ΩE .
Liouville’s theorem says that the measure ν
E
is invariant concerning the flow {ψEt }−∞<t<∞. That is,
it holds that
ν
E
(S) = ν
E
(ψEt (S)) (0 ≦ ∀t <∞, ∀S ∈ BΩE ) (9.2)
Putting C(Ω) = C0(ΩE ) = C(ΩE ) (from the compactness of ΩE ), T = R, ωt = (q(t), p(t)), φt1.t2 =
ψEt2−t1 , Φ
∗
t1.t2δωt1 = δφt1.t2 (ωt1) (∀ωt1 ∈ ΩE ), we define the deterministic Markov relation {Φt1,t2 : C(ΩE )→
C(Ω
E
)}(t1.t2)∈T 2≤ in Axiompmc 2.
About 2©
Now let us begin with the well-known ergodic theorem. (cf. [33]).
For example, consider one particle P1. Put SP1 = {ω ∈ ΩE | a state ω such that the particle P1 always
stays a corner of the box }. Clearly, it holds that SP1 ( ΩE . Also, if ψEt (SP1) ⊆ SP1 (0 ≦ ∀t < ∞), then
the particle P1 must always stay a corner. This contradicts 2©. Therefore, 2© means the following:
2©′ [Ergodic property]: If a compact set S(⊆ Ω
E
, S 6= ∅) satisfies ψEt (S) ⊆ S (0 ≦ ∀t <∞), then it holds
that S = Ω
E
.
The ergodic theorem says that the above 2©′ is equivalent to the following equality:∫
Ω
E
f(ω)ν
E
(dω)
((state) space average)
= lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ α+T
α
f(ψEt (ω0))dt
(time average)
(∀α ∈ R, ∀f ∈ C(Ω
E
), ∀ω0 ∈ ΩE ) (9.3)
where the normalized measure ν
E
is defined by such that ν
E
=
ν
E
ν
E
(Ω
E
) .
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After all, the ergodic property says that if T is sufficiently large, it holds that∫
Ω
E
f(ω)ν
E
(dω)≈ 1
T
∫ α+T
α
f(ψEt (ω0))dt.
Put m
T
(dt) = dtT . The probability space ([α, α + T ],B[α,α+T ],mT ) (or equivalently, ([0, T ],B[0,T ],mT )
) is called a (normalized) first staying time space, also, the probability space (Ω
E
,BΩ
E
, ν
E
) is called
a (normalized)second staying time space. Note that these mathematical probability spaces are not
related to “probability”.
About 3© and 4©
Put DN = {1, 2, . . . , N(≈1024)}. For each k ( ∈ DN ), define the coordinate map Xk : ΩE ( ⊂ R6N )→
R6 such that
Xk(ω) = Xk(q, p) = Xk((q1n, q2n, q3n, p1n, p2n, p3n)
N
n=1) = (q1k, q2k, q3k, p1k, p2k, p3k)
for all ω = (q, p) = (q1n, q2n, q3n, p1n, p2n, p3n)
N
n=1 ∈ ΩE ( ⊂ R6N ).
Also, for any subset D ( ⊆ DN= {1, 2, . . . , N (≈1024)}), define the distribution map R(·)D : ΩE ( ⊂ R6N )
→M+1(R6) such that
R
(q,p)
D =
1
♯[D]
∑
k∈D
δXk(q,p) (∀(q, p) ∈ ΩE ( ⊂ R6N ))
where ♯[D] is the number of the elements of the set D.
Let ω0(∈ ΩE ) be a state. For each n (∈ DN ), we define the map Y ω0n : [0, T ]→ R6 such that
Y ω0n (t) = Xn(ψ
E
t (ω0)) (∀t ∈ [0, T ]).
And, we regard {Y ω0n }Nn=1 as random functions on the probability space ([0, T ],B[0,T ],mT ). Then, 3© and
4© respectively means
3©′ {Y ω0n }Nn=1 is a sequence with the approximately identical distribution concerning time. In other words,
there exists a normalized measure ρ
E
on R6 (i.e., ρ
E
∈Mm+1(R6)) such that:
m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : Y ω0n (t) ∈ Ξ})≈ ρE (Ξ) (∀Ξ ∈ BR6 , n = 1, 2, . . . , N)
4©′ {Y ω0n }Nn=1 is approximately independent, in the sense that, for any D0 ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , N(≈1024)} such
that 1 ≦ ♯[D0]≪ N ( that is, ♯[D0]N ≈0 ), it holds that
m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : Y ω0k (t) ∈ Ξk(∈ BR6), k ∈ D0})
≈ ×
k∈D0
m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : Y ω0k (t) ∈ Ξk(∈ BR6)}).
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The following important remark was missed in [?, ?]. This is the advantage of our method in comparison
with Ruelle’s method (cf.[28]).
Thus, the law of large numbers says that, putting D0(⊂ DN ) such that 1 ≪ ♯[D0] ≪ N (that is,
1
♯[D0]
+ 0 + ♯[D0]N ), fot almost time t (∈ [0, T ]), we see that
1
♯[D0]
∑
k∈D0
δY ω0
k
(t)+ρE (∀ω0 ∈ ΩE ), ( by 3© and 4© ) (9.4)
Also, we see, by (9.3), that, for D0(⊆ DN ) such that 1 ≤ ♯[D0]≪ N ,
m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : Y ω0k (t) ∈ Ξk(∈ BR6), k ∈ D0}) = mT ({t ∈ [0, T ] : Xk(ψEt (ω0) ∈ Ξk(∈ BR6), k ∈ D0})
=m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : ψEt (ω0) ∈ ((Xk)k∈D0)−1(×
k∈D0
Ξk)})≈ νE
(
((Xk)k∈D0 )
−1( ×
k∈D0
Ξk)
)
≡(ν
E
◦ ((Xk)k∈D0)−1
)
( ×
k∈D0
Ξk).
Particularly, putting D0 = {k}, we see:
m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : Y ω0k (t) ∈ Ξ})≈ (νE ◦X−1k )(Ξ) (∀Ξ ∈ BR6). (9.5)
Hence, the setences 3© and 4© in ordinary langugae can be tlanslated to measurement theoretical
sentence as follows.
Hypothesis 9.1[ 3© and 4© ] Put DN = {1, 2, . . . , N(≈1024)}. Let H, E, νE , νE , Xk : ΩE → R6 be as
in the above. Then, summing up 3© and 4©, we say:
(b) {Xk : ΩE → R6}Nk=1 is approximately independent random variables with the identical distribution
in the sense that there exists ρ
E
(∈ M+1(R6)) such that⊗
k∈D0
ρ
E
(= “product measure”)≈ ν
E
◦ ((Xk)k∈D0)−1.
for all D0 ⊂ DN and 1 ≦ ♯[D0] ≪ N .
Also, a state (q, p)(∈ Ω
E
) is called an equilibrium state if it satisfies R
(q,p)
DN
≈ρ
E
.
Now, we have the following theorem (cf.[17]):
Theorem 9.2 [Ergodic hypothesis(ergodic hypothesis)] Assume Hypothesis 9.1 ( or equivalently, 3©
and 4© ). Then, for any ω0 = (q(0), p(0)) ∈ ΩE , it holds that
[R
(q(t),p(t))
DN
](Ξ)≈ m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : Y ω0k (t) ∈ Ξ}) (∀Ξ ∈ BR6 , k = 1, 2, . . . , N(≈1024)) (9.6)
for almost all t. That is, 0 ≦ m
T
({t ∈ [0, T ] : (9.6) does not hold}) ≪ 1.
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Proof. Let D0 ⊂ DN such that 1≪ ♯[D0] ≡ N0 ≪ N (that is, 1♯[D0]≈0≈
♯[D0]
N ). Then, from Hypothesis
A, the law of large numbers (cf. [26]) says that
R
(q(t),p(t))
D0
≈ ν
E
◦X−1k ( ≈ ρE ) (9.7)
for almost all time t. Consider the decomposition DN = {D(1), D(2), . . . , D(L)}. (i.e., DN =
⋃L
l=1D(l),
D(l) ∩ D(l′) = ∅ (l 6= l′) ), where ♯[D(l)]≈N0 (l = 1, 2, . . . , L). From (9.7), it holds that, for each k
( = 1, 2, . . . , N (≈1024)),
R
(q(t),p(t))
DN
=
1
N
L∑
l=1
[♯[D(l)]×R(q(t),p(t))D(l) ]
≈ 1
N
L∑
l=1
[♯[D(l)]× ρE ]≈ νE ◦X−1k ( ≈ ρE ), (9.8)
for almost all time t. Hence, the proof is completed.
We believe that Theorem 9.2 is just what should be represented by the “ergodic hypothesis” as follows.
Corollary 9.3 [ergodic hypothesis]
“population average of N particles at each t”
=“time average of one particle”.
Thus, we can assert that the ergodic hypothesis is related to equilibrium statistical mechanics. Here, the
ergodic property 2©′ and the above ergodic hypothesis should not be confused. Also, it should be noted
that the ergodic hypothesis does not hold if the box ( containing particles ) is too large.
♠ Note 9.2 Let us explain Corollary 9.3 as allegory of Note 9.1 as follows. We see that, at almost every time
the number of the kindergartner who is doing the swing is 50 persons
the number of the kindergartner who is doing the sliding way is 50 persons
the number of the kindergartner who is doing the sand play is 20 persons
Here, we want to add the remark about the time interval [0, T ]]. For example, as one of typical cases, consider
the motion of 1024 particles in a cubic box (whose long side is 0.3m). It is usual to consider that “averaging
velocity”=5 × 102m/s, “mean free path”=10−7m. And therefore, the collisions rarely happen among ♯[D0]
particles in the time interval [0, T ], and therefore, the motion is ”almost independent”. For example, putting
♯[D0] = 10
10, we can calculate the number of times a certain particle collides with D0-particles in [0,T] as
(10−7 × 1024
1010
)−1 × (5× 102)× T ≈ 5× 10−5 × T . Hence, in order to expect that 3©′ and 4©′ hold, it suffices
to consider that T ≈ 5 seconds. Also, note that the term ”ergodic” may be used in various meanings. For
example, the formula (9.3) is also said to be ergodic. However, here, we use it in the above sense.
♠ Note 9.3 The entropy H(q, p) of a state (q, p)(∈ Ω
E
) is defined by
H(q, p) = k log[ν
E
({(q′, p′) ∈ Ω
E
: R
(q,p)
DN
≈ R(q′,p′)DN )})]
where
k = [Boltzmann constant]/([Plank constant]3NN !)
Since almost every state in ΩE is equilibrium, the entropy of almost every state is equal k log νE (ΩE ).
Therefore, it is natural to assume that the law of increasing entropy holds.
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9.1.2 The probabilistic aspect of equilibrium statistical mechanics — Where does probabil-
ity come?
In this section we shall study the probabilistic aspects of equilibrium statistical mechanics. For com-
pleteness, note that
(a) the argument in the previous section is not related to “probability”
since Axiompc 1 does not appear in Section 3.1. Also, recall the (E4), that is, there is no probability without
measurement.
Theorem 9.2 says that the equilibrium statistical mechanical system at almost all time t can be regarded
as:
(b) a box including about 1024 particles such as the number of the particles whose states belong to Ξ
( ∈ BR6) is given by ρE (Ξ)× 1024.
Thus, it is natural to assume as follows.
(c) if we, at random, choose a particle from 1024 particles in the box at time t, then the probability that
the state (q1, q2, q3, p1, p2, p3) (∈ R6) of the particle belongs to Ξ ( ∈ BR6) is given by ρE (Ξ).
In what follows, we shall represent this (J) in terms of measurements. Define the observable O0 =
(R6,BR6 , F0) in C(ΩE ) such that
[F0(Ξ)](q, p) = [R
(q,p)
DN
](Ξ)
(
≡ ♯[{k | Xk(q, p) ∈ Ξ}]
♯[DN ]
)
(∀Ξ ∈ BR6 , ∀(q, p) ∈ ΩE ( ⊂ R6N )).
Thus, we have the measurementMC(ΩE)(O0 := (R
6,BR6 , F0), S[δψt(q0 ,p0 )]). Then we say, by Axiom
p
c 1, that
(d) the probability that the measured value obtained by the measurement MC(ΩE)(O0 := (R
6,BR6 , F0),
S[δψt(q0 ,p0 )]
) belongs to Ξ(∈ BR6) is given by ρE (Ξ). That is because Theorem 9.2 says that [F0(Ξ)](ψt(q0 , p0))
≈ ρ
E
(Ξ) (almost every time t).
Also, let ΨEt : C(ΩE ) → C(ΩE ) be a deterministic Markov operator determined by the continuous
map ψEt : ΩE → ΩE (cf. Section 3.1.2). Then, it clearly holds ΨEt O0 = O0. And, we must take a
MC(Ω
E
)(O0, S[(q(tk),p(tk))]) for each time t1, t2, . . . , tk, . . . , tn. However, Interpretation (E2) says that it
suffices to take the simultaneous measurement MC(Ω
E
)(×nk=1 O0, S[δ(q(0),p(0)) ]).
♠ Note 9.4 We devote ourselves to the linguistic world-view. We first have a language called measurement
theory. And, we tried to describe the phenomena 1©– 4© in Sec. 9.1.1. And we construct equilibrium statistical
mechanics. We are faithful to the linguistic spirit ”language is before world”. In this sense, we think that
our equilibrium statistical mechanics is not physics.
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9.2 ”Dynamical system theory” vs. ”Measurement theory” in equilibrium
statistical mechanics
Equilibrium statistical mechanics is to derive thermo-dynamics from [Newtonian mechanics]+ [α].
Our method (measurement theory) is
(a) equilibrium statistical mechanics
(measurement theory)
:=
(Sec.6.4)
Axiompmc 2(causality )
(”Newton equation 1©” and 2© – 4© )
+
(Sec.2.2)
Axiompc 1
(urn problem)
where ν
E
is the normalized staying time derived from Newtonian mechanics.
On the other hand, the conventional method (dynamical system theory(cf. [28])) is
(b) equilibrium statistical mechanics
(dynamical system theory)
:= Newtonian mechanics
(”Newton 1©”and 2©
+ equal probability
( probabilistic interpretation of νE)
Thus, we have
(a) vs. (b)
Here, recall Note 1.4. This ”vs.” must be settled in future.
♠ Note 9.5 We do not agree that there are several ”equilibrium statistical mechanics”. Also, we should hurry
up to describe various sciences in terms of measurement theory. For ”psychological tests”, see [25].
9.3 Is quantum mechanics physics, or engineering?
For the foregoing paragraph, I considered that equilibrium statistical mechanics was one of the science. In
this section, I further promote this and argue about
Is quantum mechanics physics, or several sciences (engineering)?
Of course, if I say that quantum mechanics is not physics, you will think that I do not have common
sense. However, Einstein was skeptical to quantum mechanics throughout life( cf. [30]). At least, I can
be say that quantum mechanics was not ”Einstein’s physics.” It is more convenient to think ”quantum
mechanics is one of the science instead of physics” also for measurement theory. Although I explain
the reason below, it becomes the argument about von Neumann’s work ”mathematical basis of quantum
mechanics [32];(1932)” after all. Then, I recommend that you read the following, after you refer to the
Internet etc. about von Neumann’s -the man who was the cleverest at the 20-th century- genius.
I think over the classification of the measurement theory of Chap. 1(Y) as follows. :
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(a) measurement theory (=MT)
(sientific language)
quantum MT
quantum phenomena−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
description
quantum mechanics (=quantum engineering)
classical MT
ordinary phenomena−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
description
statistical mechanics, economics, · · ·
That is, it is a position which we consider is a linguistic science language rather than consider quantum
measurement theory to be physics. Namely,
I consider that Born’s quantum measurement theory[Axiom(Q);Chapter 3.1.1] should be regarded
as ”mystic words ”, and I assert a linguistic science view.
This is the position of considering that a linguistic science language called measurement theory (= [Quan-
tum measurement theory] +[Classic measurement theory] ) occurs first, and considering that the theory
(one of the science) which described the law in the micro world with the language is quantum mechanics.
In this position, quantum mechanics is one of the science - although it may be a coined word of this
book, quantum engineering -. If you may think like this (i.e., if you may think that quantum measure-
ment theory is not ”physics” but a ”language” as shown in (a)), Copenhagen interpretation ((U1)–(U7) of
Chap. 1) can also be allowed to be wonderful theory (Section 3.3). Rather, the author thinks as follows
(Note 3.6).
(b) Copenhagen interpretation is not the thing of ”physics” but a thing for ”language (measurement
theory).”
Mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics was performed by von Neumann in ”The mathemat-
ical basis of quantum mechanics [32];(1932)” - formulation of the quantum mechanics by Hilbert space -.
Supposing that is right, you should just be going to consider the following (c) in detail. Namely,
(c) Although physics, such as Newtonian mechanics, electromagnetism, and the theory of relativity, is
formalized in the mathematics of differential geometry, why is quantum mechanics formalized in the
mathematics of Hilbert space? Is quantum mechanics really physics?
Supposing it is formalized in different mathematics, it is natural that we consider that it is the world
describing method of a different category. If that is right, I would like to come to think
[The realistic method]:
Physics should be formulized in differential geometry.
[The linguistic method]:
Various sciences should be formulized in Hilbert space theory.
in world description.
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Thinking in this way, in this book, we think that von Neumann proposed in ”The mathematical basis
of quantum mechanics [32]” , not only formulation of quantum mechanics but big work with one another
more, i.e.,
(d) Formulation of the linguistic side of quantum mechanics (namely, quantum measurement theory of
(a))
I think that [32] is written by me so that it can read also not as the book of physics but as a book of the
linguistic describing method. Therefore, although it becomes the upper repetition,
(e) Substantially, measurement theory was advocated in [32]. That is, although Heisenberg, Schro¨dinger,
and Born advocated the physics of quantum mechanics, von Neumann formalized the linguistic side
of quantum mechanics.
Just before Chap. 1(B), I wrote ”In order to declare a law, the language for describing the law must be
prepared before that.” However, actual history is somewhat complicated, should be corrected as follows
and should be written.
Heisenberg and others described ”the law of quantum mechanics” in the imperfect language. And
von Neumann made the imperfect language perfect.
If that is right, von Neumann’s opinion is ”changing into an idiom [Chap. 1(M2)]” i.e., reverse ”Using
an idiom” of
(f1) [(M2) in Chap. 1]:
(word is connected with world)
quantum mechanics(H)
(physics)
−−−−−−−−−→
proverbalizing
( word is independent of world )
measurement theory
(language)
Namely,
(f2)
(word is connected with world)
quantum engineering
(variuos science)
←−−−−−−−−
using proverb
( word is independent of world )
measurement theory
(language)
That is, although it becomes re-described of (a),
(g) In a language called Measurement theory
(General quantum mechanics)
, it thinks as follows.
(g1) : The theories which describe quantum phenomena are several sciences of quantum mechanics
(namely, quantum engineering).
(g2) : The theories which describe an everyday phenomenon are ordinary science (for example, equilibrium
statistical mechanics).
If it thinks in this way, I can think that quantum mechanics (quantum mechanics based on the Copenhagen
interpretation of [32] at least) is one of the various sciences - quantum engineering - instead of physics.
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(Note 3.6). Although this (g1) may not be von Neumann’s [32] intention, I would like to consider it like
this in this book.
The above is a reason for ”branch of quantum mechanics”
(h) quantum mechanics (=QM)
−→

(linguistic)
QM 1
Copenhagen interpretation−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ measurement theory −→ contined to (a)
(physical)
QM 2 −−−−−−−→ the theory of everything
in Fig 8.2. If that is right,
(i) the quantum mechanics (namely, quantum mechanics currently ordinarily taught at the university)
explained in the third chapter is not ”quantum mechanics (2)” but quantum engineering. That is, I
would like to come to consider
[quantum engineering] = [quantum mechanics based on the Copenhagen interpretation].
Supposing that is right, we would like to come to a conclusion with ”the language of measurement
theory = science(Chapter 8.3(m))” as follows.
(j) Originally Copenhagen interpretation [(U1)–(U7)] is a universal tenet for an under-
standing of engineering, and science (not being a thing of quantum mechanics).
♠ Note 9.6 Although ”whether it is (f1) or (f2)?” may be an endless dispute, we can assert one side of the
following (♯1) or (♯2) anyway. :
(♯1) If (f2) is right, quantum mechanics (= quantum engineering) and equilibrium statistical mechanics are
the greatest examples of application of measurement theory.
(♯2) If (f1) is right, measurement theory is the greatest example of application of quantum mechanics.
Although it is un-physical unique application, considering the extensiveness of science(since most science
is science), the ”greatest” description will be allowed.
Of course, in the position of this book, we will assert (♯1) — ”The measurement theory is more funda-
mental than quantum mechanics (in the sense of (f2)).” As mentioned before, the worst understanding of
measurement theory is to consider measurement theory as an ass in a lion’s skin.
♠ Note 9.7 von Neumann’s ”mathematical-basis of quantum mechanics[32]” is the book which can be read by
various methods. More precisely,
(♯1)

0©
(mathematics)
: the mathematical book of Hilbert space,
1©
(physics)
: the book of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen interpretation)
2©
(various sciences)
: the book of quantum engineering (Copenhagen interpretation)
The reading of 1© was reading of the direction which von Neumann probably meant, and though it was natural,
it won a great success. Development of a mathematics - Hilbert space theory and the operator algebra - was
greatly urged also to the reading of 0©. It may be common sense to evaluate [32] from a viewpoint of 0©
and 1© (especially 1©), and to conclude it as ”great achievements (Bible of quantum mechanics)” under the
authority of mathematics and physics. However,
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(♯2) In this book, as reading of [32], 2© is a right course, and we can evaluate [32] by this method still more
greatly.
This is because (a) and (= the draft amendment of Chap. 1 ( Y)) can be written as follows.
(♯3) enginering theory =
measurement theory
(generalized quantum theory)

quantum measurement theory
(linguistic world-view)
· · · von Neumann
classical measurement theory
(linguistic world-view)
· · · Fisher
That is, even if it says to engineering and a mouthful, it is vast and writes the genius of two poles
from Edison (master of invention) to von Neumann (advocate of Buddhist scripture [32] of quantum
engineering)
it is a broad field. However, if only a theoretical side (namely, upper (♯3)) is considered, in 6©Strong
side vs. Weak side of Note 2.9, it can be written as
Einstein
(the greatest physicist)
vs. von Neumann(or, Fisher)
(the greatest theoretical engineer)
Although von Neumann’s work is various, I think that he was always siding with ”the weak side (Section
2.4.1).” If that is right, I would like to consider 2© to be the reading of the right course of [32].
A fiction about Kant and von Neumann may be mixed too much , in this section. However, this is for
compatibility with measurement theory (fiction of whole this book), and wants a wise reader to enjoy a
”fiction” in comparison with accepted theory.
10 Axiomp
b
1 — measurement (bounded type)
Classical measurement theory is classified as follows: (Chap. 1(Y)):
classicalmeasurementtheory
{
continuous type measurement theory(Chap. 2–8)
bounded type measurement theory(Chap. I10.11)
Although continuous type measurement theory us fundamental, an exact measurement is not generally de-
fined. Thus, we shall introduce bounded type measurement theory as follows.
bounded pure type measurement theory
(language)
:=
[(bounded type )Axiom
p
b
1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[(bounded type )Axiom
pm
b
2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
In the chapter, we shall devote ourselves to the above axiom 1. This is similar Axiompb 1 (continuous pure
type) in Chap. 2. Thus, it is surely understandable.
10.1 State and Observable — Primary quantity and Secondary quantity
In continuous type measurement theory(Chap. 2–8), continuous function (i.e., the element of C(Ω) ) plays
an important role. On the other hand, a bounded function is main in bounded type measurement theory.
Since it is a small change, readers can easily understand the bounded type measurement theory.
Consider a locally compact space Ω and measure space (Ω,BΩ, ν), where BΩ is the Borel field of Ω,
that is, the smallest σ-field that contains all open sets. Further assume that
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(a) 0 < ν(U) ≦∞ (∀ open set U), and ν is σ-finite.
A Banach space Lr(Ω, ν) (where, r = 1,∞) is the space composed of all complex valued measurable
functionf : Ω→ R with the norm ‖f‖Lr(Ω,ν) <∞ where the norm ‖f‖Lr(Ω,ν) is defined by
‖f‖Lr(Ω,ν) =

∫
Ω
|f(ω)| dν(ω) (when r = 1)
ess.sup
ω∈Ω
|f(ω)| (when r =∞)
(10.1)
Here,
ess.supω∈Ω|f(ω)| = sup{a ∈ R | ν({ω ∈ Ω : |f(ω)| ≧ a }) > 0}
A function f (∈ L∞(Ω, ν)) is said to be essential continuous at ω0(∈ Ω) if there exists a function g
(∈ L∞(Ω, ν)) that satisfies the following (b) :
(b) g : Ω→ R is continuous at ω0 and ν({ω ∈ Ω | f(ω) 6= g(ω)}) = 0.
In this case, the value f(ω0) is defined by g(ω0).
0
not essentially continuous at ω1, essentially continuous at ω2
(Ω, ν)ω1 ω2
Figure 10.1: Essentially continuity
♠ Note 10.1 It, of course, holds that C(Ω) ⊆ L∞(Ω, ν). Also, the space L∞(Ω, ν) is necessary as a consequence
of quantum mechanics ( as mentioned in Note 2.1).
Following Definition 2.1 in C(Ω), we have the following definition:
Definition 10.1 [Observable, state space, state, measured value space, measured value] The
triple O=(X,F , F ) is called an observable in L∞(Ω, ν), it it satisfies:
(i) X is a set, and F (⊆ P(X)={Ξ | Ξ ⊆ X}) is a σ-field.
(ii) The map F : F → L∞(Ω, ν) satisfies::
(a) Ξ ∈ F =⇒ F (Ξ) ≧ 0 (ν-a.e.)
(b) F (∅) = 0 and F (X) = 1 (ν-a.e.),
(c) [Completely countability]: For any countable decomposition {Ξ1,Ξ2, . . . ,Ξn, . . .}
(
that is, Ξ =
∞⋃
n=1
Ξn, Ξn ∈ F , (n = 1, 2, . . .), Ξm ∩ Ξn = ∅ (m 6= n)
)
of any Ξ (∈ F), it holds that
∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)ρ(ω) dν(ω) = lim
N→∞
N∑
n=1
∫
Ω
[F (Ξn)](ω)ρ(ω) ν(dω) (∀ρ ∈ L1(Ω, ν))
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Here, Ω ( or, (Ω,BΩ, ν) ) is called a state space, its element ω(∈ Ω) is called a state. Also, X and x(∈ X)
is respectively called a measured value space and measured value . In addition, if F (Ξ) = (F (Ξ))2
holds for any Ξ( ∈ F), the (X,F , F ) is called a projective observable.
The following theorem is clear.
Theorem 10.2 If O = (X,F , F ) is an observable in C(Ω), the it is the observable in L∞(Ω,BΩ, ν).
The following examples ( Example 10.3–Example 10.5 ) are similar to the examples in Chap. 2.
Example 10.3 [(i):Exact observable (cf. Example 2.5)] Define the observable O(exa) = (Ω,BΩ, F (exa))
in L∞(Ω,BΩ, ν) such that
[F (exa)(Ξ)](ω) = χ
Ξ
(ω) =

1 (ω ∈ Ξ( ∈ BΩ))
0 (ω /∈ Ξ( ∈ BΩ)).
where χ is the characteristic function This O(exa) is called the exact observable. As mentioned in Example
2.5, the O(exa) is no necessarily the observable in C(Ω).
[(ii):Existence observable (cf. Example 2.2)] As mentioned in Example 2.2, we can define existence
observable O(exi)=(X, {∅, X}, F (exi)) in L∞(Ω, ν) such that
F (exi)(∅) = 0, F (exi)(X) = 1, (ν-a.e.).
Example 10.4 [Normal observable(cf. Example 2.11)] Put Ω = R(= the real line) or, Ω = [a, b] (=
the interval ⊆ R). Consider the Lebesgue measure m(dω)(= dω). Assume that σ > 0 is the standard
deviation. Define the normal observable OGσ=(R,BR, Gσ) in L∞(Ω,m) such that
[Gσ(Ξ)](ω) =
1√
2πσ2
∫
Ξ
e−
(x−ω)2
2σ2 dx (∀Ξ ∈ BR, ∀ω ∈ Ω)
This is also the observable in C(Ω).
Example 10.5 [Round observable(Example 2.6)] Consider the state space Ω by the interval [0, 100]
with the Lebesgue measure dω. For each n ∈ N10010 ={0, 10, 20, . . . , 100}, define the function gn : Ω→ [0, 1]
such that
gn(ω) =

0 (0 ≦ ω ≦ n− 5)
1 (n− 5 < ω ≦ n+ 5)
0 (n+ 5 < ω ≦ 100)
Here, define the ORND = (Y (=N10010 ), 2
Y , GRND) by
[GRND(∅)](ω) = 0, [GRND(Y )](ω) = 1 [GRND(Γ)](ω) =
∑
n∈Γ
gn(ω) (∀Γ ∈ 2Y = 2N10010 )
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Then, the ORND = (Y (=N10010 ), 2
Y , GRND) is an projective observable in L
∞([0, 100]). But, it is not an
observable in C([0, 100]).
10.2 Axiompb 1 (Bounded type measurement)
10.2.1 Axiompb 1 (bounded type)
With any classical system S, a basic algebra [C(Ω), L∞(Ω, ν)] (or in short, L∞(Ω, ν) ) can be associated
in which measurement theory of that system can be formulated. A state of the system S is represented by
a state ω(∈ Ω, i.e., a state space ). Also, an observable is represented by O ≡ (X,F , F ) in the L∞(Ω, ν).
The measurement of an observable O for a system with a state ω is represented byML∞(Ω)
(
O, S[ω]
)
(or,,
ML∞(Ω,ν)
(
O, S[ω]
)
). Also, by measurement ML∞(Ω)
(
O, S[ω]
)
, a measured value x ( ∈ X) is obtained.
By the same way of Axiompb 1 [(continuous type ) measurement] in Sec.2.2, we can introduce Axiom
p
b
1 [(bounded type ) measurement] as follow.
Axiompb 1 (measurement : bounded pure type)
Consider a measurement ML∞(Ω)
(
O= (X, F , F ), S[ω]
)
formulated in a basic algebra
[C(Ω), L∞(Ω, ν)]. The probability that a measured value x ( ∈ X) obtained by the measurement
ML∞(Ω)
(
O, S[ω]
)
belongs to Ξ ( ∈ F) is give by [F (Ξ)](ω), if F (Ξ) is essentally continuous at ω.
It is a matter of course that Axiompb 1 should be use according to the Copenhagen interpretation
[[(U1)–(U7)] in Chap. 1.
Remark 10.6 When F (Ξ) is not essentially continuous at ω(∈ Ω), the sample probability space
(X,F , [F (·)](ω)) is not a mathematical probability space.
10.2.2 Simple examples — Urn problem and so on
The following examples ( Example 10.7, Example 10.8 ) are similar to the examples in Chap. 2.
The bounded type measurement theory is similar to continuous type. Thus, we introduce only typical
examples.
Example 10.7 [The exact measurement of temperature(Sec.1.2(V))] Consider the exact measure-
ment for the water with the temperature ω0
◦C. Put Ω = X = [0, 100]. Let Lebesgue measure space
(Ω,BΩ,m) be a state. Consider the exact observable O(exa) = (X,BX , F (exa)) in L∞(Ω,m). Then, wa say
that
Assume that a measured value x0(∈ X=Ω) is obtained by]the exact measurementML∞(Ω)(O(exa), S[ω0]).
Then, we can surely say that x0 = ω0.
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That is because:
Let D(⊆ Ω = X) be any open set such that ω0 ∈ D. Then, the probability that x0 ∈ D is given by
[F (exa)(D)](ω0) = χD (ω0) = 1. Therefore, from the arbitrarity of D, we see that x0 = ω0.
This completes the proof.
The following is a bounded type measurement version of Example 2.10.
Example 10.8 [Example 2.10 [Bounded type measurement version of the urn problem] There
are two urns U1 and U2. The urn U1 [resp. U2] contains 8 white and 2 black balls [resp. 4 white and 6
black balls] (cf. Fig. 2.5).
[I]: Here, consider the following phenomenon:
(a) Pick out one ball at random from the urn U2. Then the probability that the ball is white is given
by 0.4.
This statement in ordinary language will be translated to the statement (b) of measurement theory in
what follows.
Consider the state space Ω = {ω1.ω2} with the discrete metric dD and with the measure ν such that
ν({ω1}) = 1, ν({ω2}) = 1.
(It is also possible to assume that ν({ω1}) = 2 and ν({ω2}) = 3 ). Further, assume that
U1 · · · “the urn with the state ω1”
U2 · · · “the urn with the state ω2”
And thus, we consider the following identification:
U1 ≈ ω1, U2 ≈ ω2,
Put “w” = “white”, “b” = “black” , and put X = {w, b}. And define the observable O( ≡ (X ≡
{w, b}, 2{w,b}, F )) in L∞(Ω, ν) by
[F ({w})](ω1) = 0.8, [F ({b})](ω1) = 0.2,
[F ({w})](ω2) = 0.4, [F ({b})](ω2) = 0.6.
Thus, we have the measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)(O, S[ω2])
Here, Axiompb 1(page 152) says that
(b) the probability that a measured value b is obtained by MC(Ω)(O, S[δω2 ]) is given by
F ({b})(ω1) = 0.6
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Now we can present the following theorem.
Theorem 10.9 [Exact measurement] Consider the exact observableO(exa) = (X,F , F (exa)) in L∞(Ω, ν).
Assume that a measured value x (∈ X) is obtained by the exact measurementML∞(Ω,ν)(O(exa), S[ω0]). The,
the probability that x = ω0 is equal to 1.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof in Example 10.7. Let D(⊆ Ω = X) be any open set such
that ω0 ∈ D. Then, the probability that x0 ∈ D is given by [F (exa)(D)](ω0) = χD (ω0) = 1. Therefore,
from the arbitrarity of D, we see that x0 = ω0. This completes the proof.
10.3 System quantity — The origin of observables
In classical mechanics, the term ”observable” usually means the continuous real valued function on a state
space (that is, physical quantity) An observable in measurement theory is characterized as the natural
generalization of the physical quantity. This will be explained in the following examples.
Example 10.10 [System quantity] Let L∞(Ω, ν) be a basic algebra. A continuous real valued function
f˜ : Ω → R ( or generally, a measurable real valued function f˜ : Ω → Rn ) is called a system quantity (or
in short, quantity) on Ω. Define the projective observable O = (R,BR, F ) in L∞(Ω, ν) such that
[F (Ξ)](ω) =

1 when ω ∈ f˜−1(Ξ)
0 when ω /∈ f˜−1(Ξ)
(∀Ξ ∈ BR)
Here, note that
f˜(ω) = lim
N→∞
N2∑
n=−N2
n
N
[
F
(
[
n
N
,
n+ 1
N
)
)]
(ω) =
∫
R
λ[F (dλ)](ω)
Thus, we have the following identification:
f˜
(system quantity on Ω)
←→ O = (R,BR, F )
(projective observable in L∞(Ω, ν))
(10.2)
This O is called the observable representation of a system quantityf˜ . Therefore, we say that
(a) An observable in measurement theory is characterized as the natural generalization of the physical
quantity.
Here, recall the identification (3.2), which is the quantum version of the identification (10.2).
Example 10.11 [Position observable , momentum observable , energy observable ] Consider
Newtonian mechanics in the basic algebra L∞(Ω, ν). For simplicity, consider the two dimensional space
Ω = Rq × Rp={(q, p) = (position,momentum) | q, p ∈ R}
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The following quantities are fundamental:
(♯1) :q˜ : Ω→ R, q˜(q, p) =q (∀(q, p) ∈ Ω)
(♯2) :p˜ : Ω→ R, p˜(q, p) =p (∀(q, p) ∈ Ω)
(♯3) :e˜ : Ω→ R, e˜(q, p) =[potential energy ] + [kinetic energy ]
=U(q) +
p2
2m
(Hamiltonian)
(∀(q, p) ∈ Ω)
where, m is the mass of a particle Under the identification (10.2), (♯1) and (♯2) is respectively called a
position observable and a momentum observable.
In what follows, we shall introduce Schro¨dinger equation.
♠ Note 10.2 The Hamiltonian H(q, p) = p2
2m
+ U(q) produces classical and quantum kinetic equations.
(♯1) Classical case:[Newtonian equation]
”the simple case of (9.1)” =
{
dp
dt
= −H(q,p)
∂q
= − dU
dq
dq
dt
= H(q,p)
∂p
= p
m
(♯1) quantum case:[Schro¨dinger equation]
~
√−1∂ut(q)
∂t
= H(q, ~√−1
∂
∂q
)ut(q) = − ~
2
2m
∂2ut(q)
∂q2
+ U(q)ut(q)
The solution {ut}t∈R of Schro¨dinger equation represents the state change.
For each k = 1, 2, . . . , n, consder an observable Ok = (Xk, Fk, Fk) in L∞(Ω, ν). And consider the
simultaneous observable×nk=1Ok = (×k∈K Xk, ⊠ nk=1Fk, ×nk=1 Fk), which is defined by the same way
of Definition 2.14.
The following theorem is clear.
Theorem 10.12 [Exact measurement and system quantity] Let O
(exa)
0 = (X,F , F (exa)) (i.e.,
(X,F , F (exa)) = (Ω,BΩ, χ) ) be the exact observable in L∞(Ω, ν). Let O1 = (R,BR, G) be the observable
that is induced by a quantity g˜ : Ω → R as in Example 9.6. Consider the simultaneous observable
O
(exa)
0 ×O1. Let (x, y) (∈ X × R) be a measured value obtained by the simultaneous measurement
ML∞(Ω,ν)(O
(exa)
0 ×O1, S[δω]). Then, we can surely believe that x = ω, and y = g˜(ω).
Proof. Let D0(∈ BΩ) be any open set such that ω(∈ Ω=X). Also, let D1(∈ BR) be any open
set such that g˜(ω) ∈ D1. The probability that a measured value (x, y) obtained by the measurement
ML∞(Ω,ν)(O
(exa)
0 ×O1, S[δω]) belongs to D0 ×D1 is given by χD0 (ω) · χg˜−1(D1)(ω) = 1. Since D0 and D1
are arbitrary, we can surely believe that x = ω and y = g˜(ω).
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10.4 Measurement theoretical Kolmogorov extension theorem
We consider that
(a) The utility of Kolmogorov extension theorem in probability theory is due to Theorem 10.13 (mea-
surement theory version of Kolmogorov extension theorem)
This will be asserted in this section.
In this section we study “Kolmogorov’s extension theorem” in the measurement theory. It is generally
said that Kolmogorov’s extension theorem is most fundamental in Kolmogorov’s probability theory. That
is because this theorem assures the existence of a probability space (i.e., sample space). On the other hand,
our theorem (= Theorem 10.1, i.e., Kolmogorov’s extension theorem in measurement theory) assures the
existence of a measurement (or, observable). Recall the our spirit
(
see Remark (in §2.3(I))
)
:
(♯) there is no probability without measurements.
Thus, in measurement theory, the concept of “measurement” is more fundamental than that of “sample
space”. Therefore, this theorem (i.e., Kolmogorov’s extension theorem in measurement theory) is very
important in measurement theory. That is, this theorem (= Theorem 10.1) is essential to measurement
theory just like Kolmogorov’s extension theorem is so in his probability theory. Using this theorem, we
can define “particle’s trajectory” by “the sequence of measured values”. And further we prove:
(i) the existence of “particle’s trajectory” in Newtonian mechanics,
(ii) the existence of Brownian motion.
Thus, we can understand the difference between the concepts of “particle’s trajectory” and “state’s
evolution” in both classical and quantum mechanics.
Let Λ̂ be an index set. For each λ ∈ Λ̂, consider a set Xλ. For any subsets Λ1 ⊆ Λ2( ⊆ Λ̂), πΛ1,Λ2 is
the natural projection such that:
πΛ1,Λ2 : ×
λ∈Λ2
Xλ −→ ×
λ∈Λ1
Xλ.
Especially, put πΛ = πΛ,Λ̂. For each λ ∈ Λ̂, consider an observable (Xλ,Fλ, Fλ) in L∞(Ω, ν). Note that
the quasi-product observable O ≡ (×λ∈Λ̂Xλ,×λ∈Λ̂Fλ, FΛ̂) of { (Xλ,Fλ, Fλ) | λ ∈ Λ̂ } is characterized
as the observable such that:
FΛ̂(π
−1
{λ}(Ξλ)) = Fλ(Ξλ) (∀Ξλ ∈ Fλ, ∀λ ∈ Λ̂), (10.2)
though the existence and the uniqueness of a quasi-product observable are not guaranteed in general. The
following theorem says something about the existence and uniqueness of the quasi-product observable.
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Let Λ˜ be a set. For each λ ∈ Λ˜, consider a set Xλ. For any subset Λ1 ⊆ Λ2( ⊆ Λ˜), define the natural
map πΛ1,Λ2 :×λ∈Λ2 Xλ −→×λ∈Λ1 Xλ by
×
λ∈Λ2
Xλ ∋ (xλ)λ∈Λ2 7→ (xλ)λ∈Λ1 ∈ ×
λ∈Λ1
Xλ (10.3)
The following theorem guarantees the existence and uniqueness of observable . It should be noted that
this is due to Chap. 1the Copenhagen interpretation(U4)), i.e., ”only one measurement is permitted”.
Theorem 10.13 [measurement theoretical version of Kolmogorov extension theorem ( cf. [11]
) ) ] For each λ ∈ Λ̂, consider a Borel measurable space (Xλ,Fλ), where Xλ is a separable complete
metric space. Define the set P0(Λ̂) such as P0(Λ̂) ≡ {Λ ⊆ Λ̂ | Λ is finite }. Assume that the family of
the observables
{
OΛ ≡ ( ×λ∈ΛXλ, ×λ∈Λ Fλ, FΛ ) | Λ ∈ P0(Λ̂) } in L∞(Ω, ν) satisfies the following
“consistency condition”:
• for any Λ1, Λ2 ∈ P0(Λ̂) such that Λ1 ⊆ Λ2,
FΛ2
(
π−1Λ1,Λ2(ΞΛ1)
)
= FΛ1
(
ΞΛ1
)
(∀ΞΛ1 ∈ ×
λ∈Λ1
Fλ). (10.4)
Then, there uniquely exists the observable O˜Λ̂ ≡
(×λ∈Λ̂Xλ,×λ∈Λ̂ Fλ, F˜Λ̂) in L∞(Ω, ν) such that:
F˜Λ̂
(
π−1Λ (ΞΛ)
)
= FΛ
(
ΞΛ
)
(∀ΞΛ ∈ ×
λ∈Λ
Fλ, ∀Λ ∈ P0(Λ̂)). (10.5)
Proof. For the proof, see [11].
Corollary 10.14 [Infinite simultaneous observable ] For each k ∈ K ≡ {1, 2, ..., |K|}, consider an
observable Ok ≡ (Xk,Fk, Fk) in L∞(Ω, ν). If the commutativity condition:
Fk1(Ξk1 )Fk2(Ξk2 ) = Fk2(Ξk2 )Fk1(Ξk1 ) (∀Ξk1 ∈ Fk1 , ∀Ξk2 ∈ Fk2 , k1 6= k2)
holds, then we can uniquely construct a product observable O˜ ≡ (×k∈K Xk, ⊠ k∈KFk, F˜ ≡×k∈K Fk)
such that:
F˜ (Ξ1×Ξ2× · · ·×Ξ|K|) = F1(Ξ1)F2(Ξ2) · · ·F|K|(Ξ|K|).
The product observable is also called a simultaneous observable.
(ii): Even if K is infinite, the product observable similarly exists.
Consider a basic structure [C(Ω);L∞(Ω, ν)]. Let Λ˜ be a set. For each λ ∈ Λ˜, assume that Xλ is a
separable complete metric space, Fλ is its Borel field. For each λ ∈ Λ˜, consider an observable Oλ =
(Xλ,Fλ, Fλ) in L∞(Ω, ν). Then, a simultaneous observable Ô = (×λ∈Λ˜Xλ, ⊠ λ∈Λ˜Fλ, F̂=×λ∈Λ˜ Fλ)
uniquely exists. That is, for any finite setΛ0(⊆ Λ˜), it holds that
F̂
(
( ×
λ∈Λ0
Ξλ)× ( ×
λ∈Λ˜\Λ0
Xλ)
)
= ×
λ∈Λ0
Fλ(Ξλ) (∀Ξλ ∈ Fλ, ∀λ ∈ Λ0)
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of Theorem 10.13. Thus, it is omitted.
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♠ Note 10.3 if ”continuous type measurement” is compared with ”bounded type measurement”, the former
may be essential, but the latter is handy from the mathematical point of view.
♠ Note 10.4 In basic algebra [C(Ω);L∞(Ω, ν)], a mixed state ρ (∈ L1(Ω)) is defined by
ρ ≧ 0,
∫
Ω
ρ(ω)ν(dω) = 1
Then we have the following.
Axiommb 1 (measurement (bounded · mixed type ))
Consider a mixed measurement ML∞(Ω,ν)
(
O= (X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ)
)
in basic algebra L∞(Ω, ν). Then, the
probability P (Ξ) that a measured value obtained byML∞(Ω,ν)
(
O= (X,F , F ), S[∗](ρ)
)
belongs to Ξ(∈ F)
is given by
P (Ξ) =
∫
Ω
[F (Ξ)](ω)ρ(ω)ν(dω)
11 Axiompm
b
2 - causality (bounded type)
Same as continued type measurement theory, bounded type measurement theory is formalized as follows:
Thus, we shall introduce bounded type measurement theory as follows.
bounded pure type measurement theory
(language)
:=
[(bounded type )Axiom
p
b
1]
measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[(bounded type )Axiom
pm
b
2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
In this chapter, I explain the bounded type Axiompmb 2. Since there is a close resemblance between it and
”continuation and pure type measurement theory of Chapter 6 (Axiompmc 2)”, you should be able to read
easily. However, you should be cautious of a tree semi-ordered set T not being necessarily a finite set.
Bounded type measurement theory has a field including a vast domain, and when writing out, there is no
end. Therefore, in this chapter, it extracted only to Zeno’s paradox and the argument of the circumference
of it.
11.1 Zeno’s paradox — Flying arrow is not moving.
In this section, I explain the meaning of Zeno’s paradox.
11.1.1 Movement function method
In this book, movement function method is considered as follows. Movement function method is the
quantitative describing method of ”movement and change”, and if it is called a time-position function
method, you may not have misunderstanding. Namely,
(A1) In order to express movement and change, x of a position of a particle is denoted by function of time
t. That is, the time-position function x = q(t) expresses change of the position of each time (for
example, a position, height, academic ability, GDP of a country, etc.) .
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Of course, we studied the movement function method in elementary school as follows.{
q(t2)−q(t1)
t2−t1 = v, this is called a speed if ii does not depend on (t1, t2 (t1 < t2)
q(0) = a
The time-position function q(t) = vt+ a can be found from easy calculation. We think
(A2) Movement function method (= time-position function method) is a kind of world-view such as
describe movement and change quantitatively with a time-position function
If I have a worldly way of speaking, ”See movement and change through prejudice called movement function
method.”
♠ 11.1 For completeness, again recall
(X1)
(Chap. 1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic method
(world is before language)
2©linguistic method
(language is before world)
Out problem is
Where do we discuss the movement function method, 0©, 1© or 2© ?
Usually, we may argue in 0© as elementary and junior high school students’ problem. However, if we persist
in Position 3.5 of this book, naturally
Movement function method should be described in 2©.
11.1.2 Zeno’s paradox — Why is it paradox?—
As mentioned in problem 5.1, Zeno(BC490-BC430) considered the following problem about 2500 years
ago.:
Problem 11.1 [Problem 5.1 (same as the arrow which is flying (movement function method))]
(B1) [Problem]: Is the flying arrow moving? Here, of course, ”flying arrow” is one symbol of movement
and change such as ”running tortoise” ”the growth of rice”, ”the flying migratory birds”, ”the growth
of economy of the country” and so on.
(B12) [Zeno’s answer] Assume that the arrow is flying. This arrow has stopped at the time of when at that
moment. If it has stopped at the time of when at the moment, it will always have stopped, and the
arrow will have stopped, therefore it will not move.
(B22) [The answer using movement function method] In every time t, the position of the arrow becomes
settled as a value of a time-position function q(t). However, we cannot conclude that time-position
function x = q(t) is a constant function (i.e., function with a constant value). After all, we say ”The
flying arrow which is moving.”
(B3) [Problem] Of course, the problem which Zeno raised is the next.
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Which shall you choose between Zeno’s answer(B12) and a common sense answer(B
2
2)? Or what
is the basis as which you choose a common sense answer(B22)? Furthermore, a time-position
function method (= movement function method) will not be a physical law, and the empirical
validation of it will also be impossible. Although that is right, why do you believe and use a
time-position function method? What is the basis?
If it puts in another way ,
(♯) What is the best linguistic science language which includes a time-position function method (=
movement function method)?
I will summarize the above and will write in the style of a fiction.
Zeno’s paradox
(C1) About 2500 years ago, Zeno showed us ”the perfect logic of the arrow which flies(B
1
2) .”
(C2) We refuted it by ”movement function method(A2)” like (B
2
2), and answered with confidence ”It
is an easy problem, Mr. Zeno.”
(C3) At this time, Zeno brought forth a counterargument as follows immediately. :
Movement function method is mystic words which cannot carry out empirical validation.
Why do you believe and use such random and irresponsible movement function method?
Is it science?
(C4) We have to reply something to Zeno. And, of course, we have continued thinking earnestly 2500
years. However, we cannot yet answer.
Of course, we become silent in (C4) because we are caught by the realistic method. Moreover, it is
because we feel inferior in asserting dignifiedly the mathematics of the form where it was somehow buried
into ordinary language - statistics and dynamical system theory -. Namely,
(C5) It is because we cannot have the confidence to which we retort to Zeno ”We can answer easily in
statistics and dynamical system theory(that is, as the easy case of an equation of state (1.1)).”
Probably, it is good although the price for which statistics and dynamical system theory have depended
on two authority (Mathematics and Application) has turned.
However, in the position of this book which considers two classifications of world description (Chap. 1
(O) ):
world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

1©realistic method
(world is before language)
2©linguistic method
(language is before world)
it is as follows.
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(C6) We are not in the extravagant situation where we choose the logic of Zeno(B
1
2) and the common
sense answer(B12). That is, we know only a language called measurement theory as a language which
describes science, and we cannot but describe by it. And then, what was described is ”the world of
the arrow which flies.” (Chapter 8.1(m)).
Although I will answer this in Answer 11.11, some preparations of (Section 11.2–Section 11.4) are needed
before that.
♠ Note 11.2 Although Zeno’s paradox has some types elsewhere(”Achilles and a tortoise”, ”dichotomy”, ”sta-
dium”, etc.), ”the arrow which flies” expresses the essence of the problem exactly and is the first masterpiece.
However, since ”Achilles and the tortoise” may be more famous, I will also describe this. The line of argument
of Zeno about ”the paradox of Achilles and a tortoise” is as follows. :,
I consider competition of Achilles and a tortoise. Let the start point of a tortoise (a late runner) be the
front from the starting point of Achilles (a quick runner). Suppose that both started simultaneously.
If Achilles tries to pass a tortoise, Achilles has to go to the place in which a tortoise is present now.
However, then, the tortoise should have gone ahead more. Achilles has to go to the place in which
a tortoise is present now further. Even Achilles continues this infinite, he can never catch up with a
tortoise.
Generally, you may suppose ”Achilles and a tortoise are the problems of infinite geometrical progression.”
That is, the time-position function of Achilles and a tortoise is set to x = q1(t) = vt and y = q2(t) = γvt+ a,
respectively. (0 < γv < v, a > 0). Here, you may think that you can solve by calculating the solution
s0 =
a
(1−γ)v
to q1(s0) = q2(s0) by the infinite geometrical progression
s0 =
a
v
(1 + γ + γ2 + γ3 + ...) =
a
(1− γ)v
.
However, if it is a problem finished now, they will say that the philosophers who have continued considering
Zeno’s paradox 2500 years are foolish.
11.2 Causal operator, predual causal operator, deterministic causal map
Like Chap. 10, assume a state space Ω (i.e., locally compact space Ω ) and a measure space (Ω,BΩ, ν)
satisfying the condition (a) in Sec.10.1.
Definition 11.2 [Causal operator, deterministic causal map] Let [C(Ω1), L
∞(Ω1, ν1)] and [C(Ω2),
L∞(Ω2, ν2)] be basic structures. A continuous linear operator Φ1,2 : L∞(Ω2, ν2)→ L∞(Ω1, ν1) is called a
causal operator, if it satisfies the following (i) and (ii):
(i) for any f2(∈ C(Ω2)), there exists Φ1,2f2 ∈ C(Ω1), and further, the operator Φ1,2 : C(Ω2) → C(Ω1)
is the causal operator in the sense of Definition 6.2.
(ii) There exists a continuous linear operator [Φ1,2]∗ : L1(Ω1, ν1)→ L1(Ω2, ν2) such that∫
Ω1
[Φ1,2f2](ω1) · ρ1(ω1) ν1(dω1) =
∫
Ω2
f2(ω2) · ([Φ1,2]∗ρ1) (ω2) ν2(dω2)
(∀ρ1 ∈ L1(Ω1, ν1), ∀f2 ∈ L∞(Ω2, ν2))
This [Φ1,2]∗ is called the pre-dual causal operator .
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In addition, the causal operatorΦ1,2 : L
∞(Ω2, ν2)→ L∞(Ω1, ν1) is called a deterministic causal oper-
ator, if there exists a continuous map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 such that
(Φ1,2f2)(ω1) = f2(φ1,2(ω1)) (a.e. ω1, ∀f2 ∈ L∞(Ω2))
Also, the continuous map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 is said to be a deterministic causal map.
Theorem 11.3 [Causal operator and observable ] For any observable (X,F , F2) in L∞(Ω2, ν2), the
(X,F ,Φ1,2F2) is an observable in L∞(Ω1, ν1), which is denoted by Φ12O2.
Proof. it is easy to see that, for any countable decomposition {Ξj}∞j=1 of Ξ, (Ξj , Ξ ∈ F), it holds that∫
Ω1
ρ1(ω1) · [Φ1,2F2(Ξ)](ω1) ν1(dω1) =
∫
Ω2
([Φ1,2]∗ρ1)(ω2) · [F2(Ξ)](ω2) ν2(dω2)
=
∫
Ω2
([Φ1,2]∗ρ1)(ω2) · [F2(
∞⋃
i=1
Ξi)](ω2) ν2(dω2) = lim
N→∞
∫
Ω2
([Φ1,2]∗ρ1)(ω2) ·
N∑
i=1
[F2(Ξi)](ω2) ν2(dω2)
= lim
N→∞
∫
Ω1
ρ1(ω1) ·
N∑
i=1
[Φ1,2F2(Ξi)](ω1) ν1(dω1)
Thus, by Definition 10.1, we get the proof.
Theorem 11.4 Any deterministic causal operator Φ1,2 : L
∞(Ω2, ν2)→ L∞(Ω1, ν1) satisfies
Φ1,2(f2) · Φ1,2(g2) = Φ1,2(f2 · g2) ( ∀f2, ∀g2 ∈ L∞(Ω2, ν2))
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Theorem 6.5. We can omit it.
Theorem 11.5 [Continuous map and deterministic causal map] [Continuous map and deterministic
causal map in classical systems].
Let (Ω1,BΩ1 , ν1) and (Ω2,BΩ2 , ν2) be measure spaces. Assume that a continuous map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2
satisfies:
D2 ∈ BΩ2 , ν2(D2) = 0 =⇒ ν1(φ−11,2(D2)) = 0.
Then, the continuous map φ1,2 : Ω1 → Ω2 is deterministic, that is, the operator Φ1,2 : L∞(Ω2, ν2) →
L∞(Ω1, ν1) defined by (11.5) is a deterministic causal operator.
Proof. For each ρ1 ∈ L1(Ω1, ν1), define a measure µ2 on (Ω2,BΩ2) such that
µ2(D2) =
∫
φ−11,2(D2)
ρ1(ω1) ν1(dω1) (∀D2 ∈ BΩ2)
Then, it suffices to consider the Radon-Nikodym derivative [Φ1,2]∗(ρ1) = dµ2/dν2. That is because
D2 ∈ BΩ2 , ν2(D2) = 0 =⇒ ν1(φ−11,2(D2)) = 0 =⇒ µ2(D2) = 0
Thus, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem, we get a continuous linear operator [Φ1,2]∗ : L1(Ω1, ν1) →
L1(Ω2, ν2).
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11.3 Bounded type Axiompmb 2 (causality )
Let (T,≤) be a tree-like partial ordered set, i.e., a partial ordered set such that
“t1 ≦ t3 and t2 ≦ t3” =⇒ “t1 ≦ t2 or t2 ≦ t1”
Put T 2≤ = {(t1, t2) ∈ T 2 : t1 ≤ t2}. An element t0 ∈ T is called a root if t0 ≤ t (∀t ∈ T ) holds. If T has the
root t0, we sometimes denote T by T (t0). T
′(⊆ T ) is called lower bounded if there exists an element ti(∈ T )
such that ti ≦ t (∀t ∈ T ′). Therefore, if T has the root, any T ′(⊆ T ) is lower bounded. We always assume
that T is complete, that is, for any T ′(⊆ T ) which is lower bounded, there exists an element InfT (T ′)(∈ T )
that satisfies the following (i) and (ii):
(i) InfT (T
′) ≦ t (∀t ∈ T ′)
(ii) If s ≦ t (∀t ∈ T ′), then it holds that s ≦ InfT (T ′)
///
In this book, we are not concerned with the topology (or metric) of the T .
Definition 11.6 [Sequential causal operator, sequential observable] A family {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2)→
L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ is called a causal relation (or, causal relation ), if it satisfies the following conditions
(i) and (ii).
(i) With each t (∈ T ), a basic algebra L∞(Ωt, νt) is associated.
(ii) For every (t1, t2) ∈ T 2≤, a causal operator Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2) → L∞(Ωt1 , νt1) is defined such that
Φt1,t2Φt2,t3 = Φt1,t3 holds for all (t1, t2), (t2, t3) ∈ T 2≤.
Let an observable Ot ≡ (Xt,Ft, Ft) in L∞(Ωt, νt) be given for each t ∈ T . The pair [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 :
L∞(Ωt2 , νt2) → L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ ] is called a sequential observable which is denoted by [OT ], i.e.,
[OT ] ≡ [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2)→ L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≤ ]. ///
Let (T (t0), ≦ ) be a tree with the root t0. For each t ∈ T , define the separable complete metric space
Xt, and the Borel field BXt , and further, define the observable Ot=(Xt,Ft, Ft) in L∞(Ωt, νt). That is, we
have a sequential observable [OT (t0)] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2)→ L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ].
Here, define, P0(T ) (= P0(T (t0)) ⊆ P(T )) such that
P0(T (t0))
={T ′ ⊆ T | T ′ is finite, t0 ∈ T ′ and satisfies InfT ′S = InfTS (∀S ⊆ T ′)}
Let T ′(t0) ∈ P0(T (t0)). Since (T ′(t0), ≦ ) is finite, we can put (T ′={t0, t1, . . . , tN}, π : T ′ \ {t0} → T ′),
where π is a parent map.
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Now, consider the sequential observable [{Ot}t∈T ′ , {Φπ(t),t : L∞(Ωt, νt)→ L∞(Ωπ(t), νπ(t))}t∈T ′\{t0} ].
For each s ( ∈ T ′), putting Ts = {t ∈ T ′ | t ≧ s}, define the observable Ôs=(×t∈Ts Xt, ×t∈Ts Ft, F̂s) in
L∞(Ωt, νt) such that
Ôs =

Os (s ∈ T ′ \ π(T ′) and )
Os×( ×
t∈π−1({s})
Φπ(t),tÔt) (s ∈ π(T ′) and )
And further, iteratively, we get Ôt0=(×t∈T ′ Xt,×t∈T ′ Ft, F̂t0), which is also denoted by ÔT ′=(×t∈T ′ Xt,
×t∈T ′ Ft, F̂T ′).
For any subsets T1 ⊆ T2( ⊆ T ), define the natural projection πT1,T2 :×t∈T2 Xt −→×t∈T1 Xt by
×
t∈T2
Xt ∋ (xt)t∈T2 7→ (xt)t∈T1 ∈ ×
t∈T1
Xt
Assume that the observables
{
ÔT ′=(×t∈T ′ Xt,×t∈T ′ Ft, F̂T ′) | T ′ ∈ P0(T ) } in L∞(Ωt0 , νt0) satisfy
the following consistency condition, that is,
for any T1, T2 (∈ P0(T )) such that T1 ⊆ T2, it holds that
F̂T2
(
π−1T1,T2(ΞT1)
)
= F̂T1
(
ΞT1
)
(∀ΞT1 ∈ ×
t∈T1
Ft)
Then, by Theorem 10.13[ Kolmogorov extension theorem in measurement theory], there uniquely exists
the observable ÔT =
(×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈T Ft, F̂T ) in L∞(Ωt0 , νt0) such that:
F̂T
(
π−1T0,T (ΞT0)
)
= F̂T0
(
ΞT0
)
(∀ΞT0 ∈ ⊠
t∈T0
Ft, ∀T0 ∈ P0(T ))
This observable ÔT = (×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈T Ft, F̂T ) is called the realization of the sequential observable
[OT (t0)] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2) → L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ].
Summing up the essential part of the above argument, we can propose the following axiom, which
corresponds to Axiompmc 2 (Causality: page 109).
Axiompmb 2 (causality : bounded type )
(i) A chain of causalities
A chain of causalities is represented by a, sequential causal operator
{Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2)→ L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦
(ii) Realized causal observable
A sequential observable
[OT (t0)]=[{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2)→ L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ]
is realized by its realized causal observable ÔT=(×t∈T Xt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂T )
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Thus, we have themeasurement theory(bounded·pure type) as follows.
measurement theory(bounded·pure type)
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
b
1]
(pure)measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
pm
b
2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
Therefore, we say that
The probability that a measured value (xt)t∈T obtained by a measurementML∞(Ωt0 ,νt0 )(ÔT= (×t∈T Xt,
⊠ t∈TFt, F̂T ), S[ωt0 ]) belongs to Ξ̂ (∈ ⊠ t∈TFt) is given by [F̂T (Ξ̂)](ωt0), if F̂T (Ξ̂) is essentially con-
tinuous at ωt0(∈ Ωt0).
♠ Note 11.3 By an analogy of Remark 6.19, we also get the measurement theory (bounded·mixed type) as
follows. That is,
measurement theory (bounded·mixed type)
(scientific language)
:=
[Axiom
p
b
1]
(mixed)measurement
[probabilistic interpretation]
+
[Axiom
pm
b
2]
causality
[the Heisenberg picture]
11.4 Is Brownian motion a motion?
It is natural to consider that
(A) Brownian motion should be understood in measurement theory.
Let us explain it as follows.
Let (Λ,FΛ, P ) be a probability space. For each λ ∈ Λ, define the real-valued continuous function
B(·, λ) : T (=[0,∞))→ R such that, for any t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < · · · < tn,
P ({λ ∈ Λ | B(tk, λ) ∈ Ξk ∈ BR (k = 1, 2, . . . , n)})
=
∫
Ξ1
(
· · · (
∫
Ξtn−1
(
∫
Ξtn
n×
k=1
G√tk−tk−1(ωk − ωk−1)dωn)dωn−1) · · ·
)
dω1 (11.1)
where, ω0 ∈ R, dωk is the Lebesgue measure on R, G√t(q) = 1√2πtexp
[
− q22t
]
.
Now consider the diffusion equation:
∂ρt(q)
∂t
=
∂2ρt(q)
∂q2
, (∀q ∈ R, ∀t ∈ T=[0,∞) )
By the solution ρt, we get predual operator {[Φt1,t2 ]∗ : L1(R, dq) → L1(R, dq)} as follows. That is, for
each ρt1 ∈ L1(R,m), define(
[Φt1,t2 ]∗(ρt1)
)
(q) = ρt2(q) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ρt1(y)G
√
t2−t1(q − y)m(dy) (∀q ∈ R, ∀(t1, t2) ∈ T 2≦)
For simplicity, we put (Ω,B, dω) = (Rq,B(Rq), dq). And therefore, put (N ,N∗) = (L∞(Ω, dω), L1(Ω, dω)).
Putting Φt1,t2 = ([Φt1,t2 ]∗)∗, we get the causal relation {Φt1,t2 | (t1, t2) ∈ T 2≤}. For each t ∈ T , consider
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the exact observable O
(exa)
t = (Ω,BΩ, F (exa)) in L∞(Ω, dω). Thus, we get the sequential causal exact
observable [OT ] = [{O(exa)t }t∈T ; {Φt1,t2 | (t1, t2) ∈ T 2≤}]. The Kolmogorov extension theorem (Theorem
9.21) says that OT has the realized causal observable Ôt0 = (Ω
T ,B(ΩT ), F̂t0 ) in L∞(Ω, dω).
Assume that
a measured value ω̂ (= (ωt)t∈T ∈ ΩT ) is obtained by ML∞(Ω)(Ôt0 , S[δω0 ]).
Let D = {t1, t2, · · · , tn} be a finite subset of T , where t0 = 0 < t1 < t2 < · · · < tn. Put Ξ̂ = ×Dt∈TΞt(∈ BR+) where Ξt = Ω (∀t /∈ D). Then, by Axiompmb 2, we see
the probability that ω̂( = (ωt)t∈T ) belongs to the set Ξ̂ ≡×Dt∈TΞt is given by [F̂t0(×Dt∈TΞt)](ω0)
where
[F̂t0(×Dt∈TΞt)](ω0)
=
(
F (Ξ0)Φ0,t1
(
F (Ξt1) · · ·Φtn−2,tn−1
(
F (Ξtn−1)
(
Φtn−1,tnF (Ξtn)
)) · · ·)(ω0)
=
∫
Ξ1
(
· · · (
∫
Ξtn−1
(
∫
Ξtn
×nk=1Gtk−tk−1(ωk − ωk−1)dωn)dωn−1) · · ·
)
dω1 (11.2)
which is equal to the (11.1).
Thus, we say that
The Brownian motion B(t, λ) is not a motion but a measured value. ( Some may recall Parmenides’
saying: There are no “plurality”, but only “one”. And therefore, there is no movement. )
♠ Note 11.4 The above argument gives an answer to the problem (Chap. 1(F5)(=Note 1.1(♯2)) ), i.e.,
Why is a mathematical theory (i.e., Brownian motion, stochastic process) useful?
That is,
Behind Brownian motion, the world-view (called classical measurement theory) is hidden
In this sense, Nelson’s probabilistic quantization may be the confusion of the order of things. Also, recall
Note 2.17 as follows. Therefore, for example,
mathematics world-description method
differential geometry the theory of relativity
differential equation Newton mechanics, electromagnetism
Hilbert space quantum mechanics
probability theory
(Hilbert space)
measurement theory
11.5 Exact measurement of deterministic sequential causal operator and the
Schro¨dinger picture
The Copenhagen interpretation — Chap. 1(U4) — says that ”only one measurement is permitted”, which
implies ”State does not change”.
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However, as mentioned in Sec.6.4.4, as a convenient method, we sometimes use the state change due
to the Schro¨dinger picture.
Definition 11.7 [State change — the Schro¨dinger picture] Let {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2) → L∞(Ωt1),
νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ be a deterministic causal relation with the deterministic causal maps φt1,t2 : Ωt1 → Ωt2
(∀(t1, t2) ∈ T 2≦). Let ωt0 ∈ Ωt0 be an initial state. Then, the {φt0,t(ωt0)}t∈T (or, {δφt0,t(ωt0)}t∈T is called
the Schro¨dinger picture representation.
The following is similar to Theorem 6.18
Theorem 11.8 [Deterministic sequential causal operatorrealized causal observable ] Let (T (t0), ≦ )
be a tree with the root t0. Let [OT ] = [{Ot}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 :  L∞(Ωt2 , νt2) → L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ] be a
deterministic sequential observable. Then, the realization Ôt0 ≡ (×t∈TXt, ⊠ t∈TFt, F̂t0) is represented
by
Ôt0 = ×
t∈T
Φt0,tOt
That is, it holds that
[F̂t0(×
t∈T
Ξt )](ωt0) = ×
t∈T
[Φt0,tFt(Ξt)](ωt0) = ×
t∈T
[Ft(Ξt)](φt0,tωt0)
(∀ωt0 ∈ Ωt0 , ∀Ξt ∈ Ft)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 6.18.
Theorem 11.9 Let [OT (t0)] = [{O(exa)t }t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2) → L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ] be a de-
terministic sequential exact observable, which has the deterministic causal maps φt1,t2 : Ωt1 → Ωt2
(∀(t1, t2) ∈ T 2≦). And let Ôt0 = (×t∈T Xt,×t∈T Ft, F̂T ) be its realized causal observable in L∞(Ωt0 , νt0).
Assume that the measured value (xt)t∈T is obtained by ML∞(Ωt0 )(ÔT = (×t∈T Xt,×t∈T Ft, F̂0), S[ωt0 ]).
Then, we surely believe that
xt = φt0,t(ωt0) (∀t ∈ T )
Thus, we say that, as far as a deterministic sequential observable,
exact measured value (xt)t∈T = the Schro¨dinger picture representation (φt0,t(ωt0))t∈T
Proof. Let D = {t1, t2, . . . , tn}(⊆ T ) be any finite subset of T . Put Ξ̂ = ×Dt∈TΞt = (×t∈D Ξt) ×
(×t∈T\DXt), where Ξt ⊆ Xt(= Ωt) is an open set such that φt0,t(ωt0) ∈ Ξt (∀t ∈ D). Then, we see that
the probability that the measured value (xt)t∈T belongs to Ξ̂ =×Dt∈TΞt is equal to 1.
That is because Theorem 11.8 says that(
F̂T (Ξ̂)
)
(ωt0) =
( n×
k=1
(
Φt0,tkF
(exa)(Ξtk)
))
(ωt0)
=
( n×
k=1
F (exa)(φ−1t0,tk(Ξtk)
))
(ωt0) =
n×
k=1
χ
Ξtk
(φt0,tk(ωt0)) = 1
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Thus, from the arbitrarity of Ξt, we surely believe that
(c) (xt)t∈T = φt0,t(ωt0) (∀t ∈ T )
♠ Note 11.5 Note that ”(b) ⇔(c)” in the above. That is, (b) is the definition of (c).
The following is a consequence of Theorem 10.12 and Theorem 11.9.
Corollary 11.10 [Quantity and exact observable]. For each t ∈ T (t0), consider the exact observable
O
(exa)
t = (X,Ft, F (exa))(= (Ωt,Bt, χ)) in L∞(Ωt, νt) and a quantity gt : Ωt → R on Ωt. Let O′t =
(R,BR, Gt) be the observable representation of the quantity gt in L∞(Ωt). Assuming the simultaneous
observableO
(exa)
t ×O′t, define the sequential observable [OT (t0)] = [{O(exa)t ×O′t}t∈T , {Φt1,t2 : L∞(Ωt2 , νt2)→
L∞(Ωt1 , νt1)}(t1,t2)∈T 2≦ ]. Let φt1,t2 : Ωt1 → Ωt2 (∀(t1, t2) ∈ T
2
≦
) be the deterministic causal map. Let Ôt0
=
(×t∈T (Xt×R),×t∈T (Ft×BR), F̂t0) be the realized causal observable. Thus, we have the measurement
ML∞(Ωt0 )(Ôt0 , S[ωt0 ]). Let (xt, yt)t∈T be the measured value obtained by the measurement ML∞(Ωt0 )(Ôt0 ,
S[ωt0 ]). Then, we can surely believe that
xt = φt0,t(ωt0) and yt = gt(φt0,t(ωt0)) (∀t ∈ T )
♠ Note 11.6 As mentioned in Note 1.7, ”linguistic monism” is not yet established, or it may not exist. If it
exists, it may have the following form:
(♯) monistic linguistic world-description method := monistic description
[Sec.1.2.2]
+ causality : {φt1,t2}t1≦t2
[Corollary 11.10]
However, it may be regarded as the abbreviation of measurement theory. That is, the (♯) is absorbed into
measurement theory.
Before reading Answer 11.11 ( Zeno’s paradox(flying arrow) ), confirm Standing point 3.5 in Chap. 3.
That is,
(d) The theory described in ordinary language should be described in measurement theory. That is
because almost ambiguous problems are due to the lack of ”world-view”.
the fact that
Answer11.11 [Answer to Problem 11.1: Zeno’s paradox(flying arrow) ] Let us answer to Problem
11.1(flying arrow)(cf. [18]). As mentioned in Sec.11.1(C6), There is only the method of describing by
measurement theory. Therefore, in Corollary 11.10, putting
q(t) = gt(φt0,t(ωt0))
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we get the time-position function q(t). Thus, it suffices to discuss Problem 11.1(B22) by the time-position
function.
(e) If Zeno asks ”Why do you use measurement theory?”, it suffices to answer ”We have only measure-
ment theory”.
♠ Note 11.7 Thus, we add ”Zeno’s paradoxes” to Sec.9.3(a), as follows.
(a)
(Sec.9.3)
measurement theory

quantum
quantum phenomena−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (quantum engineering)
classical
ordinary phenomena−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (statistical mechanics, economics,
flying arrow · · · )
♠ Note 11.8 In quantum measurement theory, the time-position function does not exist (that is, the trajectory
of a particle is meaningless. For the further argument, see [21].
Example 11.12 [Newtonian mechanics in measurement theory] Let T = R be the time axis.
Newtonian equation (9.1) on the state space Ω determines the continuous map φt1,t2 : Ωt1(= Ω) →
Ωt2(= Ω) (t1 ≦ t2). The formula (9.2) says that there exists the measure ν(= νt) on the state space
Ω(= Ωt) such that
ν(Dt1) = ν(φ
−1
t1,t2(Dt1)) (∀Dt1 ∈ BΩt1 ) (11.3)
Therefore, by Theorem 11.5, we get a sequential deterministic causal map {φt1,t2 : Ωt1(= Ω) → Ωt2(=
Ω)}t1 ≦ t2 . Thus, in Newtonian mechanics, Theorem 11.9 says that
the exact measured value sequence = state change due to the Schro¨dinger picture
Thus we say, from the measurement theoretical point of view, that Newtonian equation does not represent
the motion but the time series of exact measured values. In this sense, Newtonian mechanics can be
regarded as one of various sciences and not physics.
♠ Note 11.9 In the above argument, Newtonian equation has two aspects as That is,
motion

1© : Newtonian equation in physics · · ·state change
2© : Newtonian equation in measurement theory · · · exact measured value sequence
Example 11.13 [1 + 1 = 2 ? ] It is a famous anecdote that; when Thomas Edison, the greatest-ever
inventor, was a school child, he made the question: “Why does 1+ 1 = 2 hold?” on his teacher, and made
the teacher embarrassed. Although we do not know his real intention, we consider, from the measurement
theoretical point of view, that this question is not so trivial. Consider the following 1© – 3©:
11 AXIOMPM
B
2 - CAUSALITY (BOUNDED TYPE) 170
1©: What is 1 plus 1? Is 1 + 1 = 2 true?
2©: Assume that a particle A with the mass 1kg ans a particle B with the mass 1kg are are combined.
Then, how weight the combined particle (i.e., A+B) ?
3©: Assume that the exact measured value of the mass of a particle A is 1kg and the exact measured
value of the mass of a particle B is 1kg. Then, the exact measured value of the mass of the combined
particle (i.e., A+B) is equal to 2kg. Is it true?
Answer: From the mathematical point of view, the equality in 1© is merely a mathematical rule. In
physics, the 2© is just the law of conservation of mass. Thus we focus on the measurement theoretical
aspect 3©, in which the equality is not trivial. The proof is as follows.
[ The proof of 3©]: Consider the Lebesgue measure space (Ω1,BΩ1 , ν1) = (R,BR,m) and its product
measure space (Ω0,BΩ0 , ν0) = (R2,BR2 ,m2). Let Ω0 and Ω1 be state spaces. Put
(the mass of a particle A, the mass of a particle A ) ∈ Ω0(=R× R)
(for simplicity, assume that negative mass is possible). By the law of conservation of mass, define the
continuous map φ0,1 : Ω0 → Ω1 by φ0,1(α, β) = α+ β (∀(α, β) ∈ R× R). The following is clear:
D1 ∈ BΩ1(= BR), m(D1) = 0 =⇒ m2(φ−10,1(D1)) = 0
Thus, Theorem 11.5 says that the continuous map φ0,1 : Ω0 → Ω1 is a deterministic causal map. And
thus, the deterministic causal operator Φ0,1 : L
∞(Ω1, ν1)→ L∞(Ω0, ν0) is defined by
[Φ0,1(f1)](ω0) = f1(φ0,1(ω0)) (∀f1 ∈ L∞(Ω1, ν1), a.e. ω0)
Consider the exact observableO
(exa)
0 in L
∞(Ω0, ν0) and the exact observableO
(exa)
1 in L
∞(Ω1, ν1). And con-
sider the realized causal observable O˜0 = O
(exa)
0 ×Φ0,1O(exa)1 . Taking the measurementML∞(Ω0,ν0)(O(exa)1 ×
Φ0,1O
(exa)
1 , S[(α,β)]), we obtain a measured value ((α0, β0), γ0). Then, by Theorem 11.9, we see, with prob-
ability 1,
(α0, β0) = (α, β) and γ0 = α+ β
Therefore, we see that α0 + β0 = γ0.
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12 Realistic world-view and Linguistic world-view
This chapter describes the conclusion of measurement theory in there comparison of mathematics, physics,
and various sciences(engineering).
12.1 Mathematics, Physics, Various Sciences·Engineering
12.1.1 Language
If the ecology of various animals is observed, it will be clear that the base of language was due to intimi-
dation · solidarity · reproduction. Language was one of the strongest arms for the survival and breeding.
Such a time have continued for millions of years. Of course, the greatest incidents happened in ”the history
of language”, for example, ”a rhythm and a song”, ”logical structure”, a ”quantity concept”, ”grammar”,
”tense”, a ”character”, etc. However, it was too long years ago, we cannot specify the contribution person’s
name.
12.1.2 Mathematics - The language independent of the world.
When human beings began to have some confidence in ”survival and breeding”, people who get interested in
the ”quantity concept” in ordinary language unusually have appeared. Probably, it is good also considering
the pioneer as Pythagoras — everything is a number. This flow was inherited to Archimedes (BC287 –
BC 212 years), Euler (1707 – 1783), and a gauss (1777 - 1855), and the ”quantitative portion” in ordinary
language was strengthened rapidly. That is, the mathematical achievement was accumulated rapidly.
However, language makes survival and breeding the origin as mentioned above,
(a) Ordinary language was not devised in order to tell mathematics.
It will be Cantor (1845 year–1918 year) that noticed, if it considers from now on. Therefore, Cantor made
the special language - set theory (that is, ”the mathematical origin is set”) - for describing mathematics.
Of course, this was inherited to Hilbert (1862 – 1943) or Godel (1906 – 1978), and brought about the
prosperity of modern mathematics. However, it should be careful that the axiomatization of mathematics
clarifies that mathematics is independent of our real world, as symbolized by Hilbert’s words ”a point may
be a chair and a line may be a desk”. Though that is right, the custom to consider that statistics and
dynamical system is a part of ordinary language continues to go out of use as a convenient and easy way.
12.1.3 Physics - realistic science view (the world is before language)
If a time is traced back, although Demokritos (around BC370 - BC460 ) — The origin of everything is an
atom — may be famous, I will start with modern science, for example. Of course, work of Galileo (1564 –
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1642) and Kepler (1571 year–1630 year) is admired. However, language makes survival and breeding the
origin,
(b) Ordinary language was not devised in order to tell physical phenomena.
Newton (1642 – 1727) found out it. Therefore, Newton made the languages of special — Newtonian
mechanics — for describing a classical mechanics phenomenon. This was inherited to Maxwell (1831 –
1879), Einstein (1879 – 1955), etc., and brought about a great success of the realistic science view. And
imprinting, such as ”realistic science view = science”, has become common by the great success.
12.1.4 Various sciences (engineering) - linguistic science view (language is before world.)
When you understand various matters in the world, it is always a given occasion, and if thought individually,
naturally you think that it is troublesome. Therefore, the plan to consider is decided previously, and when
various matters are faced, I would like to come to depend on the method of considering along with the
plan. That is, in order to have understood various matters in the world, when there was ”form of common
thinking”, many philosophers must have believed and investigated. The pioneer is Plato (BC 427 – BC
347 )- Idealism -, and he advocated the prototype of dualism and idealism. This was inherited to Descartes
(1596 – 1650) and Kant (1724 – 1804), and the spirit of ”language is before the world”. - Linguistic science
view - was further established very much by linguistic philosophy. It is as having seen in Chapter 8 that
these formed the philosophical (= world description) main stream.
However, in respect of the technology of an understanding of various matters in the world, probably,
we have to stress the importance of ”the method of the classical mechanics world view”. Although we
can not say the name of the founders, Fischer (1890 – 1962), Robert Wiener (1894 – 1964), Kolmogorov
(1903 – 1987 year 1), Kalman (1930 –), etc. should be mentioned especially. The two (i.e., ”the form
of thinking(philosophy)” and ”the classical mechanics world view (technology)”) have been independent.
From this unfortunate fact, various sciences were classified into the category of ”the weak thing” in Section
2.4.1. The reason which has fallen into such a situation is reasonable for thinking that it originates in
(c) Ordinary language was not devised in order to tell usual scientific phenomena
Although I do not know whether von Neumann (1903 – 1957) was conscious of this (c), as a result, von
Neumann proposed the quantum measurement theory — at the meaning of Section 9.3, dualism idealism
— based on Copenhagen interpretation in ”the mathematical basis of quantum mechanics [32]” And von
Neumann’s work was inherited and the languages of special make for describing the scientific phenomena
of an everyday scale - Measurement theory - were proposed in this book.
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Two things unexpected as follows happened to Measurement theory.
(d1) Suppose that the method of ”considering along with the plan when the plan considered previously
is decided and various matters are faced” as mentioned above was adopted. Since various sciences
are various, it is a matter of course that even if such a plan exists, it is an non-quantitative plan and
the number of the plans increases considerably moreover. However, the plan of Measurement theory
was only two quantitative plans (i.e., Axioms 1 and 2).
(d2) The family line of Measurement theory was quantum mechanics. And measurement theory has been
saddled with ”two kinds of absurd character”as stated repeatedly. Namely,
(♯) ”Absurd character” of Measurement Theory{
Idealism · · · Linguistic science view
Dualism · · · Copenhagen interpretation (i.e., dualism)
That such measurement theory is materialized is a mystery which is hard to believe. However, since
this is a proposal of this book, the elucidation of this mystery must be left to readers as ”homework
to readers.” The author does not know the thing beyond having stated with Section 9.3.
12.1.5 Mathematics, Physics, Various sciences (engineering)
The above is summarized and the next is obtained. (Note 2.10, Note 9.6 ).
(e)

0© : Mathematical language · · · Set theory
(The proposal and solution of mathematical outstanding problems )
1© : languages of physics · · ·Newtonian mechanics, electromagnetism,...
(Realistic science view: Theory which explains what God made )
2© : language of engineering · · ·Measurement theory
(Linguistic science view: The language for making about the same robot as a scientist )
About 0© and 2©, following some will need to keep in mind that there is probably no complaint about
physics 1©. Even if it does not know set theory etc., mathematical outstanding problems may be solved,
and even if it does not know Measurement theory (for example, set theory does not seem to have been
indispensable in order to solve the four colors problem), ”about the same robot as a scientist” may be
made(Note 2.10). Even if it says so,
If the foundation is established with languages of special make, ”rapid development” should become
possible and each language (set theory and measurement theory) of special make must be required
also for 0© and 2©.
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13 Conclusions
It is a matter of course, ordinary language is the greatest invention of mankind However, science cannot be
ripened only with ordinary language. For that purpose, the world describing method is indispensable. And,
it is always continuing evolving and developing toward the direction of ”saving of thinking.” Supposing
that is right, I claimed ”evolution and development of world description” of the following figure (= Fig.
8.2).
0© ordinary language
(what is world?)
Parmenides−−−−−−−−→
Heracreitos
Sec.6.1,Sec.11.1.1
how to describe motion
(Zeno’s paradoxes)
−→
Sec.6.1
causality
(Galilro, Bacon, DEcartes)
−→
−→

Kant −−−−−−−−−−−→
Sec.8.1
linguistic philosohy −−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Sec.8.1
(classical mechanical world-view)
statistics:(trial) ←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
abbreviation
(language)
measurement theory
(idealism)
Newton −→

state equation method(Chap. 1(E1))
(the causal world-view)
quantum mechanics
Sec.3.1
−→

(1)
(linguistic)
−−−−−−−−−→
Sec.3.2
(2)
(realistic)
−−−−−→
the theory of relativity
(Einstein)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
✻
❄
(missing link)
 −→
(physics)
the theory of everything
(realism)
[realistic world-view(unsolved)]
[linguistic world-view]
Figure 13.1: The development of the world-descriptions(=Fig. 8.2)
If this is summarized (i.e., if the ”beginning” and the ”last” are written), we say that
(X1)
(Chap. 1)
0© widely ordinary language
(before science)
=⇒ world-description
(Chap. 1(O))

2©linguistic scientific language (measurement theory)
(The language for making about the same robot as a scientist)
1©realistic scientific language (the theory of everything)
(Theory which explains what God made )
Although there was 3000 years of history in world description, a major event didnot necessarily break
out frequently. It has occurred only about at most 10 times, and, as fa as about the linguistic describing
method, the major event (discovery of = mystic words) has occurred only 5 times. Namely,
(B)
(time-position function)
motion·change
[Sec. 11.1]
,
[State equation ]
causality (1)
Sec.6.1
, trial
[Sec. 4.1]
, measurement
[Axiom 1 ]
, causality (2)
[Axiom 2 ]
,
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Even if we have to add the gradually ripe process of dualistic idealism (Sec. 8.1), it can be said that it was
quite peaceful history. If Fig. 13.1 is followed, we would like to come to claim a scenario called
(C) the happy end of a big tale
in the sense that both the linguistic world-view and the realistic world-view are compatible.
Of course, the above is only one scenario. In order to make this scenario steadfast (or it overthrows),
I would like to come to pursue the following problem:
(D) Why does the metaphysics of Measurement theory hold?
The answers were given to various miscellaneous mistily problems in this book. For example,
(E) [What is sapce (or, time, causality, probability ?]
(Sec. 2.3.3, Note 6.2)
, [Heisenberg’s uncertaty relation]
(Theorem 3.4)
,
[sillogizm]
(Theorem 5.11)
, [the priciple of equal weight]
(Theorem 6.21)
,
[equilibrium statistical mechanics]
(Chap. 9)
, [1+1=2]
(Chap. 11)
, [Zeno’s paradoxes]
(Chap. 11)
were clarified.
(F) The answer to the question ”Why can the problems in (E) be solved?” is clear. That is because
these problems are the same problem, i.e., the problem ”Propose the language for describing these
problems!”.
Thus, the problems in (E) are easy exercises in measurement theory. Though that was right, possibly
readers had the following comment.
(G) The opinion of this book - establishment of a linguistic science view - was understood once. However,
what the author did is that a variety of miscellaneous mistily problems only come back to the one
biggest mistily problem such as
Is it possible that metaphysics is introduced as a base of various sciences?
However, it is the same as that of Newtonian mechanics, electromagnetism, or the theory of relativity, that
is, we believe that
(H) A scientific theory is returning various miscellaneous mysteries to one big mystery.
Since mathematics and physics are the learning of God (namely, learning common to whole creation
people) , the reason for the formation is substituted for a word of a ”miracle”, and the rest may be what
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to leave to the high alien. However, measurement theory is man’s learning (namely, learning depending
on man’s recognition and linguistic competence), so man may reply to (D).
Although it was above, possibly the author’s interest ( namely, about (D)) was written too much. What
was necessary was to have said only the following things, supposing that was right.
(I) Measurement theory was not made for ”the happy end (C) of a big tale” ( or for the rehabilitation
of the Descartes-Kant philosophy). If an author’s spirit is written honestly,
In the time of the engineering which will continue four hundreds years from now on, in order
to defeat the battle which risked survival of human beings(Sec. 2.4.2(e) , (f)) , measurement
theory was made as the scripture of engineering and science. (Note 9.7)
I solved outstanding and ambiguous problems (E) since I wanted to have the courage to add this
spirit to this final chapter.
If that is right, what should be performed now is the next.
(J) Under the belief (F), in a language called measurement theory, phenomena are described rapidly and
engineering and science are developed rapidly.
Since measurement theory is a language,
Measurement theory is valueless if not used.
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